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West Europe Report

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MILAN PEACE MOVEMENT CONFERENCE ON EAST-WEST DIALOGUE

Milan L'OTTAVO GIORNO in *Italian* Vol 6, Jun 84 pp 8-15

[Introductory address by Jiri Pelikan: "Working Toward a Dialogue" at the Milan Peace Movement Conference on East-West Dialogue, published under cover heading "Thoughts on Peace"; date of address not given; passages enclosed in slantlines are printed in italics]

[Text] The conference was held with the significant support of the League for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples.

We thank the Milan Municipality and the CGIL-ICFTU-UIL [Italian Union of Labor] Confederation for their participation in the organization of the conference.

First of all, I would like to thank all of you who have accepted the invitation of the three magazines L'OTTAVO GIORNO, CRITICA SOCIALE and LISTY to take part in this dialogue--or confrontation, if you prefer--between the representatives of the independent peace movements of East and West. We are aware of the difficulties of choosing interlocutors, because objective criteria of representativeness in this field do not exist. Therefore, each one will speak from a personal viewpoint, based also on the experience of the movement of which he or she is a member, but without transforming our conference into a small UN Assembly where each one defends the position of his or her "government" and where instead of a dialogue there is only a series of monologues.

We are glad that assembled here in Milan are citizens from almost every European country and from the United States as well, although some persons, either because of previous engagements or the impossibility of leaving their own country, have not been able to join us. We therefore have a solid base for an exchange of views and a sincere and open discussion; at the same time, we hope to see prevail a spirit of tolerance and respect for the different positions that may emerge.

I must say immediately that with this initiative it is not our intention to create another peace movement or a new organization. Our purpose is to iden-

tify the views that are /common/ to those who work for peace in the countries of the East and the West and the points on which they /differ/. At the same time, though, we do not want a discussion for its own sake. Our intent is to try, together with you and on the basis of the views common to all, to develop joint actions, and to find, if possible, /a format for the continuation of this dialogue/.

We do not claim for this dialogue any monopoly or right of primacy. On the contrary, our initiative has been based on many meetings, bilateral discussions, appeals by various groups, movements and leaders, from the East as well as the West, which underscore the need for such dialogue and for a linkage among peace movements in both parts of Europe. We therefore consider our conference a phase of this process and a contribution to its expansion.

For this reason, it is not a matter of discussing only the start of a dialogue and of that linkage but of also discussing /their forms and content/, based on your own first-hand experience as well as that of those who cannot be present but have sent us their messages and documents.

First of all, my thoughts are drawn to the appeals for a dialogue that have been received in the West from the East Europeans: From the KOS [expansion unknown] in Poland, from Charter '77 in Czechoslovakia, from leaders in the GDR through representatives of the Environmental League, the "Appeal for a Dialogue" from Vienna, the appeal of the Western pacifists extended together with the signatories of Charter '77 at Prague in June of this year, and many others published in the various Western newspapers. Frankly, we must also say that /these appeals have not met with their due response within the Western peace movement. We must now try to see if we can give a new impetus to this dialogue and move from bilateral agreements to common agreements and actions that could involve the independent movements of the West and East concurrently, even though in differentiated forms owing to the different conditions existing in the two parts of Europe.

In our opinion, a dialogue and cooperation of this type must be based on a few essential points:

1. The principle of universality of the fight for peace, for disarmament and against nuclear missiles, or, if you like, the principle of /symmetry/ between the pressure of public opinion in the Western countries and that in the Eastern countries. To become credible and effective, the peace movement must exercise equal pressure on both camps, on the NATO governments as well as those of the Warsaw Pact. We all know that precisely here lies the weakness of the movement because today one can demonstrate in Bonn, Rome, Paris, London and Washington, but cannot demonstrate in Prague, Warsaw, Budapest and East Berlin.

It is clear that the fault is not on the part of the Western peace movements and that these circumstances must not hinder their actions in regard to their own governments. But it is in the Western peace movement's own interest to

exert all forms of pressure such as can render it possible for the citizens of the Eastern countries to also express their opinions on the problems of peace, different though they may be from those of their governments.

It is not sufficient to shout against cruise missiles and Pershings and against the SS-20's here in the West when the same demands and aspirations cannot be expressed in the other half of Europe, in the countries under the control of the USSR. It is not a purely moral requirement but, on the contrary, a very concrete one, because without equal and simultaneous pressure on both camps a concrete result is out of the question. As Sylos Labini said in the debate published in UNITA of 21 October 1983, "The movement will always appear one-sided, until ways are found to pressure the East as well."

This brings us to the first question that I put to the participants of this conference: What forms of pressure can be proposed by the Western peace movement and by independent groups and movements working in the Eastern countries, such as will help bring public pressure to bear on the governments of the Warsaw Pact countries as well?

2. The principle of political /plurality/, the principle, that is, that peace is the overriding value affecting all citizens and all peoples, and that as such it cannot be identified with a particular party or ideology, but must be open to all who wish to make their contribution. Nor can the struggle for peace be limited to peace movements, because for various reasons there can be citizens who want to work for peace outside the organized movement. It would be a repetition of the errors of the sectarianism of the 1950's to consider "indifferent" or worse yet "enemies of peace" those persons who do not march for peace or who do not belong to an organized movement, and to claim that only those belonging to peace movements have the right to intervene in the problems of peace.

This political plurality exists in the majority of the Western peace movements, in which several political forces participate, with diverse views but jointly committed to specified essential and common aims, in the struggle for peace. When a certain movement is dominated by a particular party or political leaning, another one can be created, or a person can simply remain outside the movement. But in the Eastern countries, these choices are non-existent, and only official peace movements, participation in which is often forced and which fully support the government's policy and the party in power, are tolerated. For this reason, we must defend political pluralism also in the Eastern countries; that is to say that peace movements, independent of the regime's official movement must be able to rise, but that no existing or newly created group must pretend to be the sole representative of that country's public opinion or of the peace movement.

This brings us to the second question: What can the Western peace movements do to support the just demands of the citizens of the East who seek the right to concern themselves with peace problems and to express their views even if these differ from those of the government? Is it possible to demand that one or more independent peace movements be allowed to rise in the Eastern coun-

tries and, in case of refusal, to suspend all relations with those countries and with their official peace committees?

3. The aim of the various peace movements must not be just any peace, but a peace that guarantees to peoples the right of self-determination, and to citizens the civil rights that will enable them to live as free men with dignity. A peace based on military occupation, on suppression of national independence and human dignity, on repression, is not a true peace; on the contrary, it creates a tension that ultimately threatens the peace, both inside a country and outside it at the international level, as we see today, for example, in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central America, but also in Central and Eastern Europe, as in the cases of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1981. Our aim, therefore, is a peace not founded on freezing the present situation, but on the contrary, on going beyond it and changing it, to permit peoples to decide their own destiny.

We arrive here at another controversy that is reflected also in the peace movements: The meaning of /international detente/. For some, detente means the confirmation of the political status quo in Europe as it emerged from the Yalta conference, or rather from Stalin's unilateral interpretation of the conference, which was subsequently more or less accepted by the Western countries. But this concept of detente leaves half of Europe under the hegemony of the USSR, and all of Europe divided into two opposing blocs, each controlled by "its" superpower. Instead, for us the concept of detente consists of going beyond the political status quo to open a gradual and nonviolent process, within which even the smallest countries can choose their own way without the danger of a military intervention by the USSR or economic pressure by the United States. But I would also like to emphasize that we cannot compare the political and military influence of the United States in Europe with the theory and practice of the restricted sovereignty imposed by Russia on the East European countries. This problem is sometimes underestimated by the proponents of the Western peace movement. In Western Europe, with our political democracy and political and union rights, we can fight for our independence, and forward strides have been made by our governments by way of the European Community. In Eastern Europe, from 1948 to the present, the most elementary rights to national independence have been suppressed by force.

This raises another question for us all: How should we interpret Mitterrand's well-known dictum "Get out from under Yalta"? And how are we to initiate this process, first of all in Europe? By strengthening the integration of Europe within the framework of the European Community and extending it to the other Western countries? But how are we to open it also to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe?

What is the meaning of stability and to what extent are the movements for democratization and change, like the Prague Spring or the Hungarian uprising or the Polish workers movement in 1980-1981 /destabilizing/, according to some on the European Right and also some on the European Left?

4. From the preceding guidelines, the need emerges for a direct linkage between the struggle for peace and the one for the civil rights, self-determination and national independence of peoples. But precisely on the issue of this linkage there are two viewpoints; two opposing positions have been taken, one within the Western peace movement and the other in the Eastern countries. In the first of these cases, a segment of the peace movement, perhaps the majority, maintains that absolute priority must be accorded to the struggle against the installation of cruise and Pershing missiles in the West, because in this part of Europe pressure can be brought to bear on the governments, and the decisions of NATO (the "dual decision") can be changed, while in the Eastern countries this is not possible. In addition, some leaders of the peace movement maintain that while opposition to the missiles represents a very broad-based platform, the issues of civil rights and self-determination of peoples could divide the movement, and that it is therefore better to put the latter issues aside. Many Western pacifists who sincerely aspire to a Europe without blocs are convinced that a West European neutralism could foster a relaxation of pressure by the USSR on the satellite countries and enable what is called a process of "Finlandization" and a democratization of the communist systems to set in. But in truth, the USSR has interpreted the Helsinki agreements on detente in Europe not as an opportunity to relax its pressure on the Eastern countries, but as its "historic" right to maintain the status quo. The coup d'etat in Poland has been a bitter lesson. The USSR, with its military pressure on Europe, wants to instill fear and prevent the creation in the Western world of a political movement with the courage to back resolutely the Eastern countries' right to independence. This is a problem that the Western pacifists must address.

On the other hand, some independent movements or their leaders in the Eastern countries feel that the most urgent problem is the defense of civil rights, which are guaranteed now also by the Helsinki agreements among states, and instead look upon the Western peace movement with a certain suspicion, accusing it of crediting the USSR with a policy favoring peace, of only weakening the West and thus encouraging the "hard-liners" within the Soviet regime, and moreover, of abandoning the citizens of the East to repression by totalitarian governments. We must ask ourselves if it is true that the peace movement can be split on the issue of civil rights, and, if the answer is yes, what are the roots of that attitude and what can be done to overcome this self-limitation.

5. We come now to the problem of the criticism that is very often voiced by our friends in the Eastern countries, namely, that the Western peace movement concentrates too much on the missiles and neglects the fight for general disarmament. There is an element of truth in this criticism in that in this way the danger of a war with conventional weapons and intercontinental missiles that can hit not only the territories of the USSR and the United States, but also any place in Europe, is being disregarded. I think these objections are valid, but it is also important to assess the central role being played by this struggle against medium-range missiles, namely, SS-20's, Pershings and cruise missiles. These missiles are often portrayed as demoniacal bearers of the holocaust, and in this way a atmosphere of terror is created. It seems to me that their true purpose is a political one, a means of perpetuating

drag the doctrine of linkage. The installation of these missiles has resulted in a) preventing the peoples of Europe from questioning the political status and the fear of catastrophic destruction; and b) strengthening the centrally administered and controlled character of the two blocs by the two superpowers. We must expect to learn the truth of the installation of the SS-20's on the USSR's European territory as well as the reason why the USSR refuses to destroy them.

Our ally France, her campaign against the cruise and Pershing missiles is motivated only on condition that it also be waged, at the same time and with the same vigor, against the SS-20's on the USSR's European territory and against other to-beby Soviet missiles on the territories of the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

If the Western peace movement is not able to find new ways of pressuring the USSR into destroying the SS-20 missiles, or if it accepts a status of minority party on the eastern and western sectors of Europe, we cannot hope to achieve a positive result in our campaign against the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe. In this case, a segment of public opinion will follow the lead of the peace movement, because it will feel threatened by the USSR's pressure and military superiority.

At the last question is: Who are and could be the partners in the dialogue and co-operation of the Western peace movement in the Eastern countries? Initially, there has been an inflated talk of the "reawakening" of peace movements in the East of Europe in 1977, and the topic is frequently being used as a premise for the defense of a certain unilaterality in the peace movement. Naturally, we are all glad that in the vast chorus for peace some voices from the East are also being heard. But this positive and encouraging development does not hide the reality that in the Eastern countries a genuine independent movement cannot be developed.

According to Hungarian prefects, Ferenc Koszegi, sees three categories of peace movements in the Eastern countries:

a) the official committees that work to popularize the policy of the government and are part of the drive belts of the communist party machine;

b) the unofficial movements backed, however, by the Church, even if not officially recognized, as in the GDR and Hungary;

c) the unofficial movements and groups based on the social initiative of individuals, as the Charter '77, Hungary's Dialogus, Poland's KOS and the Council Councils for Trust Between the United States and the USSR.

After the previous discussion on how the Western peace movement should act towards the official peace committees in the Eastern countries: As to whether to establish contact with them or refuse any contact with them considering their dependence on the government. Opinions on this question differ, in the Western countries as well as the Eastern countries. In June of this year we

saw that Charter '77 was prepared to discuss with the official committee the possibility of the former's participation in the World Peace Conference which was to be held in Prague, but the result was negative. Hungary's Evangelical Church, on the other hand, favored a dialogue with the official committee. Other similar peace endeavors totally useless.

On the Western side there is a viewpoint like that of Professor Torgler, according to which one can talk with these committees but on condition that one defend one's own views and the right of citizens of the Eastern bloc to also express independent views ("We do not ask the permission of anyone, not his subordinates to speak with citizens on the other side") that is, meetings and dialogue with the official committees and also with other groups and movements, as the Dutch IKV (expansion unknown) did in the case of Hungary. Another example is the line of contact followed by Hans Bartel, international secretary of the IKV and present here at our meeting, who walked out of an international meeting in 1982 in Moscow (USSR) without standing prior promises, he was prevented from speaking at the meeting of Solidarnosc. His action was judged very positively by the Polish Solidarnosc bloc and by one segment of the Western peace movement, while another segment has criticized it.

It is often said that one can, out of courtesy, accept the invitation of an official peace committee of an Eastern country, then just speak with persons who are considered by that committee to be its "opponents." It would be useful to exchange our experiences in this regard.

While I am not categorically opposed to contacts with the official committees of the Eastern bloc, since we cannot deny that they represent the views of the governments concerned and also in some cases those of a broad section of opinion, it seems to me inadmissible to talk with them in order to be heard and to refuse to meet with the representatives of the independent movements in those countries. The latter category--that is, the independent movements or groups backed, indirectly as well, by the Churches--include, among others, the groups in the GDR and also in Hungary. But the GDR is a special case within the Eastern bloc, for two reasons: Unlike the other countries of the part of Europe, in the GDR there exists a pluralistic movement in regard to the problems of peace, since Western television and radio broadcasts, which discuss these problems in its own language, are heard throughout its territory. Consequently, its perceptions of the danger of nuclear war, and its factual knowledge, are decidedly positive. It must be added the influence of the Protestant Church, which is recognized by the government as an important partner and which through its various activities to a certain extent express independent views at least in the religious sphere. It would be interesting to hear from our friends in East Germany and from our friends in Poland, where the Church--in the latter case the Roman Catholic Church--has even greater influence, as to the reason for the existence of different attitudes, namely, a commitment by the Protestant Church in East Germany towards social problems, while in Poland the opposite is true.

The importance of the Church in the GDR made itself felt lately when NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, official organ of the SED [Unified Socialist Party of Germany] in the GDR, published some apprehensive letters concerning the decision of the Soviet government to deploy SS-20 missiles on the GDR's territory. A reaction of that magnitude has not been seen on the part of the Catholic or Protestant Churches in Czechoslovakia with regard to a topic of such pressing nature.

A very precious experience is represented by the attempt of the Hungarian group Dialogus (dialogue between East and West, dialogue among the countries of the Eastern bloc, dialogue within each Eastern country) to obtain formal recognition by the state as an independent organization able to dialogue with the state and the party, and therefore, in this way, to avoid the difficult choice between submitting to cooptation by the state and exclusion from the area of dissenting. Notwithstanding its efforts to achieve some form of cooperation and dialogue with the official council for peace and with members of the party, Dialogus decided, in mid-July of this year, to dissolve itself and seek alternative forms of peace in lives.

It would be very interesting to hear the protagonists of this initiative, like Hegedus and Rajk, who are present here, to understand the reasons for such a decision, which caught many pacifists by surprise who see Kadar's Hungary as a more open and independent terrain for peace activities--a decision that represents a serious loss in a very honest attempt to dialogue with the state in an Eastern country in the arena of peace.

The third category of independent movements founded on the social initiative of citizens comprises movements that did not start from the peace movement as such but rather from the hopes nurtured by the Helsinki Conference and from the need to defend human rights, including the fundamental right to life, but that later began to concern themselves with the problems of peace--such as Charter '77, Solidarity and KOS in Poland, the Committee for Oversight of the Helsinki Agreement in USSR (since the police suppression of the latter, other initiatives linked to the peace movement have emerged, such as Sergej Batovrin's Group for Trust). These groups and movements are not the sole representatives of the people and do not claim to be. They too want to dialogue with the government, make constructive proposals, express the desires of the citizens and open a debate, but the government treats them as opposition groups, rejects them, and persecutes them.

Despite the difficulties, we think that these groups and movements are valid interlocutors for the Western peace movement with which they seek dialogue and cooperation. It is a very positive forward step that numerous peace movements have established contacts with these groups in various ways: Through visits to the respective countries, exchanges of messages and experiences, the signing of bilateral agreements and acts of solidarity in cases of persecution of citizens of the Eastern bloc because of activities in favor of peace.

Even if we recognize that the peace movements are not intended to deal with all persecutions and violations of civil rights, I think the position of Professor Thompson is right: "We must clearly state that for us it is intolerable that in the East the independent voices in search of dialogue be persecuted and stifled." Unfortunately, examples are not lacking: I would like to recall the conviction of Ladislav Lis, one of the spokesmen of Charter '77, who tried to create an independent peace movement in Czechoslovakia and who is now in prison in very serious condition; /soviet pacifists like Oleg Razunovskij, those of the GDR like Jahn, and many others, who have been arrested and expelled from their own country.

It would be useful to hear the views of our Eastern friends and what, according to them, are the most effective ways of protest and solidarity available to the Western peace movement. In the West there is a widespread view that visits and public statements of support for the independent peace movement and its members can do harm to persons and that the most effective way is via discreet intervention through diplomatic channels or during meetings between Western and Eastern leaders. In my view there is no contradiction between the two lines of action and one does not exclude the other. But we must not forget that while through discreet and diplomatic interventions some personal cases can be resolved, the peace movement has the duty of defending the right of the citizens of the Eastern countries to express a different view from that of their government on the problems of peace. The defense of these principles must be carried on in a loud voice; otherwise, the Western peace movement, which is often portrayed on the state-owned television screens of the Eastern countries, loses its moral credibility.

Another question needing to be addressed concerns dramatic actions in the Eastern bloc by activists of the Western peace movements, against missiles, including the Soviet ones. For instance, we saw the Greens in East Berlin and the Italian Radicals in Prague and at the Czechoslovak borders. It would be useful to discuss whether these actions actually help the populations of those countries or whether they serve merely to publicize the peace movement in the Western countries. We should examine whether these solidarity actions would not be more effective if organized in cooperation with the groups or movements of those Eastern countries.

These are some of the questions awaiting sincere and certainly diverse answers from our meeting.

To conclude, let me phrase the question that many of you have certainly already put to yourselves before coming here: How can we continue this dialogue and maintain the bonds between us and many other forces and persons who for various reasons are unable to be present here but who have our same aspirations?

First of all, we can put this question to issue within the peace and political movements to which we are pledged. Then we can ask to have the issue of East-West dialogue introduced into the international conferences that are being readied in various European countries.

We can meet again next year, on a broader and better prepared basis, as is being proposed by some of our friends from Berlin who have discussed with many of us a plan for East-West dialogue. Lastly, we can begin to publish a simple bulletin in different languages, with all the documentation of the independent groups and peace movements in the Eastern countries, and also on all the concrete initiatives of the Western peace movement in support of the Eastern groups, putting all this information at the disposal of the peace movement as a whole.

I invite you, therefore, to talk about all these problems and proposals, with the sincerity, tolerance and solidarity that must characterize our common goal for a Europe without blocs, without missiles, without censorship and repression, as our contribution to world peace.

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COLLAPSED LEADERSHIP BLAMED FOR FISCAL CRISIS

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 12 Oct 84 p 29

[Article by Rudolf Wagner: "The Decay of Europe--Background and Causes of Current Financial Crisis Point to More Basic Problems"]

[Text] The European Community (EC) is in the midst of its most severe crisis: whether it will be its last remains to be seen. A few weeks before the end of its term, the EC-Commission has simply given up. Its president, Gaston Thorn from Luxembourg, could be using his remaining days in office to combat publicly attitudes of selfish nationalism, the narrow-minded mutterings of experts, or to search for the buried goals of a united Europe. What does he do instead? He only travels and gives speeches. He is usually ill-prepared to face controversies. He leaves official discussions to others and he can no longer cope with the daily pressures of office. The man is burned out or he may simply be tired from controversies whose course he has been unable to affect in a long time. While Thorn observes the slow decay of the EC as a spectator, Margaret Thatcher is an active participant. The British prime minister still has friends in Brussels who are not part of the Tory clique and therefore do not need to offer routine gestures of praise. They are grateful to Mrs Thatcher for being the first head of state or government who has applied a cost-effectiveness analysis to the Community's functions and consequently denounced important aberrations. She called for "fiscal discipline." The "Iron Lady" with unmerciful logic forced the Community to engage in fiscal reforms.

However, each new summit meeting from Athens to Fontainebleau has nourished doubts whether such British willfulness is to Europe's advantage. According to Mrs Thatcher's enemies--whose numbers increase every day--London is only interested in more money for itself rather than a reform which serves everybody. Great Britain wanted to join the EC because of the blessings of a trade and customs union and discovered to its amazement that it also profited through the Community's agrarian system. The British minister of agriculture was one of those who busily turned the price-and-production screw. British complaints about overproduction and financial wastefulness are therefore not always convincing.

Last week's meetings of the Luxembourg Council made it quite clear that the London government is eager to shoot down proposals for overcoming the crisis

without simultaneously offering solutions which have a chance of being approved by a majority of Community members. Boycott is not the right word for describing this policy which is looking for ways to realize Margaret Thatcher's objectives. The EC budget supplement for the coming year was unanimously approved at the last minute because it would allow London to receive the blocked DM 1.7 billion from the European Parliament.

The remaining members of the Community had to pay for approval of the 1985 budget--a rather dubious torso--by guaranteeing repayment of British contributions. So far nobody knows how the required DM 2.25 billion are to be raised. The Belgian Leo Tindemans, who has experience in such compromises, said: "The financial crisis is not over." The EC foreign ministers nevertheless congratulated each other for their cosmetic solution.

The EC crisis is one of leadership. The Council's presidency is in the hands of the Irish government whose EC policy has always been willful and ego-centric. The cliches in the statements of Dublin's Foreign Minister Peter Barry illustrate how he seesaws in serving national and Community interests. The Italians will take control after the turn of the year. Their ability to develop leadership qualities will depend on the time left for them after government crises and national navel-gazing as well as the Mafia.

French President Francois Mitterand, as a socialist within the conservative EC majority, is not in a good position and cannot cope with the economic and social problems in his own house. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl rapidly lost his role as a model. After a series of personal and political reversals in Bonn, he has lost any reputation as an effective European. Margaret Thatcher operates in isolation and it is being said more and more that interpersonal contacts with her are simply unpleasant.

The European Parliament should fill the power vacuum but is incapable of doing so. While EC budgetary law gives it the power, changing majorities see to it that a serious test of power is avoided. Pierre Pflimlin, Parliament's president, compromise; he will never inspire new convictions in anybody. The General Assembly has become more varied through the Greens and through radicals of the Right such as Jean-Marie Le Pens but its has not become more convincing in its development of objectives. The established European parties and their representatives are merely exhibiting their old and tired vigor.

Responsibility for the EC crisis does not only lie with individuals, institutions are also to blame. These institutions, by mutual agreement, were "rendered harmless" over the years. Since the end of the 60's the EC Council has set aside even urgently needed decisions if a single member of the Community threatens a veto. In the past decisions were made democratically by a majority--as intended by the Rome Treaties--so that the Community could maintain its own dynamic force. In the past the EC-Commission also wrote all draft resolutions for the Council meetings. Today, its documents are filed away. Meetings of undersecretaries, not provided

for in the treaties, are searching for the smallest common denominator of national consensus, parallel to the Commission which is accountable to Europe. Their minimal papers provide the basis for all minister conferences. In this manner experts had doomed the Athens summit meeting to failure from the beginning.

It has been the European experience in this erosion of the institutions that it pays to apply the brakes, because those who do are invariably rewarded with additional contribution of funds by the others. This is the only rule which British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe applied during the week in Luxembourg. The difficult passage of the supplementary budget, one week before the EC would have had to announce its insolvency, proves that effective administration of the EC can no longer be guaranteed at this time. Whether the Community still has a future is being investigated by a committee. The public is less interested than ever in what happens in Brussels, Strasbourg, or Luxembourg.

The ministers are not even maintaining proper protocol. Something dreadful has happened in a diplomatic sense. The Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Moran complained--only after his return to Spain however--about the "lack of manners" of his EC colleagues. What had preceded it was the "admission conference" for which the Spaniards had come to Luxembourg last Wednesday with a 20-men delegation. The EC foreign ministers, with one exception, had left town hours earlier. There was nothing to be negotiated about and nothing could therefore be offered. Unfortunately no one remembered to inform Moran. The "admission conference" was cancelled. Moran did not feel inclined to sit down with substitute undersecretaries. In obvious anger he addressed a request to the Community Council not to invite him to a conference again until the ministers knew what their negotiation position would be.

The negotiations concerning admission to membership between the EC and the candidate countries of Spain and Portugal which have been going on for 7 years, have never been as strained as now. A positive conclusion is urgently needed so that the Spanish prime minister, Felipe Gonzalez, can ask for support of his country's NATO membership during the mid-December convention of the Labor Party. The expansion of Europe's security has to be supported with agreements on olive oil, import of wine, on the use of Spanish fishing boats, and on freedom of movement for migratory workers from the Iberian peninsula. However, a package deal has always been politely and silently ignored. The resounding flop with Moran illustrates the weakness of a community which pursues the important political objective of expanding to the south with the vision of agrarian ministers.

The membership negotiations have revealed the inability of the ministers' conferences to meet Spain halfway on the basis of a true partnership. A week ago, the ministers of agriculture failed in their attempt to limit the Community's wine production which is a necessary precondition for absorbing Spanish surpluses. Thus, the southern expansion has also become

a test of the Community's willingness to reform. Today, the mass-producers of cheap wines are obviously able to prevent a reconstruction of the foundation of the Community and its reform. Olive farmers and captains of cutters surely will also get their chance.

Bonn's chronic complainers surely will not stand by idly during the big sell-out of Europe's future. One should not, however, ignore them. Foreign Minister of the FRG Hans-Dietrich Genscher, to everyone's amazement, criticized in great detail a plan for economy of EC ministers of finance at the opening of the last Council meeting in Luxembourg, despite the fact that his colleague Gerhard Stoltenberg had agreed to it the day before.

It will soon be worth reporting when the Bonn government stops making one mistake after another in its Europe policy.

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DIFFICULT TASKS FACING NEW FOREIGN MINISTER GRATZ

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German 27 Sep 84 p 7

[Article by Inge Santner: "Troubled Times for Austria's Fair-weather Neutrality"]

[Text] Sonnyboy Leopold ("Poldi") Gratz is up to his neck in advance praise. Apparently Austria's newspapers have forgotten that just a few days ago the new socialist foreign minister was an office-wear, and otherwise not exactly scintillating Vienna mayor. They attest to his practical competence, coupled with a "country-boy's charm" (according to the magazine PROFIL). He is, one reads, a perfectionist at amiable imperturbability, a dogged consensus seeker, a spirited and at the same time prudent minimizer of insoluble problems.

Bravo, let us hope they are not wrong. Because Gratz will need most desperately all the cited qualities of polish in order to reform the foreign policy of the Ballhausplatz [Austrian foreign ministry].

He is taking over a ministry in which only the tokens of a former greatness are rolling around still. For the first time since the concluding of the international treaty almost 30 years ago now, Austria sees itself reduced to its true smallness internationally. Gone are the happy times of fair-weather neutrality, when the half-pint from the banks of the Danube was automatically loved and mollycoddled worldwide. A must take disillusions note of the fact that it has gotten ht in the middle of the raw winds of East-West confrontation, for which it was by no means prepared.

From its immediate vicinity, words are flying thick and fast already. The Czechoslovak newspaper MLADA FRONTA is all worked up about a possible purchase of American interceptor aircraft by the Austrian army, regarding this as a "violation of neutrality" (which in fact is tommyrot, but it fittingly illustrates the climate between Prague and Vienna). Yugoslavia is threatening to go to the United Nations, where it would like to complain about the inadequate rights of the Slovenian minority in Carinthia. Again, Italy is assailing top Austrian functionaries up to the Federal president because in the most recent Innsbruck riflemen's parade, some South Tyrolean banners appeared calling for "separating from Rome."

The two superpowers as well have taken pleasure recently in allotting just to the Danube republic the worst moral features among all the neutrals. On the one side there are the Americans, who suspect Austria of forwarding valuable U.S. technology to the East and thus of undermining the Western embargo. And on the other side there are the Soviets, who are demanding that Austria show more backbone vis-a-vis the Americans and in the very same breath are expressing their ostensibly great concerns about the "nequal union" between the economies of the FRG and Austria.

A Sound Foundation Is Lacking

Thus there is criticism from all sides. The question about the justness of one or another charge seems to be relatively secondary. What is striking for one thing is that suddenly the complaints are starting just now of all times like a well-coordinated Greek choir, although these complaints surely would have been equally warranted or unwarranted even years ago.

"It is likely that the former barriers of respect have broken down," conjectures a Vienna diplomat. In his opinion, Austria appears to be weak enough "to serve by turns as a whipping boy."

And in fact there is probably some truth to this. This is demonstrated not least by the remarkable Andreotti case: As is known, after the cancellation of Honecker's trip to Bonn that Italian foreign minister had declared himself to be in favor of the perpetual continuance of two German states, and in doing so had denounced so-called "Pan-Germanism." When a wave of violent protests swept through the FRG in response, he retreated abruptly to the line of least resistance. He claimed to have used the ominous word purely and simply in connection with the Innsbruck riflemen's parade. The fact that his subterfuge was clearly obvious as such did not bother him in the least. He was satisfied to shift the conflict away from strong Bonn to weak Vienna. Its simply true that the devil always takes the hindmost.

But how could it have happened at all to the Austrians that they have gotten into the unpleasant position of the hindmost? Among the analysts at Ballhausplatz, there are very diverse answers to this. The most convincing thesis is that Austria has become involved too much in foreign policy and too little in defense policy to remain believable in the long run.

For almost 3 decades--let this be nostalgically observed in retrospect--everything ran smoothly to a degree beyond all expectations. The Austria which became free and neutral in 1955--which was ultimately itself a product of detente--was able to skillfully exploit the West-East thaw for the sake of its own standing. In the climate of waning mistrust, it was good to be at the dividing line between communism and capitalism, especially since in the person of its state secretary, foreign minister, and later Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, Vienna possessed a political figure with boundless vision.

Above all in the golden 1970's Austria played an important role internationally which was based neither on economic nor on military power. It provided both the secretary general of the United Nations and also the

person for the like post in the Council of Europe. Its mediating services were gladly accepted even by the great powers. Its capital blossomed into being the third UN city after New York and Geneva.

In contrast to cautious Switzerland, whose neutrality had been looked upon expressly as the model in the negotiations on the international treaty, Austria moved about very actively on the international stage. "We are not asking what we should do in Washington nor in Moscow; thus we also are not asking this in Bern either," ruled Kreisky self-assertively, and he established the Austrian variety of neutrality as the third type besides the Swiss and the Swedish varieties. Many things seemed to bear him out. Through certain processes of disintegration within the superpower blocs, even small and very small states gained in importance and rose in status to the point where they were taken seriously as partners in talks. Moreover this change was helped along by the general upgrading of the Third World--that is, of the nonaligned states of Africa and Asia with their numerical superiority in the United Nations.

But now, in the wake of the "cold peace," as Kreisky likes to say, all neutrals are having a harder time. The superpowers are admonishing their allies to again maintain discipline in their pacts and are not tolerating any more exceptional cases. The room for maneuvering of the small states in the East and West is being reduced to almost nothing. The neutral countries are short of partners for talks because even the UN forum is fading in importance.

To a quite exceptional degree all of this is true of Austria, which borders not only on two NATO states but also on two Warsaw Pact states. Instead of the former goodwill from the two sides, today it is reaping mistrust above all. To the Soviets it is not at all fitting that Vienna and Budapest have gotten close enough to be on almost friendly terms with one another. And it is becoming increasingly more difficult to get the Americans to understand that a country ideologically located otherwise in the Western camp wants to be genuinely neutral above all and does not necessarily want to act as a secret henchman of Washington.

Austria is learning willy-nilly the bitter lesson that neutrality by itself does not represent anything of value. What counts is the intrinsic weight of the neutral state.

In the presently frigid world climate, Austria has been weighed and found to be too light. Because in whatever direction one looks, the requisite sound foundation is missing for a credible and possibly even active neutrality.

Domestic Policy Now Dominates

This is true of its economic-policy basis. An example: In 1983, Austria's energy imports were such that 70 percent of its imported coal came from the East, 47 percent of the electric power, more than a fourth of the crude oil, 37 percent of the mineral-oil products, and an impressive 98 percent

of the natural gas. When the communists are angry, things can quickly become grim in the area between Neusiedler Lake and Lake Constance.

In addition this is true of its civil defense. A nuclear war would be survived by at most 3 percent of the Austrian population.

And it is true all the more of the safeguarding of its neutrality by military means. Defense minister Friedhelm Frischenschlager recently forced himself to make a dramatic confession at a Salzburg meeting with defense experts from Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland. Austria's army, he said, unfortunately does not really impress even its own population ("the people do not believe that we will have any chance in an emergency").

As was said: Leopold Gratz is entering upon a difficult office. The test of toughness is not likely to be passed by way of the often extolled foreign-policy "continuity." A rethinking is required.

In the first place, the Ballhausplatz must justify its foreign policy internationally in a different way, no longer brashly and at any price in the manner of a busybody, but preferably with a circumspect attitude, restricting itself to what is essential. Because who says that, in the fashion of Gratz' predecessor Erwin Lanc, the Austrian foreign minister is supposed to talk up a storm about world politics and give grades to the superpowers? At best such a great-power affectation was amusedly excused only in a Kreisky. His successors would do better to concentrate on those few issues which directly affect Austria's interests. For additional pinpointings of Vienna's view, the Austrian missions at the United Nations and its affiliated organizations are available.

Secondly, the Ballhausplatz must put its foreign policy beyond controversy internally. It is essential to again produce the lost climate of consensus and to avoid these kinds of oppositionist monkey wrenches. Because only in consensus can that formation of domestic policy take place which must precede a serious foreign policy.

Insiders at the Ballhausplatz happily observe that Gratz is blazing initial trails in this direction. He has not only gotten the SPOe [Socialist Party of Austria] and FPÖe [Austrian Liberal Party] ministers to agree to speak a common foreign-policy language, but on top of this has announced an early discussion with the conservative opposition leader Alois Mock. The same people are pleased also with his positive attitude to the army, which emphatically distinguishes Gratz from the far-left Lanc.

The jubilant diplomats are far less happy about the unfortunately not unlikely prospect of quite soon losing again their Poldi, who just recently has been so highly praised and welcomed as their hope. Surely Federal Chancellor Fred Sinowatz, a good servant of party politics, was in no way guided by Austria's foreign-policy needs when he brought the Vienna mayor into the cabinet. His only concern was to establish an attractive SPOe alternative to the undoubtedly brilliant ÖVP [Austrian People's Party]

candidate Kurt Waldheim in connection with the 1986 elections for federal president.

"Sinowatz does not understand at all how bad our international position is," says a foreign-office official in deploring such a "total priority of domestic policy over foreign policy" which has been seen recently in the state of Metternich and Kreisky.

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INFLUENCE, PERSONALITIES OF PARTY GROUPS IN PARLIAMENT

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 1-9 Oct 84

[Article by C. D. F.: "Tour of the Chamber"]

[1 Oct 84 p 3]

[Text] 1 -- The CVP Group: Victim of Its Own Strategy

Honor to whom honor is due. Thus we begin this tour of the Chamber with the largest group, the CVP [Social Christian Party]. Worn out, it continues to decline with every election, but it is still the CVP that makes decisions. For a long time in Belgium, it has not been the opposition that has brought down the government, but dissension within the majority and especially within an essential part of that majority: the CVP.

What is curious is that the more radical the CVP becomes on the community level, the less election benefit it derives because each time it is the Volksunie (VU) that is the cat's paw. When will this precipitous race stop? Today, there are no more than 43 CVP deputies opposing the VU group, which already has 20 elected officials and which is revived by its undeniable success in the European elections.

And yet, it is Luc Van den Brande, author of the famous abortive bill bearing his name, that the CVP has chosen to replace the faded Karel Blanckaert (named to the Court of Arbitration) with the coming October session as head of the Chamber's CVP group. Of course, Van den Brande is not lacking in qualities. This young Malines lawyer is an active and imaginative member of Parliament. But would a Luc Dhoore, less clouded by the linguistic titillations of which the people have begun to tire, not have been a calmer group leader? Whatever the case, he is a parliamentarian about whom one can say that he assiduously does his job. Rare is the session from which he is conspicuously absent.

Nor is there any point in speaking about deputy ministers here. Everyone knows the CVP deputies serving on the King's Councils: Martens, Eyskens, Tindemans, De Keersmaecker and Coens. Everyone also knows Frank Swaelen, president of the CVP. The group nevertheless does have deputies who are less well-known but who would gain by being known.

For example, while Andre Bourgeois, deputy from Roulers-Tielt, has never been a minister, he is the author of several bills passed as such or that have inspired governmental initiatives, especially regarding the functioning of justice. This is also the case of Guido Verhaegen, an expert on problems concerning corporate law and private life.

Unlike in the PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress], there is no longer any "Franstaligen" in the CVP. The only one to have tried to adapt is Adhemar d'Alcantara, who has never ceased playing an influential role in his party. He nonchalantly but competently heads the finance committee, unduly favoring the opposition, which he thus manages to circumvent at the proper time. If the CVP is ever to regain the presidency of the Chamber, it is undoubtedly he who would have the job.

Paul Tant has succeeded Verroken as the deputy from Audenaerde. Moreover, he has inherited his tics and as his spiritual father, succeeds in delivering interminable harangues without notes. There will be much talk of him. For her part, Miet Smet has succeeded, in the Saint-Nicolas-Waas district, in ousting the effervescent Volksunie Nelly Maes, a considerable feat. She is doing excellent work, confining herself to problems of employment and social security, which makes her undeniably more effective than a Wivina De Meester, who, by dint of trying to participate in all discussions, is no longer heeded by anyone. Jos Dupre is also very active. His great dream: becoming a minister some day. But is that not the dream of any elected official in Parliament?

As for Herman Suykerbuyk, it is often up to him to represent the group at extended sessions (the unfortunate man lives in Essen, on the Dutch border!) and he never fails to manifest his ill humor by continual thunderous yawns!

Georges Cardoen and Achille Diegenant mainly handle problems of the periphery. Their pet peeve is the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] Georges Clerfayt, with whom they have oratory jousts on thrilling problems such as garbage collection in Linkebeek, for example.

Calmer, Manu Desuffer and Antoon Steverlynck speak out only on problems they know well: fishing in the case of the former and the middle classes in the latter. Adhemar Deneir is interested in socioeconomic problems. As for Godelieve Devos, she represents the agricultural world in the Chamber and effectively defends it.

Further to the left than some socialists, Marc Olivier is the spokesman in the Chamber of the left wing of Christian Democrats and presents bills whose only result will undoubtedly be to bring into the PVV certain VCP voters hard hit by such untimely measures.

There are still at least 20 other CVP deputies. Are you familiar with Vankeirsbilck, Lenssens and Piot or Mrs Boeraeve-Derycke? No? Be reassured that you are not alone. This little group belongs to the CVP group in the Chamber, which, given the repeated successes of the Volksunie, must now bitterly regret that for nearly 20 years now, it has followed the tactic of one-upmanship

preached by Verroken and consorts, a tactic that has now led to harsh election setbacks: 4 seats (instead of 7 in 1979) in the latest European election in June.

[12 Oct 84 p 3]

[Text] 2 -- The PSC Group: A Few Sure Values

Pitted against those who believe that "bipolarization" in Belgium is inevitable, the PSC [Christian Social Party] continues to preach understanding between social groups, going so far as to erase "families" from its operative chart. While this may not have cheered members of CEPIC [Political Center of Christian Independents and Cadres], one has to admit that the PSC voters have not fled the fold as some had predicted. The results of the June European elections can be considered as relatively satisfactory.

In the Chamber, the PSC has 18 deputies under the leadership of their chief, Emile Wauthy, burgomaster of Dinant, who is more than a little proud of having, since he entered the Chamber, become the pet peeve of the socialists. Every time he speaks, it is a veritable hue and cry on the left, since Emile Wauthy is not used to soft-pedaling what he thinks of them, to say the least! It suffices for the leader of the PSC group to take to the speaker's platform for the whole chamber to awaken. One point for Wauthy, for members of Parliament who become personalities are far from legion!

The hope of the PSC group in the Chamber is two young deputies from Verviers who as children lived next door to one another in Petit-Rechain and who now occupy important posts at the tender age of 35. No need to introduce Philippe Havstadt and Melchior Wathelet, two pillars of the party who have already been tested and have a definite future ahead of them. Another young deputy, Marc Lestienne, has not yet revealed all of his talents and it is also possible that he may soon leave Brussels for Strasbourg.

Former ministers Joseph Michel and Jose Desmarets served as a very good president of the Chamber and an excellent leader of the PSC group respectively. Seasoned members of Parliament, they no longer play an outstanding role for the time being and it is a shame. It is true that in Belgian politics, provincial dosages are sacrosanct and that for Luxembourg, as long as Nothomb occupies a ministerial post, Joseph Michel will remain out of the game, which is regrettable for the PSC.

Alongside Jose Desmarets, on the front bench of the Chamber, VDB is probably in his last term because he reaches the now fateful age of 65 this year. Formerly prime minister and of wide-ranging experience, he scarcely speaks but never misses an important session.

Less is known of Leon Remacle, president of the Justice Committee, and Gerard de Hardy de Beaulieu, questor of the Chamber, two excellent deputies who do their work conscientiously and with an honesty that does them honor.

Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb, who was an excellent president of the PSC, was clearly not as good as president of the Chamber, where he confused everything at will. He is now a minister and even deputy prime minister. Whatever the case, it is difficult to judge him as a mere member of Parliament: He has practically never spoken in that capacity. The same is true of Michel Han senne.

Albert Lienard handles education problems for the PSC. Undeniably, he knows a great deal about the subject, but too frequently lapses into the jargon, which generally makes him incomprehensible or, to say the least, less comprehensible than a Ylief, for example.

Jean-Louis Thys is very active and there is not a debate on Brussels in which he does not speak. He would like to become at least secretary of state. His disappointment was major upon seeing that Cecile Goor-Eyben barely missed her seat as a European deputy. He had done so much in that election campaign for the sole purpose of being able to replace her as secretary of state for Brussels' affairs.

Albert Gehlen, along with his liberal colleague Evers, represents German-speakers in the Chamber. He occasionally speaks in German, which always poses problems for Chamber services, where everything is organized based on the two major communities in the country.

Jean-Pierre Grafe scarcely speaks in the Chamber. On the other hand, in the French-speaking Community Council, he is an excellent leader of the PSC group, where he spares neither the socialists nor the liberals.

Finally, one practically never hears three other deputies: Rene Jerome, Jean-Pierre Detremmerie and Albert Lernoux. The least known of the three is Detremmerie, who, as burgomaster of Mouscron, engaged in the quarrels with the minister of national education when he had the communal school in his commune absorbed by the local free school. Lernoux, elected from Thuin, is mainly interested in agriculture.

In a word, both among the elders and the youngsters, the PSC group in the Chamber has undeniably good talent.

[3 Oct 84 p 3]

[Text] 3 -- The PS Group: Nonexistent

The second largest group in the Chamber (35 deputies, compared with 43 for the CVP) and the leading opposition group (the SP has only 26 deputies and the Volksunie 20), the Socialist Party, which could make things difficult for the Martens-Gol team in the Chamber, is nearly nonexistent. While its Flemish alter ego, the SP, never misses an occasion to shove a stick in the spokes of government and sometimes succeeds in stirring up some trouble, one can, on the other hand, consider the SP group as nearly inoffensive.

Disenchantment

The PS group in the Chamber is in a state of collapse. It once enjoyed great glories (and still does once in awhile, like Andre Cools), but it has undeniably lost the art of renewing its leaders.

Herve Brouhon was greatly criticized when he was head of the PS group in the Chamber. In the final analysis, he was not so bad if compared with his successors Guy Mathot and Alain Van der Biest, in whom the socialists still placed great hope even recently. The disenchantment was proportionately great.

Leaders

There are nevertheless a few bright lights in the PS group in the Chamber. For example, Guy Coeme delivered an excellent speech in June during the discussion on the proposed recovery bill. He has a future in his party. Another young star, Robert Collignon, would make an excellent leader, a role he plays from time to time when Van der Biest is incapacitated.

Andre Cools scarcely speaks since elected president of the Walloon Regional Council. Nevertheless, when he takes to the speaker's platform, it is always an event. One either hates him or loves him, but it is impossible to remain insensitive to this orator.

There is also Philippe Moureaux, long the brain behind Andre Cools before becoming minister himself. It will long be remembered when, as minister of justice, he found nothing better to do than to state in the middle of the Senate that jurists were jokers! Paul de Stexhe had an attack over it and nearly had to be carried out!

To this group of leaders, let us add Jean Mottard, from the Walloon Rally, the lawyer of Jose Happart and very skillful in the art of persuasion, and Robert Urbain, a Borinage scientific regent with a rugged style who was an excellent minister of foreign trade before being relegated to the Executive Branch of the French community.

Second Batch

In the second batch, in addition to Alain Van der Biest, one finds men like Andre Baudson, whose speeches they always try -- one wonders why -- to schedule for the morning sessions and who turns out to be an excellent debater, "regionals" Philippe Busquin and Valmy Feaux, the former handicapped by his catastrophic elocution and the latter valid even if somewhat of the "dazed" type. Francois Guillaume speaks little, but always on subjects he knows, which is unfortunately not true of everyone. Yvan Ylieff, of Bulgarian ancestry, elected from Verviers, speaks only on education, with a sectarianism worthy of the 19th century. However, one has to admit that this political animal is very active and that all his dossiers are up to date. The minister of national education has no easy task pitted against this veritable mischievous imp.

Guy Mathot could have pursued his astounding career if his naivete and casualness had not put him where he is. For his part, his colleague Gaston Onkelinx is very moving when he defends his working comrades. This son of a Limburger who emigrated to Seraing is one of the few workers (the only one?) to sit in the Chamber.

As for Jean-Baptiste Delhay, president of the Interior Committee, he persuasively defends the interests of the communes. Nor should one forget Herve Brouhon, whom one sees only rarely ever since he was named burgomaster of Brussels. Formerly leader of the group, he was then the expert on "solemn appeals" to opposing groups.

Third Lot

In the third lot is a picturesque bearded man as well versed on education as his colleague Ylief, Jacques Collart, along with Yvon Biefnot, a teacher from Colfontaine and assuredly less spiritual than his charming daughter, an announcer for the RTB [Belgian Radio and Television], and Jean-Joseph Delahaye, a doctor who, as one would have guessed, is responsible for speaking in debates on public health.

Finally and for the record, there are the countless foot soldiers, the Anselmes, Georgette Brenez, Henry, Dejardin, Delizee, Perdieu, the tandem made up of the ineffable Willy Burgeon (whom Mark Eyskens stubbornly calls Bourgeon) and Richard Gondry, the two Harmegnies (the son of his father and the nephew of his uncle), the Lafosses and other Rigos.

As one can see, the leading opposition group in the Chamber has much more dead weight and "empty barrels" than deputies of substance, a shame for the quality of the debate. Fortunately, there is the SP....

[4 Oct 84 p 3]

[Text] The SP: The Best Group

Alongside the nearly nonexistent PS group, its Flemish counterpart, the SP, numerically smaller, by far leads its French-speaking big brother with respect to quality.

At its head is Louis Tobback, who since 1981 has turned out to be the very embodiment of the opposition in the Martens-Gol government. This 46-year-old Louvain student of Romance languages is a little to the SP what Andre Cools was to the PS. His speeches leave no one indifferent. Moving with consummate art from a bantering tone to a threatening style, he is skilled at repartee and knows the bylaws of the Chamber nearly as well as President Defraigne, whose fencing with Tobback are never bereft of interest.

Will the head of the SP group, also the tutor of the president of the party, Karel Van Miert, ever become a minister? He would deserve it, without a doubt, but it would then be a very heavy loss for the SP group in the Chamber. It is also true that those who excel in the opposition can clearly be less good in

the majority. For Willy Claes, on the other hand, the opposite is true. A good minister (except for the monumental blunder of the Distrigaz contract), he no longer truly reveals himself in the opposition. His speeches are always announced with great fanfare, but one is always disappointed.

Young Assets

Tobback's successor as head of the group could well be Marcel Colla, a sociologist from Anvers who might be considered as the real revelation of the last parliamentary session. Actually, the SP's main asset is its young people. At last, here is a group that has succeeded in recent years in renewing its cadres with unequaled brio.

The most brilliant of these young men is a Ghent jurist 37 years old, Luc Van den Bossche, who entered the Chamber scarcely three years ago and who already has the style, even the flair, of a seasoned veteran. This brilliant young man from a bourgeois, Catholic milieu, will go very far if his party keeps its confidence in him, which seems assured inasmuch as a certain priest is already on his lists! Alongside him, other young men are also highly promising: Norbert De Batselier from Termonde and Gilbert Bossuyt from Menin, to whose names one can add even more newcomers: Jan Leclercq, Eric Derydke and Victor Peuskens, all the representatives of a new socialist generation that one would seek in vain among the French-speakers and in whom the old labor soldiers from the beginning of the century would have difficulty recognizing themselves.

It is fruitless to present Marc Galle, author of the famous bill that bears his name and that was postponed indefinitely. He will undoubtedly soon leave the Chamber to succeed the governor of eastern Flanders, De Kinder, who died two months ago. And yet, one wonders how that "distinguished Verroken," as he is now called, could have stooped to such banal bills for the man is far from stupid.

Freddy Willockx, the young economist who served as Posts and Telecommunications minister when he was scarcely over 30, has certainly not spoken his last word.

There are also several SP deputies who are not as well-known and who could do considerable work in the Chamber. Such is the case of Lode Hancke, author of a bill on the State Archives, and other measures in the field of public health, first vice president of the Chamber, another certain standout in the SP group.

Obsessions

One might also mention Eddy Baldewijns, who knows the education field by heart, handling it with much less sectarianism than Jef Ramaekers, a brain of the Ylieff type but more distinguished. Two SP members have a veritable obsession, the situation in Central America, which provides the Chamber with long speeches ("as if you had been there") by Jef Sleenckx and Louis Vanvelthoven, disputing first place in the field. Tindemans listens to them politely, then reminds them that our country has never recognized anything but countries, never regimes. One suspects that the speeches have as much effectiveness as those made by Costa Rican deputies on respect for universal suffrage in Fourons, for example.

There are also two women in the group: Leona Detiege, author of the bill favoring abortion that bears her name, and an influential deputy, Olga Lefebver.

Except for the latter, the SP group can therefore be considered as a model group.

[5 Oct 84 p 3]

[Text] There are 52 liberal deputies in the Chamber, the majority of them (28) Flemish and part of the PVV group. The liberal landslide in the 1981 legislative elections sent a whole series of deputies to Parliament who were perhaps more surprised than anyone else at their election. This undoubtedly explains why very little is known about the members of the PVV group of the Chamber, except for those occupying government posts, obviously.

Everyone knows Willy De Clercq, from Ghent, and his likely successor as deputy prime minister, Herman De Croos. Aha! Herman De Croos, always there with the quick retort, in French or Dutch. With him, no debate can be boring. Of course, he knows he is funny and sometimes overdoes it. Whatever the case, how nice it is to hear a minister talk of serious things in a humorous fashion. After all, it costs no more!

The other PVV ministers are not as well known. There is: Andre Kempinaire, secretary of state for foreign trade, in the shadow of Willy De Clercq; Anne Marie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, who provoked the fury of her French-speaking colleagues from Brussels in making a shrewd campaign speech during the last European elections to all residents of the capital and in French; and the ineffable minister of national defense, Trudon notary Freddy Vreven, his father's own son.

The outstanding member of the group is unquestionably Frans Grootjans, chairman of the foreign affairs committee and a Cabinet minister. A deputy for over 30 years and a renowned journalist, he is now 62 years old and practically never speaks in a public session, which does not prevent him from being among the hard-working members of the Assembly.

Departures

The leader of the PVV group in the Chamber was until June Auguste De Winter, intelligent and a moderate on linguistic questions, as are nearly all the PVV deputies. Having said that much, one must nevertheless recognize that he has practically never been truly active and his departure for the European Parliament will not leave a big gap in the Chamber.

Another announced departure is that of Louis De Greve, named to the Court of Arbitration. Undeniably, it will be a major loss for the group to which, since 1977 and after serving as a senator, he has contributed his talent and moderation for problems relating to institutional reform.

Auguste De Winter's replacement as leader of the group starting in October will be Emile Flamant, a deputy for a dozen years and scarcely known outside of the little world of Ghent.

President Arrives

One of the few PVV deputies who is active in the Chamber is notary Ignace Van Belle from Zomergem, who always speaks out on problems of justice or the budget of Interior and the Civil Service. Another deputy elected in the Ghent district is Andre Denys is a young 36-year-old industrialist who entered the Chamber in 1981. He would do well to cause a little more stir if he wants to remain there.

For the time being, there are four liberals elected from Ghent. It is not certain that that number will remain unchanged with the coming elections. The first surrogate for Willy De Clercq is Guy Verhofstadt, president of the PVV, who will probably make his entry into the Chamber in January. Another Ghent representative, Guy Schrans, mentioned as a successor to Willy De Clercq as minister of finance, could also run in the coming legislative elections in Ghent, where he was already elected deputy in 1977 and 1978. In a word, in Ghent, seats will be very sought-after in the future.

In addition to Frans Grootjans, the district of Anvers has sent three other liberal deputies to the Chamber, starting with Jacky Buchmann. The nephew of Baron Kronacker, he always looks profoundly bored in the Chamber, and yet, he is an effective member of the Executive Committee of the Flemish community. The two other Anvers natives are Dr Etienne De Groot, entrusted by his group with responsibility for problems of medical ethics and disciplinary councils, and Edward Beysen, a high school history teacher and great defender of public education.

Fernand Colla is one of the few liberals elected from Limbourg. President of the Chamber's college of questors, he rarely speaks in public sessions, except when there is a discussion of problems concerning veterinarians, of which he is a staunch defender, being one himself! There is also Marilou Van Den Poel, of Zonhoven.

Twelve Men at Peace

What is to be said of the dozen other PVV deputies? They truly speak very little, which naturally pleases a government that wants nothing to do with parliamentary snipers of the Van den Brande stripe!

What is particularly attractive about the PVV group is that it is the last to plunge into the community wuarrel. When the CVP and SP members speak out on the subject, the PVV members feel forced to submit their little bills also, but one can see that they do so against their will.

[6-7 Oct 84 p 3]

[Text] 6 -- The PRL Group: "Historic" and Converted

Jean Defraigne, president of the Chamber, Robert Henrion, leader of the group, and Jean Gol, deputy prime minister: No one will deny that these are the three chiefs of the PRL [Party of Liberty and Reform] group in the Chamber.

Everyone in Parliament agrees that Jean Defraigne has for the past four years emerged as the best president that the Chamber has had in a long time, even better than Achille Van Acker, which is not faint praise!

A poacher as head of the PRL group, he has now become a shrewd gamekeeper. Independent and self-confident, he knows the rules backwards and forwards.

A relentless adversary of special powers (he has no words harsh enough to criticize the legalistic work done in the Cabinets), he has come into conflict with another liberal from Liege -- newer than he, it is true -- Jean Gol himself. It has sometimes been whispered that it would cost Jean Defraigne his presidential seat. It could be a dangerous game, but one could then imagine the opposition aiding in his reelection, which would be comical, to say the least.

Conscience

The leader of the PRL group is also a prominent personality and a resolute adversary of the government's encroachment on the prerogatives of the legislative government. Robert Henrion, who has become the "conscience" of the group and deservedly so, is a zealous chief whose speeches are always short, concise and to the point, all qualities missing from the speeches of nearly all the deputies. At the age of 69, he is in his last legislature in the Chamber and his departure will create a very large vacuum in the Chamber.

As for Jean Gol, it is needless to introduce him. Recently converted to liberalism, since this 42-year-old Liege attorney has only had the time to go through the socialist left and the RW [Walloon Rally], he is all the more zealous, but occasionally irritates the old guard of the Liberal Party. Nevertheless, he has "his" PRL in hand, remaining the uncontested boss.

Bloempot?

And yet, one must not minimize the role of President Michel and call him a *bloempot*. This teacher of Germanic languages, who just turned 37, is not only "his master's voice." Almost mute in the Chamber, he sometimes gives rise to the unexpected by forcing a decision and he undeniably has the party's popular base.

Daniel Ducarme had to leave the Chamber to sit in Strasbourg, since our country forbids holding both offices. However, one might wager that that "young wolf" will soon return to a promising future in the halls of the Chamber.

Another bright light is Armand De Decker, who has enormous ambition.

Catholics

One of the first Catholics to rally to the Liberal Party when it opened up to them, Charles Poswick, has been in the Chamber for nearly 20 years. This bachelor, who will be 60 next month, is tanned year-round and one would think he spends all his weekends in Marbella! Perhaps he has an excellent sun lamp!

In addition to Poswick, there is: Colonel Militis (who did not spare his criticism in the most recent discussions on National Defense); Charles Cornet d'Elzius, his group's expert on agricultural and real estate problems and an ephemeral minister of economic affairs; Alfred Evers; and finally, Jean Barzin, a Namur attorney who punctually attends the Chamber's sessions but who has not been outstanding so far.

Georges Mundeleer has been a deputy since 1960! As he says himself, he is fairly comfortable there! His speeches are sometimes excellent and always funny. In a parliamentary marathon, schedule his speech at any hour of the night and you will immediately see, as if by magic, the Chamber bar and even the local pubs empty out as everyone returns to the Chamber, where success is guaranteed!

Obviously, it is difficult to judge ministers and members of the Executive Committees as mere deputies. Louis Olivier is too nice for anyone to say anything unpleasant about him. Andre Bertouille is too busy to be accused of laziness! And Etienne Knoops is too criticized already for anyone to add fuel to the fire. Will one see Andre Damseaux more frequently since he is no longer a European deputy? Scarcely likely, because he is still a member of the Walloon Executive Branch and a communal council member from Verviers, of which it is rumored that he will become burgomaster. As for Philippe Monfils, he calls attention to himself mainly because of his wardrobe!

Minor Actors

Guy Pierard is a questor and speaks very little, unless on the subject of the status of management and enterprise reform. Edouard Klein has a great passion for family names and has introduced a bill enabling parents to give children their mother's name. In a period of crisis, amusement is where one finds it! Denis D'Hondt confines himself to problems of education, but Catholic education will surely not count on him for its future survival!

With his PSC colleague Gehlen, Alfred Evers handles the affairs of eastern cantons, for which they have obtained practically everything one could imagine! Charles Petitjean is 50 and has been in the Chamber only three years, a little late to begin a parliamentary career. He speaks very little, as little as Jacques Mevis, Serge Kubla or Omer Huylebrouck. The latter constantly threatens to conduct a poll when it comes time to draw up election lists. And since this Anderlecht notary is the guardian angel for all elderly persons in his commune, a place is always reserved for him on the list!

[8 Oct 84 p 3]

[Text] 7 -- The Volksunie: A Miracle

"What a miracle!" a friend whispered to me one day in the Chamber gallery, where she had never before set foot. I saw that she was looking at the Volksunie group, which, as is often the case, was nearly complete that day. And with its bearded statesmen, its Valkeniers and Desaeyeres, the group was a real amalgam!

And yet, it is one of the most active groups and one can even say that along with the SP, it forms the only opposition to the Martens-Gol government with the name, the others being content to be no more than onlookers. But unlike the SP, the Volksunie generally allows only its stars to speak. When a whole string of deputies whose voices have practically never been heard.

Two Leaders

Two Chamber members stand out: Frans Baert, the leader of the group; and Hugo Schiltz, formerly president of the party. Leader of the Order of Barristers of the Ghent Bar (another Ghent resident!), Frans Baert is an excellent group leader, conscientious, even scrupulous, to such an extent that in certain discussions, he is the only one in the Assembly knowing where one is and on what measure they are voting! Except for his little ballpoint pen and an incurably nervous habit of pulling his tie tighter and tighter -- one wonders if he will finally strangle himself before the session is over! -- he is a model member of Parliament and one wishes there were more like him.

As for Hugo Schiltz, he is a man who had the courage to say "Yes" on behalf of his party to the famous Egmont Pact and who, at the last minute, was betrayed by the repudiation of the CVP. When other members of the opposition put up only political arguments to the Martens-Gol team, Schiltz pronounces brilliant speeches in which he succeeds in taking up problems with great ease. If he had chosen the CVP, he would perhaps now be one of its most prominent stars.

Alongside the Schiltz-Baert duo, one must also mention Victor "Vic" Anciaux, president of the party, less brilliant, more thundering than Baert and Schiltz. But it is true that noise always enjoys a certain success in the Chamber, only to wake the dead! One has to have heard Anciaux speak at least once, his voice trembling, of the "Flemish nation." One nearly has to shed a tear.

Willy Kuijpers is no longer a deputy. Elected from Strasbourg, he has given up national politics. It is a shame because alongside his famous rolled collar and his tricks in the Fourons, the only things generally known about him in the French-speaking circle, he was an excellent deputy, hard working and generous, even if slightly demagogic.

Most Active

We know that patients sometimes leave their mark on those who try to take care of them. Jef Valkeniers is a neuropsychiatrist and is among the most active members of the Chamber. Above all, never pronounce the name of Jose Happart in his presence! (Just a piece of friendly advice!) Apart from that, when he speaks in discussions of medicine, his remarks are never without interest. He is also practically the only defender of South Africa in the Chamber, which never fails to make some of his VU colleagues uncomfortable.

With his high voice and interminable speeches, Willy Desaeyere acts the professor of economics. He is always easily put in his place by Mark Eyskens. Andre De Beul, who has never gone to the university, seems to make more valid remarks.

Joos Somers is the author of a whole series of bills preaching amnesty, whose consideration has given rise to more than one tense session and "linguistic" votes. He was also, in 1974, the first Flemish deputy not to be able to get along in French, a phenomenon becoming increasingly rare, for now that the young French-speakers have resolved to learn the other national language, it is the young Flemish-speakers who no longer learn French!

Daan Vervaet is a bearded, long-haired professor who fervently defends monuments and historical sites, too rare not to be pointed out. Paul Van Grembergen, formerly leader of the group, is also very attractive. As for Jaak Gabriels, when not going after the situation in the Fourons, which is rare, it is on the train schedules in Limbourg that the ad hoc minister is perorating. Thrilling!

A painter-tapestry maker, Oktaaf Meyntjens also knows how to act the noble father, even if that may seem daring when one speaks of the Volksunie. For his part, Jan Caudron has replaced Willy Kuipers as Chamber questor and it appears that he will fulfill the role as well as his predecessor.

There remains the claque, those who are practically reduced to silence and about whom there is nothing to say. They must at least be named: Jozef Belmans, Raph Declercq (an antique dealer in Knokke), Julien Desseyn, Lode Van Biervliet, Franz Vansteenkiste and Jan Verniers.

Oh yes! Alongside the Volksunie, there is a deputy who never misses a session but who never says a word. It is Karel Dillen, the leader and only elected official from Vlaams Block. Well-educated, he undoubtedly knows French literature better than many of his French-speaking colleagues. He himself says he is astonished by the poor education of some members of the Chamber. How could such a harmless-looking man be associated with the actions of the TAK [expansion unknown] militants?

[9 Oct 84 p 3]

[Text] 8 -- Small Parties

We have come to the end of our tour of the Chamber. The seven groups we have studied so far had between 18 and 43 members. There remain 18 deputies belonging to the so-called "smaller parties."

The FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers]: Declining more and more with every election, the FDF now has only five deputies whose average age is 58. And yet, when Lucien Outers became president of the party, one would have expected the FDF to be reborn. It was the time of the famous slogan "The FDF is coming back." Nothing of the sort. The latest European elections have only accentuated the free fall.

Outers practically never speaks in the Chamber. His rare addresses are nevertheless very brilliant, like those of Basile Risoupoulos, leader of the group, with countless effects. When he has the floor, one would think one is in court, with prosecutor Riso suddenly turning into a judge responsible for convicting the odious "Belgian-Flemish" government, the source of all evils afflicting French-speakers!

Antoinette Spaak is truly devastated over the loss of her seat in Strasbourg, but it would have been just as painful for her to give up her seat in the Chamber, where she speaks regularly. Since there had to be an FDF member on the King's Council, it was probably right that it was she who was named to be a Cabinet member.

Georges Clerfayt is the now famous "Palestinian on the periphery." He juggles the problems of the communes with ease -- or difficulty, as he says. Occasionally, out of arguments, he has occasionally ended up shaking his fist at the prime minister! Then the ushers had to lead him back to his seat! Except for that, he is also an excellent deputy. Soon 50, he is the junior member of the group.

As for Leon Defosset, he is the expert on flowing, soporific speeches. As soon as he takes the floor, everyone goes about his business.

The RW: The Walloon Rally has declined even more than the FDF and now has only two deputies, which is probably a prelude to its total disappearance. An excellent journalist with the RTBF [Belgian-French Radio-Television Broadcasting System], Henri Mordant has become execrable in the Chamber. To hear him constantly complain, one wonders whether to laugh or to cry. As for the other RW deputy, Mrs Boniface, she is one of the hardest-working members of the Chamber, but rarely speaks. Now 73, she is the dean of the assembly and her main role consists of presiding over the opening session on the second Tuesday in October, a mission she fulfills with great good will.

Ecologists

There are also four ecologists in the Chamber, two French- and two Flemish-speakers, whose entry cannot go unnoticed. Wearing an ear ring, threadbare pants and shoes in the brightest possible colors, Olivier Deleuze makes his entry into the Chamber, even going so far as to take to the speaker's rostrum in shirt sleeves! Which was too much for the presiding officer, who sent him straight back to his seat. "I do not dress any differently from those who vote for me!" he tried to protest. "I have women voters who go to the beaches topless, but I would not come here naked!" replied Defraigne.

The other French-speaking ecologist is Jose Daras. He speaks much less than his Brussels colleague, which is so much the better, for this long-haired geographer from Liege is rather muddled.

For the Flemish, the ecologist incarnate is a likable railroad employee, Fernand Gyeselings, who has occupied the floor for hours on subjects as thrilling as bacterial fire and the future of the hawthorns. The other Agalev is a first-class bore: Ludo Dierickx. The nephew of Leo Tindemans (just as European Parliament member Roelants is the nephew of Ch.-F. Nothomb), this 55-year-old Anvers resident is an unconditional admirer of Proudhon, which says it all!

The UDRT [expansion unknown]: The UDRT now has only two deputies: Robert Hendrick and Pascal de Roubaix, since Thomas Delahave "seceded." A brilliant

debater, perfectly bilingual and a distinguished jurist, Delahaye was immediately comfortable in the Chamber as soon as he was elected in 1981. But what can an isolated deputy like him do?

Robert Hendrick, who has haunted the corridors for nearly five years, has remained true to himself, the fierce enemy of any state interventionism. And on one has to admit that on more than one occasion, he has made the liberals uncomfortable, suggesting, for example, that one impose legal status on the trade unions, a proposal that the liberals were forced to reject! But he lost as much credit as his party did.

Pascal de Roubaix speaks almost exclusively on education problems, deeming that the free system has become a prisoner of the subsidies granted by the state. Intelligent but not a speaker on just any occasion, he is not very successful.

Communists

The communist group is now reduced to two deputies. The Louis Van Geyts and other Marcel Levaux who rarely missed a session and fueled all debates have been succeeded by a new generation. The two current "cocos" are now among the youngest members of the Chamber: Daniel Fedrigo, a German scholar of Italian origin and a radical ecologist; and Didier Bajura, who a few months ago replaced Jacques Nagels, dean of the School of Economics of the Free University of Brussels. The PCB organs have probably decided that the latter, a wide-ranging member of the Chamber, was too "high-flying" and above all, did not attend Chamber sessions frequently enough! It is unfortunate, however, that persons at this level get discouraged or are discouraged by their party's organs because an assembly thus loses its value over the years.

There remain the three "loners": Delahaye, Dillen and Nols. We have already spoken of the former two. As for Roger Nols, who has just turned 62, he can look to the future with optimism because whether or not he goes back to the liberal fold, his name is now so well-known that he can be assured of being reelected to the Chamber and as burgomaster of Schaerbeek, a dream that most of his colleagues in the Chamber must secretly harbor.

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CSO: 3619/17

PEACE MOVEMENT SPOKESMEN ON FUTURE OF MOVEMENT

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 5 Sep 84 pp 49-52

[Interview with Ludo Segers, member of VAKA-Antwerp, and Bob Spaenhoven, member of VAKA-Brussels, by Geert Decock: "This Cannot Be the End"; date and place not given]

[Text] The peace movement did not in the first step succeed in keeping the missiles out of Europe. Is that a defeat?

The FRG is deploying Pershing 2 missiles, Great Britain and Italy are stationing cruise missiles. In Belgium, the anticipated deployment schedule is being followed faithfully. The Netherlands is going to wait another year in the hope that meanwhile the Soviet Union will not deploy any more SS-20 missiles. This would seem like a poor balance for the West European peace movement, which during the eighties developed into the largest postwar social movement.

What is going to happen now with that peace movement? Isn't it going to fall apart into a number of small action groups who believe in a utopia, while the leaders reconcile themselves to a (temporary) nuclear presence in Western Europe?

Last month they met in the Italian city of Perugia for the third nuclear disarmament convention. There were delegations from Western and Eastern Europe, the United States and several Third World countries. Flanders sent 30 people from peace groups, SP [Socialist Party] and VU [People's Union] circles and local VAKA [Flemish Action Committee Against Atomic Weapons] committees. Among them were Ludo Segers from VAKA-Antwerp and Bob Spaenhoven from VAKA-Brussels.

Question: The SS-20 missiles have not been dismantled. The Pershing and cruise missiles are being deployed. The spiral even continues with the SS-21's, SS-22's and SS-23's in Eastern Europe. Isn't that a defeat for you? What was the reaction to that in Perugia?

Ludo Segers: I have the feeling that, contrary to what some people are afraid of and others hope, the peace movement is absolutely not tired. I first want to point out clearly that Belgium and the Netherlands still have not deployed, so that you can certainly not talk of a defeat there. And there is also quite a bit in progress in other countries. Just think of Germany where, because

of NATO maneuvers near Fulda Gap, actions are planned for the second half of September. England and Italy did not sit still either.

And that is not true only in the countries where missiles have been deployed; that is also true in, for example, Austria and Switzerland, neutral countries where a great deal is going on even though we don't hear about it in the press. Thus, a large people's gathering has been planned for this fall in Linz (Austria), which proves that there is also a great deal of enthusiasm there.

But what was particularly reflected in Perugia was the fact that the peace movement is a Pan-European movement which is striving for a total European solution, where Eastern Europe is not forgotten. The unanimous and standing ovation at the closing session for support of the independent peace movements in Eastern Europe were the clearest example of that.

Bob Spaenhoven: The deployment of the missiles cannot be the end of the peace movement, because those missiles are only an external symbol. The struggle of the peace movement is directed not only against those missiles, but against the whole strategy of which those missiles are an expression. And that is a cold war strategy, a strategy of dividing Europe into two blocs. The mass movement must be seen against that background, and the Euromissiles have only been a beginning. Militarily speaking it is not all that important for those missiles to be deployed on land; they could just as well be stationed on boats. They are put on land to make Europe politically hostage, to prevent Europe from conducting its own European policy. And the same is true for the Eastern Bloc. In the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, people are not all that happy with the SS-20's either. For them it means a limitation of their freedom, just as the missiles in our countries are also increasingly threatening our freedom.

Overkill

Question: You are pleading for a Pan-European solution, which may have to be sought in cooperation with the East European peace movement. But only the official peace movement was present in Perugia, and from them we have yet to hear the first bad word about the Soviet Union.

Segers: I think that those officials clash in two ways with the West European peace movement. First of all, they have no room for the independent peace movement and -- this is connected with it -- for political movements, period. And, secondly, they are not really a peace movement as we understand it. Indeed, they approve of the fact that SS-20's are deployed as a response. We say that there is no question of a response. Both sides have an overkill capacity, and thus this evolution must be brought to an end immediately.

On the other hand, I do want to say that there are already voices within those official delegations which say that a nuclear balance is nonsense when there is excess capacity.

But the Western peace movements declared themselves in solidarity with the independent East European groups because they weren't there, because they had been forbidden to come (they didn't get an exit visa) and because the position of the official peace movement is too close to that of their governments.

Question: There was also a remarkable solidarity for the struggle against repression in the Third World. The convention sent a telegram of congratulations to Nicaragua on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation. There were also quite a number of representatives of peace groups and liberation movements in the Third World. What did they have to say?

Spaenhoven: The Third World countries especially emphasized the uncommitted character of their movements. In this they have drawn the parallel with the independent, free standing character of the Western peace movement in its struggle against the two power blocs. As a matter of fact, I believe that the peace movement is a support to the liberation movements in the Third World. Thus, the strategy of the United States, for example, is directed specifically to free their hands in Central America, Asia, Africa. Our peace movement is an independent force, which can try to put a stop to it in such a way that it cannot be said that it is thus playing Moscow's card.

In this way our peace movement can also make contact with the independent groups in Eastern Europe. As Kovaleski from the Polish Solidarity Union said: too often support of our independent groups has been discredited as manipulation by the CIA, while support to liberation movements in the Third World is said to contribute to the expansion of the Soviet empire. The Western peace movement is the only independent movement with ties in both directions. Hence, it is its task to break those misconceptions and to bring those different movements and groups closer together.

Conventional Arms

Question: With standing ovations for, among others, an East German peace activist who was expelled and for the representative of the junta in Nicaragua, Perugia does seem to have been the convention of solidarity. Did they also give some thought to the future? What is their answer, for example, to the continuing militarization of Europe? Was any thought also given to the conventional armaments programs?

Segers: That is somewhat my reproach against Perugia. There was unity about that Pan-European solution, and about the ties with the Third World. But there the matter really ended. No strategy was developed to translate all that politically, to develop action steps around those themes. Here in the West we should be able to produce a climate of detente, as a result of which the East Europeans would also get more opportunities.

Spaenhoven: The fact that no real strategy for the future was developed in Perugia is true. But you cannot develop that in a very short period of time either. On the other hand, it must be said that one of the consequences of the peace movement is the fact that we managed to shake the so-called Atlanticism, as a result of which NATO circles (and Henry Kissinger said this out loud) began looking for an alternative in a West European Defense Union. The peace movement knows that, it is working on it and it already has a first response to it. As a matter of fact, it was decided at Perugia that during the first ministerial conference of the West European Defense Union in October of this year in Rome, a parallel conference of the peace movements involved would be organized in the same location in order to develop an alternative.

Question: What would be accented there?

Interviewer: That Union wants to enlist the social democratic governments of Western Europe into an integrated net of arms production. That is what concerns me most. The actual Defense Union will certainly not come about today -- Europe is still too much divided for that -- but it begins with the production of primarily new technological weapons. The argument is already well known now: we no longer need to spend foreign currency to purchase those arms in the United States; on the other hand, we will get foreign currency through our exports. This will undoubtedly lead to higher arms production -- first of all conventional arms -- with the Third World as outlet market.

Answer: One of the few discussions on the strategy of the peace movement which I took part in in Perugia dealt precisely with conventional armament. But the key theme was that it still fit within the framework of an integrated NATO strategy. Think, for example, of the Airland Battle, in which there is room for both conventional and nuclear arms. In this respect the transfer from conventional to nuclear arms is easy to make, without orders from above. In other words, the conventional arms are integrated in a strategy which brings us closer. And with the nuclear arsenal Europe has at its disposal at the moment, a conventional conflict would turn into a nuclear war anyhow.

Interviewer: It is the task of the peace movement to indict conventional armament specifically because it is part of an offensive strategy. The European peace movement must do its utmost to weaken the tension between East and West, in such a way that fewer conventional arms and no nuclear arms are necessary; after which we can start the discussion about what defense really is still necessary, and how it should be organized.

Question: Has the Flemish peace movement also gotten to such a discussion?

Answer: I think that we, in Flanders, are well attuned to this international discussion. The few discussions on this subject which took place in Perugia showed that the views within the Flemish peace movement are at a good level.

Interviewer: In working on conventional armament, we are thinking about working toward a European solution. During the past vacation months we have collected quite a lot of material to fight with on these themes within the Flemish Action Committee Against Atomic Weapons. In the fall we will launch discussions in all organizations and local committees which occupy themselves with the problems of peace, in the hope of achieving a broader consensus on the subject by the spring of 1985.

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GREENS STILL SEEN POSING LITTLE THREAT AFTER SECOND CONGRESS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Oct 84 p 8

[Text] The Greens want to show that they are more than an environmental party. The second national congress of the party, however, concentrated on philosophical and idealistic views which will become quite difficult to transform into concrete politics.

The party platform of the Greens has been so little prepared that they will not allow any quotations from it in public. At any rate, not without pointing out at the same time that it is a question of a program which is 'still under consideration and in the process of editing.'

Even if the party is still working to become entitled to nominate candidates for the next elections to the Folketing, "Denmark's only environmental party" still seems to be far from having found its identity.

No attempts were, indeed, made to conceal this fact during the party's second national congress, held at Haderslev yesterday.

The approximately 50 participants spent most of the time in attempts at working out "a basic human view." There was such a large number of views, and they were marked by ideology to such a great extent that it will become difficult converting them into concrete politics.

Inger Brochmann, Slangerup, referred to the party as a "cry of ideological distress:"

"We do not focus on the economy unlike all the other parties, but on the human being in the society. Only man is capable of changing the situation of pollution and the materialistic philosophy. We are not there, neither for workers nor for employers, socialists or liberals, home owners or other interest groups but for human beings," said Inger Brochmann.

Poul Bjerre Andersen, Copenhagen, wanted further information on the philosophies of those present. However, he was not permitted to carry through an examination of views. On the blackboard in the meeting hall, he wrote, among other things: "Socialism, humanism, democracy, the religions of the East, spiritual science, etc." He, moreover, asked the participants to list their highest priorities. This small incident was stopped, however, as the majority of the

Greens present did not want to become categorized.

Preben Bjørn Madsen, deputy mayor of Høje Tåstrup, who is a member of the party's coordination group, pointed out that the Greens comprise many political viewpoints. He admitted, however, that it is difficult for the party to disengage itself from the suspicion that the Greens are leftists.

"Many left-wing parties place higher priority on work places than on the environment, and this is where we are decisively different," said Preben Bjørn Madsen, who was elected on the local environmental list at Høje Tåstrup.

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CSO: 3613/20

SCHLUTER MAY BE LESS ABLE TO RELY ON RADICAL LIBERALS' SUPPORT

Leadership, Party Members Diverge

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Oct 84 p 8

[Editorial: "The Radical Liberal Rebellion"]

[Text] The Radical Liberal Party is in the midst of a minor rebellion. The party leadership and the Folketing group are faced with a mutiny among delegates and constituency organizations. There is extremely great dissatisfaction with the agreement entered into by the party with the government on educational openings for young people and on job creation schemes. The air is thick with protests, and abolition of honorary posts and even withdrawals have been announced. In other words, the fundamental basis of the government is in the process of being damaged.

It is understandable that the representatives of the Radical Liberal Party expect their party not only to be able to have some of the planks of the Radical Liberal platform fulfilled but also to be able to prevent the adoption of bills which they do not care for. The parliamentary situation makes it necessary for the government to continuously negotiate agreements with the Radical Liberal Party to ensure the political stability which is the condition for carrying through the economic recovery. The Radical Liberals hold greater power than justified by their number of seats. However, in every party, party representatives will find it difficult accepting compromises which, in any circumstances, contain elements which they do not care for. It is, after all, a condition for compromises that they incorporate various opinions. This applies to the government parties in their joint efforts and it applies to the government in its cooperation with the Radical Liberal Party.

There is, however, no reason to fear that the basis will disintegrate although it will receive a few scratches. There are indications that the Radical Liberals--like the public in general--have not quite understood the actual content of the compromise which has been entered into. The immediate reaction, the instantaneous indignation of which manifests itself so readily in the mass media, sidetracks the debate because the reaction is directed against an incomplete basis. More comprehensive information is needed to bring about a debate which may be conducted on the basis of objective arguments. This is a recurrent problem which the government has often been subject to when presenting its policy.

Once the Radical Liberal leaders have got their dissidents somewhat under control, and people have calmed down, there will be good possibilities for a discussion on the details of the compromise and the long-term effects it may have. It will then appear that the purpose of the compromise is neither as negative--nor as downright evil--as some are inclined to believe.

May Affect Foreign Policy Support

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Oct 84 p 15

[Commentary by Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen]

[Text] The party supporting the government's economic policy has during the past week got restive. It is hardly a sign of withdrawal. For that, the Radical Liberal Party is placed in a much too ideal position.

A placement in or merely close to the well-worn political center may give influence. The Radical Liberal Party makes a good deal of capital of this, as it has been doing throughout most of the party's history.

The position of the Radical Liberal Party has been favored by the majority situation in the Folketing. It has become particularly complicated since the radical transformation of the party pattern.

Apart from this, however, it is no new problem that they are difficult. The Social Democratic Party has never been close to a parliamentary majority. The nonsocialist division has, throughout the post-war period, meant that the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party have not been able either to accomplish a great deal on their own.

Parliamentary conditions such as these have brought the party in the center into a key position. For many years, the fate of the Social Democratic governments depended either on a government cooperation with the Radical Liberal Party or at least a stable cooperation with them. When, in the course of the sixties, the close relations to the Social Democratic partner started disintegrating, the Radical Liberals became the partner of the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party.

Against this background, it is no accident that coordination and cooperation are key words in the vocabulary of the Radical Liberal Party. It was, after all, the former leader of the Radical Liberal Party, Bertel Dahlgaard, who launched the idea of a democracy based on cooperation. To Dahlgaard, who had been involved since the joint government with Stauning of the thirties till the changed conditions of the fifties and the early sixties, this was an elegant attempt at glorifying the parliamentary constellation which had brought the Radical Liberals so many good things.

A placement in the center may, however, also be a difficult position. The Radical Liberals have experienced the truth of this not least after the disruption of the old party system. With the many parties in the Folketing,

situations may easily arise where it is not certain ahead of time that the government in power will be forced to seek the support of the Radical Liberal Party. The Radical Liberal Party experienced this when the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party, for a short time, joined forces in a government cooperation. The party has also experienced this on occasion when the Social Democratic minority governments of the last decade have been arranging compromises where the Radical Liberal Party was not needed to obtain a majority in the Folketing.

A placement in the center is also dangerous in another way. The profile of the Radical Liberal Party has sometimes suffered a great deal, and there were undoubtedly many who found Anker Jørgensen's comparison of the party with a bar of wet toilet soap fitting. That characterization occurred at a time when the party was once more in motion around its own short axis. The relations of cooperation with the Social Democratic minority government were extremely taxing, and the government cooperation came to nothing.

From then on, the days of the Social Democratic government were numbered. The supporting party was ready to accept a new experiment where the nonsocialist four-leaf clover formed a minority government. This constellation has provided the Radical Liberals with a comeback as the party which cannot be ignored. At the same time, the party has found a position which in many respects is ideal.

At an early point, the prime minister stated that the economic policy was given the highest priority by the government. If the government is to be overturned, it will have to take place on the basis of its economic policy measures and not on the basis of some wording or other of its foreign policy proposals. Since the Radical Liberal Party so far has been formulating demands in the area of the economic policy which in most respects have been closely similar to or have coincided directly with the intentions of the government, there has been a basis for a close cooperation. Since the January election, this cooperation has been so close that the Radical Liberals for all practical purposes may be regarded as part of the government.

By not participating in the government itself, the Radical Liberals have, at the same time, retained their freedom of movement in other areas. They are able to avoid participation in the defense agreement, they are able to coast in foreign policy matters without either they or the government running any risk that the Social Democratic Party may drive a wedge into the government cooperation. In this way, the cooperation with the government parties is considerably more stable than the participation of the Radical Liberal Party in the Liberal, Conservative and Radical Liberal government. During its 3 years of existence, the Radical Liberal Party and its partners had all the time to put up with the Social Democratic challenges of their cooperation through foreign policy and defense policy initiatives which made life difficult for the Radical Liberals.

The possibilities of the Radical Liberals for opposing the government's policy in areas other than the economic policy area, for example, in the declaratory battlefield of foreign policy and environmental policy, have so far sufficed

to keeping the representatives of the party calm. The question naturally is whether the agitation during the past week in connection with the participation of the Radical Liberals in the budget agreement is an omen of new, difficult times for the cooperation of the government with the Radical Liberal Party. That is hardly conceivable. The attempts which we have experienced appeared clearly to have been launched in conjunction with the preparations of a deputy chairman for his entry into the Folketing via the secure Skive constituency. At the same time, the Radical Liberals have far too much at stake for risking being thrown anew into the arms of the irresponsible Social Democratic Party.

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MANEUVERS, COMPETITION IN RIGHT WING ANALYZED

Internal Readjustments

Paris LIBERATION in French 3 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by Jean-Michel Helvig: "Opposition Positions Itself for Start of 1986 Race"]

[Text] The National Assembly elections are still 18 months off. Yet it is apparent that this summer everyone began thinking more about those elections following President Mitterrand's appointment of Laurent Fabius as prime minister. In so doing, the president activated the governmental apparatus that will serve as the noncommunist Left's campaign machine for 1986. This maneuver abruptly roused the opposition whose younger members were the ones to most quickly realize what dangers they faced if they failed to initiate an "aggiornamento". It was in this situation that Raymond Barre moved up into first place ahead of a Jacques Chirac hobbled by his strident calls for dissolution of the National Assembly. Thus Barre now commands recognition as the other leader, with Chirac, of the Right-wing opposition, and the one, in any case, who is likely to attract the broadest political support (see following article). Barre's irruption onto the political scene is not the work of one man alone. Over the past 3 years, Barre supporters have been busily organizing what are known as "the Barre networks," an organization that will start to become operative as early as the 1986 parliamentary elections (see second following article).

This summer belonged to Mitterrand. This fall belongs to the Rightist opposition. The president's initiatives, and foremost of all his appointment of Laurent Fabius as prime minister, hit the opposition's political organizations like so many electric shocks. During the traditional "summer schools," the last of which--the Republican Party's at Font-Romeu and the Radical Party's at Le Canet--closed their doors this week, observers noted incipient stress lines, if not fracture lines, indicating that the general great hustle and bustle of the opposition's march on to the 1986 parliamentary elections, and beyond those on to the 1988 presidential election, has only just begun.

Circumstances had theretofore given the Right more opportunities to present a united front against the "socialo-communists" than to clearly define its own course of action. In this regard, the European Parliament election proved to be a sort of damper that simply postponed any real debate on tactics and platforms.

A new-style of government, the departure of the communist cabinet ministers, a certain neutralization of the civil liberties question as a political issue, and behold! the opposition slumped back into its former spell-like complaisance. Francois Leotard of the PR [Republican Party] and Philippe Seguin of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] were the first to put their finger on the new situation. Others followed suit: Alain Juppe (RPR), Charles Millon (PR), etc.

Much has been made of a split between hard-liners and more tolerant elements advocating an easing of tension, indeed even of a squabble between generations. What has primarily happened is that the opposition has opened a far-ranging strategic debate in which everyone's unquestionable wish to see a united opposition win, is brutally clashing with the undeniable desire of each one of the principal protagonists to derive a decisive advantage from that victory. But history is not given to passing the fruits of victory around. Consequently the loser or losers of the next presidential race will be able to take it easy for a while, regardless of whether the winner is from the Left or the Right.

The abrupt emergence of the National Front party on the national political scene is a cardinal factor in this strategic debate. Indeed more than one opposition parliamentarian now spends many a restless night disturbed by "Frankenpen" [Jean-Marie Le Pen], as the leader of the Far Right is called on the "Collaroshow."

The National Front (FN) poses problems particularly for the RPR. As the opposition's principal organized force, with a leader whose hard-hitting image delights those Rightist voters who dream of crossing swords as quickly as possible with the "usurpers" currently in power, the RPR is the most threatened of the opposition parties. If it stands aloof from the FN, it loses its "good will" among its traditional electorate. If it smiles at the newcomers, it disappears into the Rightist darkness, leaving a clear field to its liberal-centrist rivals.

As is proper, Chirac has compromised. He condemns Jean-Marie Le Pen's "ideology" and formally rejects any national alliance with the FN, but puts up with it locally (in Dreux and Corsica). And above all, Chirac has hardened his criticism of the government in an effort to deprive the Far Right of any room for maneuver.

The blocking of the chief of state's referendum proposal reflected this hardened attitude. (Le Pen would have been the only one to campaign against the referendum if the parliamentary Right had agreed to play ball with the president). [In addition, dissolution of the National Assembly] serves as the RPR's all-purpose response to the slightest governmental action. The main weakness of this defense system, approved by Chirac at the 22 July special meeting of the RPR's central committee, lies in its rigidity. Should the political climate become milder, Chirac's bazooka would look like a water pistol.

Raymond Barre demonstrated this Friday in the twinkling of an eye with the following hard-hitting remark before a group of young Social Democrats: "It is

useless and futile to announce every 6 months that the government is in a precarious state and about to collapse, and call for dissolution while knowing full well that it will never happen, and also announce that one is prepared to govern with the same president one has thus far been denouncing." While Chirac compromised in dealing with the Le Pen problem, Barre sort of killed two birds with one stone in the above statement. 1. He certified himself as a supporter of legitimate authority, a stance that cannot help but attract the moderate electorate, to say nothing of "socialism's disappointed followers". 2. He made a great impression upon "socialism's exasperated followers" by his opportune reminder that he has always refused to consider working with the current president if the opposition were to win the parliamentary elections. But Chirac would, even though he does not think much of him.

This division within the opposition over the dissolution issue symbolically marks the build-up of the "Barre networks". An operation prepared willy-nilly by all those persons who, by trying to outdo each other in calling for an easing of political tension this summer, contributed to destabilizing Chirac's political machine.

The magnitude of the damage can be measured by the violence of Bernard Pons' retort in the JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE. His sharp reply referred to "collaboration or defeatism" while mentioning those "individualists" who go so far as to consider a more temperate opposition than in the past. In Gaullist rhetoric such words can only be viewed as alluding to that "Vichyist Right," a category in which the nebulous UDF [Union for French Democracy] used to be placed not so very long ago.

Although these words do not refer expressly to Raymond Barre, the latter is certainly not unconnected with the RPR general secretary's flare-up. If Barre should gain definite supremacy over Giscard within the UDF, he would represent a politically lethal danger to Jacques Chirac in that he, Barre, would then attract potentially broader support than Chirac.

In this alarming situation, some RPR members now miss Giscard who has sidelined himself for the time being. And persons, here and there, are gloatingly speculating about the former president's return to the UDF group in the National Assembly and the inevitably resultant rivalry with his former prime minister.

The RPR plans to counterattack particularly by emphasizing its economic and social proposals. This will be Jacques Chirac's task when appearing on [television channel] TFI's "l'Enjeu" [a sort of "Issues and Answers" program] on 13 September. The RPR's congress in November is expected to enable that party to popularize these proposals with much flourish. RPR strategists believe it is possible to counter Raymond Barre on the issue of governmental credibility because he is inclined to be extremely circumspect in proposing specific programs.

This will be a "hot" autumn for the Right. The Fabius appointment made the opposition open one eye, but paradoxically it is Barre's inroads upon the UDF that have shocked the opposition wide awake.

Barre 'Networks'

Paris LIBERATION in French 3 Sep 84 p 3, 4

[Article by Fabien Roland-Levy: "The Barre 'Networks' and the Spider-Like Strategy"]

[Text] Some 3 years after the voters sent his boss [Giscard d'Estaing] back to his native Auvergne, former prime minister Raymond Barre has acquired human and political resources that now preclude his being called a man alone. Starting with a core of highly reliable and determined associates, he has built, in 3 years time, a veritable network of devoted supporters, or rather networks that are operating mainly below the surface but whose highest points are already beginning to come into view.

The Barre networks are coordinated by a handful of loyal associates, most of whom formerly served on Barre's staff when he was prime minister. They now work in his campaign headquarters on Boulevard Saint Germain. The official associates, those who cannot be reached by telephone, include the following: Yvette Nicolas, "the housekeeping shrew", a nickname which is a whole program in itself; Sylvie Dumaine, the parliamentary liaison officer; Pierre-Andre Wiltzer, rapporteur of the Council of State, who sees to almost everything and acts as chief of staff; and Jacques Alexandre, former press secretary to Barre as prime minister. Alexandre frequently accompanies Barre on his trips. To track down all other elements of the largely covert Barre networks, a person has to have a pair of powerful binoculars.

Nevertheless, on Thursday mornings from a vantage point on the sidewalk in front of the Lipp brasserie, a person can see, without the help of binoculars, six prominent politicians entering--one after another, between approximately 0814 and 0816--a gateway on the other side of Boulevard Saint Germain. Pierre Mehaignerie (UDF), chairman of the CDS [Social Democrats Center], Andre Rossinot (UDF), chairman of the Radical Party, Jacques Barrot, general secretary of the CDS, and three members of the National Assembly, Charles Millon (PR), Jean-Pierre Soisson (PR), and Philippe Mestre (UDF), all arrive at the headquarters to have breakfast with Raymond Barre. These six men constitute the future presidential candidate's political general staff which now meets weekly to discuss a prearranged agenda. Pierre-Andre Wiltzer is responsible for drafting the minutes of these meetings. The Barre campaign's real executive committee is evidently "totally immersed," to use the expression of a member of Barre's entourage.

Nibbling at the Political Parties

Another type of regular meeting is also scheduled to begin when the National Assembly reconvenes. These will be weekly working-luncheons with members of that legislative body. The deputy from Lyon [Barre] did, however, already meet with a dozen of his parliamentary colleagues 12 days ago in the Sofitel Hotel. In addition to such well-known Barrists [Barre supporters] as Charles Millon of the Republican Party (PR), also in attendance was Jean Brocard (from Savoy) who up to now was believed to be a loyal Giscardian. Knowing that

Giscard, who is expected to be elected deputy from Puy-de-Dome on 23 September, will certainly launch a "glamor" offensive, it can be logically assumed that Barre is anxious to tighten his hold on a UDF parliamentary group the majority of whose members have thus far been committed to him.

Whenever the former prime minister is told he has no political party and that without a party organization behind him it appears impossible to gain the presidency, he readily lists the different organizations within the UDF on which he can count: the CDS, for the power and authority of its network of influential Centrist leaders; the Valois Radical Party whose chairman, Andre Rossinot, the deputy mayor of Nancy, is a staunch supporter; members of the UDF proper led by Michel Pinton, but especially Philippe Mestre, deputy for La Vendee, Barre's former chief of staff in the Hotel Matignon [prime minister's official residence].

The last few months, a steadily increasing number of UDF federations have joined the Barre camp, generally on the prompting of the influential Barrist leaders of those federations. Such was the case in Yonne with Jean-Pierre Soisson, in Mayenne with Francois d'Aubert, in Ain with Charles Millon. All of this would be relatively insignificant if within Giscard's very own party, the PR, some members were not now working openly for Barre. This is true notably in the Rhone, Val d'Oise, and Aube where some 20 PR federations are said to be involved according to a member of the Barre networks. Even worse is the fact that Jean-Pierre Soisson, Pascal Clement, deputy from the Loire, and particularly Charles Millon, all official Barrists of the Giscardian party, are endeavoring to establish an official Barrist movement with the Republican Party.

Francois Delatre, the mayor of Franconville (Val d'Oise) and Charles Millon's "henchman," is currently conducting a systematic survey of all delegates to the Republican Party Congress to be held in 2 weeks. Francois Leotard recently decided to block the emergence of this Barrist movement. But he could be in for some surprises because PR Barrists are determined to have their votes counted one way or another. Leotard wants at all costs to be his own man and no longer viewed as the spiritual son of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Hence he has already declared himself to be nonaligned. The chairman of the UDF group in the National Assembly, Jean-Claude Gaudin, irritated Giscard a few weeks back by flaunting a similar desire to be neutral.

Lastly, Barre's influence would not be complete if it did not encroach upon the Chirac family. Four young RPR deputies are quasi-officially under the Barrist influence: Francois Fillon, Michel Barnier, Philippe Seguin, and Michel Noir. Like the Republican Party's Millon and Aubert, most of them were elected in 1978 thanks to the vigorous campaign waged by then majority leader Raymond Barre. At all events, they are convinced of this because they were able, so they say, to verify the man's effectiveness on the campaign trail and still cannot understand why Giscard kept his prime minister in the background during the 1981 presidential campaign.

Origins of Barrism

But Barrism's power to act would be nil without the second network which is a spider web of professional persons, i.e. doctors, lawyers, high-level civil

servants, but principally heads of business firms. Thousands of them are said to be working for Barre throughout the country, ready to commit themselves publicly the moment they are given the signal to do so. During the period when Barre was out of the limelight--May 1981 to early 1982--they were the first to show signs of being partial to him.

To understand how this partiality ultimately became support and then a network, we must turn back in time.

Back to May 1981, when only a small group of faithful followers continued to support the former prime minister. This hard core included Pierre-Andre Wiltzer, Sylvie Dumaine, Jean-Claude Casanova, former technical adviser on Barre's ministerial staff, Albert Costa de Beauregard, and Francois Froment-Meurice who remained in the government's general secretariat for a period of several months after the Socialist Party victory. Another of the faithful was Bruno Du.ieux, Barre's chief "forecaster" in the Hotel Matignon. Upon his prompting, the core of die-hards, at a loss for what to do, almost immediately formed the GESEC (Economics Study Group) which quickly attracted other eggheads uneasy about the socialist government's economic recovery policy. "In the beginning", one of the group's founders explained, "we made the volunteers sweat and slave, but without any specific goal. Then we started publishing articles here and there on the great issues of the day and on topics of current interest." This quite naturally led to FAITS ET ARGUMENTS, Raymond Barre's monthly review. Frank Lessay, its editor and an Ecole Normale Superieure alumnus, had previously worked for Barre as a writer on the Hotel Matignon staff.

During the same period, preparations were also being made for the coming great debate on nationalizations. A handful of young 1978-vintage deputies were already working on the matter. When the government released its proposed nationalization legislation and regulations, Jean-Maxime Leveque, president of the CCF [Commercial Credit Bank of France], was roused to action. A defense of the threatened private sector had to be organized. In early October 1981, he held a highly secret working-luncheon in his bank's main office with Ambroise Roux and Pierre Moussa, one of the directors of the Bank of Suez. All three men were favorite targets of the proponents of nationalization. The following deputies also attended the luncheon: Jean Foyer (RPR), Michel Noir (RPR), Jacques Godfrain (RPR), Francois d'Aubert (PR), Charles Millon (PR), plus Senator Etienne Dailly of the Radical Party. Ambroise Roux told the group that he had prepared a counterattack plan. He then drew a thin folder from his brief case and displayed four or five amendments to the proposed nationalization law. "That's all there was to Ambroise Roux' battle plan!", indignantly explained one of the future members of what was going to become the "club," the first manifestation of Barrism on the march. The idea of forming this very exclusive club of young militant deputies was born very shortly after the Leveque luncheon, when the young deputies agreed that they would have to rely on their own forces. Thus the club was created as an aftermath of the luncheon. Its membership included Millon, d'Aubert, Seguin, Noir, and a few others. Its activities were coordinated by Francois Froment-Meurice.

Spider Web

But wrangling with socialists in the National Assembly was not enough to secure Barrism's hold on public opinion. In the bourgeois but simple comfort of their Boulevard Saint Germain headquarters, the Barre staff was receiving more and more calls, invitations, messages of encouragement, and earnest requests. Persons were demanding Barre's presence in the provinces. And he did, in fact, go there, holding an ever-increasing number of meetings, conferences, and discussions. The review FAITS ET ARGUMENTS began to gain influence and readership. "It was an important tool for building up grass-roots support," said one of Barre's associates. Its list of subscribers was used to organize meetings and form discussion clubs. And with such good results that in early 1983 Raymond Barre called upon Daniel Doustin to systematize this somewhat cumbersome upsurge in interest and support.

This former prefect, and Barre's Hotel Matignon chief of staff before Philippe Mestre, was given the task of designing "the field nomenclature of bottom-of-the-line Barrism", to quote a Barre adviser. The system adopted is simple and circumspect. When a new Barrist appears at the Paris headquarters, a rapid investigation of his political conduct and character is made, generally by local CDS [Social Democrats Center] officials. If the results of this check are favorable, a list of FAITS ET ARGUMENTS subscribers is sent to the new Barrist. He then uses it to make his own horizontal contacts. This system has produced a large number of associations throughout the country, associations made up of "local deciders".

Because of the lack of space in the headquarters building, Daniel Doustin's office is in a neighboring building, the "annex," which inconspicuously houses a documentation center and the master personnel files of Barre supporters. These valuable files will be a positive factor when the Barre machine decides to surface.

Another network is composed of some 15 study clubs. Their members are high-level civil servants, economists, technicians, and specialists of every type. Their task is to provide "Babarre's" insatiable mind with food in the form of data and analyses. Barre allocates his Saturday afternoons to each one of his 15 study clubs. It should be noted that these clubs are not interrelated laterally.

A man with Barre's European political and academic background obviously has a thick address book. He scrupulously maintains his contacts with the elite of the world academic community. At the same time, through Jean-Claude Casanova, he nurtures his relations with the elite of the French intellectual Left which frequently is more interested in him than in the socialists. He secretly visits European chiefs of state. Early this spring, for example, he spent an afternoon chatting with Herman Kohl. Lastly, it is said that Barre's membership in the Trilateral Commission and his relations with a large Swiss bank also contribute to the expansiveness of his networks.

If history does not make this former economics professor the fifth president of the Fifth Republic, it will not be because he has not prepared himself for that high office.

Barre Candidacy

Paris LIBERATION in French 3 Sep 84 p 3

[Editorial by Serge July: "A Game of Leapfrog"]

[Text] At the height of the turbulence surrounding the Senate's consideration and subsequent rejection of the president's proposed referendum this summer, the opposition outwardly appeared to be rolling along in a tight pack [like a well-disciplined bicycle racing team]. It was at that moment, however, that Raymond Barre chose to make his first dash out of the pack and take a slight lead. This is a type of move usually made in the preliminary phase of the sprints. Supported and relayed by his teammates, Barre is now the one who has quickened the challengers race. And his moves, to say the least, have created utter confusion within the opposition's ranks.

Admittedly Raymond Barre's "equation" is particularly difficult to solve. As a presidential candidate, he has to eliminate two formidable rivals, Chirac and Giscard. And Chirac is viewed as the favorite among the opposition. Lastly, the republican timetable is not very favorable to Chirac's successor as prime minister. Indeed, the 1988 presidential election is preceded by the 1986 parliamentary elections which logically are likely to favor the RPR. And a parliamentary victory in 1986 would clearly strengthen Jacques Chirac's chances of gaining the presidency. In fact, that office is traditionally a bonus given to the leader of the dominant party.

It is, therefore, quite natural for Chirac and Barre to be fighting the clock in totally opposite ways. It is in Chirac's interest to precipitate events, unlike Barre who, on the contrary, has to slow them to a maximum extent, minimize the National Assembly elections as much as possible in favor of the important presidential election. The least that can be said about this equation is that it dovetails perfectly with Mitterrand's from a tactical standpoint. And to an even greater extent ever since this summer's presidential initiatives, with the result that an objective alliance can now be said to exist.

The referendary hodgepodge triggered by Mitterrand definitely boobytrapped the opposition as a whole, but most particularly the RPR which had prodded the conservative senatorial majority to support its proposed referendum on [private] schools. And Chirac's party, which was clamoring for early [National Assembly] elections and a return to the polling booths in short order, spent the summer trying to justify its rejection of the Mitterrand referendum. The Elysee Palace strengthened its hold on the opposition by putting an end to the reign of the socialist-communist governmental majority and appointing a new prime minister, Laurent Fabius, in an effort to win over the ideologically neutral electorate in the name of Social Democracy. Nothing could be more pragmatic than these presidential maneuvers. The latter also meant the time had come for Barre to "presidentialize" his organization and methods by exploiting the situation thus created.

Mitterrand's hard move to the Center had the effect of catching Chirac and his supporters in the act of extremely radicalizing French politics and institutions at a time when the RPR was trying to distance itself from Le Pen. Barre immediately surged into this gap between Mitterrand and the RPR because this conjuncture suddenly imparted new legitimacy to his presidential aspirations. Indeed, a segment of the opposition's moderate support is now alarmed about the violent political crisis that can erupt from the victory of an intolerant opposition in 1986, an opposition typified by Bernard Pons, Charles Pasqua, or Claude Labbe. Thus there is now a new oppositional electorate which has to be reassured. This is very obviously the task Barre has assumed. If successful, he would be able to rally to his side a body of followers which in some respects he has lacked to date.

In so doing, Barre wins on three counts: he vies with Fabius for the undecided or "floating" Center; he takes over a traditional Giscardian position, i.e. advocacy of tolerance and an easing of political tension, a few weeks before Giscard's return to the National Assembly in late September; and lastly, he partially spoils Chirac's efforts to cover the entire oppositional spectrum, as he endeavored to do, for example, through Simone Veil for the European elections. And as a consequence, persons in both the RPR and UDF see the future and perhaps inevitable Barrist secession directly in the offing.

And that is how the "soft Right" emerged to confront the "hard Right", in other words the RPR. For it will be noted that the basic issue of the debate within the opposition revolves around its relations with the present governmental majority, and also the style of those relations. But by professing to be a modern, realistic, and reassuring Right, Barrists logically come round to crediting the Fabius government with a certain number of qualities, and in an even more clear-cut fashion than they did when similarly crediting Jacques Delors [the former finance minister]. This recognition by the Barrists, even if partial and limited, also reflects credit on Mitterrand's attempted shift to the Center. And this temporary objective alliance is responsible for the "mini grace period" granted Laurent Fabius the past few days.

The "straight talk" oppositional approach used by Barre with respect to the government and to the opposition as well, gives the Fabius program room to move just as it is taking off. This also forms part of Barre's presidential scenario: to retain a chance in the race for the presidency, it is essential to Barre that Mitterrand's gambling move to the Center not be a total loss in either the near term or middle term. For both Mitterrand and Barre it is, of course, entirely a matter of properly proportioning their respective efforts.

This is altogether normal in that Fabius is Barre's stepping stone as much as Barre is his. Both men are thus engaged in a game of leapfrog, a game that has only just begun.

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POLL ON VIEWS ON SOCIAL, POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 28 Sep 84 pp 11-14

[Excerpt of Report by Gerard Driehuis and Tom-Jan Meeus: "Political Barometer-- Ten Years and the Spirit of the Times; that's how Far to the Right the Netherlands is"]

[Text] Ten years ago there was still some prospect of things changing--primarily improving. "Distribution of income, knowledge and power." Now, in 1984, the rich are getting richer again, the differences in income are increasing, development aid is being cut, school classes are getting larger again, and the prime minister wants to govern peacefully without demonstrations by some of his annoying subjects. How far has the restoration of the Netherlands progressed? Below are the sad results of an inquiry by DE TIJD and the Interview [polling] Bureau: the restoration of self-interest.

How does one determine whether Netherlanders indeed are so much more closeted than 10 years ago? In spite of the relativity that entails, we submitted a few propositions to the Dutch population. Most of those propositions had already been looked into in past years, but due to [Bertrand] Russell who once said: "there are statistics and there are lies," we shall refrain ourselves from comparing those former results with the current ones; for that, there is too much difference in the wording of the questions and in the groups which were interviewed.

Nevertheless, most of the sacrosanct topics of 10 years ago now have been demolished by Ed Nijpels. Just look at the tables. At one time poverty in the third world received a very high score. Now 92 percent of the population deems hunger in the world to be of secondary importance. For that matter, look at the score of PvdA [Labor Party] voters on this question; interest in problems outside our country meanwhile has become minimal (just as the priority of the nuclear armament problem appears low among PvdA voters).

Or perhaps look at the question into the necessity or desirability of cuts in development cooperation. Most of the interviewees think we've done enough.

/Their/ economy has received attention long enough; now it is the turn of /our/ economy. Detail: in both this question and the one above, the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] electorate tends to subordinate self-interest (unemployment, the economy) to the interests of others to a greater degree than PvdA voters.

As to the choice between Lubbers and Den Uyl as prime minister, at one time the slogan /Elect the Prime Minister/ was worth 10 additional seats. At that time Den Uyl was popular with both his friends and the CDA. The enemy was by far in the minority. Now there is very little interest among the interviewees for the possibility of a Den Uyl cabinet. The Interview bureau found so few CDA voters with a preference for Den Uyl that the number cannot even be translated into a percentage. And among the floating voters--who will represent a greater number than ever in the coming elections--the large majority want nothing to do with Den Uyl, and a majority prefer Lubbers.

As already mentioned, there is a considerable degree of relativity in these types of questions. The trouble is, however, that all the questions we asked (some of which are published here) point in the same direction. For example, we inquired (no table) into the desirability of a strong man to "put affairs in order without being hindered by parliament." No fewer than one out of four Netherlands are great supporters of that. Among the older interviewees (people over 50 years of age), one third support such a strong man.

Most Netherlands also seem to believe that benefits remove the urge to work, and therefore most are in favor of decreasing benefits. Among voters for government parties, that view is even shared by 70 percent. A strong man, a decrease in development aid, criminals locked up for longer periods of time, "put them back to work"--that itself is a system.

Table A--Who is the best prime minister for the Netherlands, Den Uyl or Lubbers?



	(1) allen	(2) PvdA	(3) CDA	(4) VVD	(5) klein links	(6) nog geen partijkeus bepaald
Lubbers	51%	9%	94%	94%	34%	56%
Den Uyl (7)	29%	74%	0%	3%	49%	6%
Weet niet (8)	11%	8%	2%	3%	0%	24%
Geen van beiden	9%	8%	4%	0%	17%	14%



[Key on following page]

Key:

1. Everyone
2. Labor Party
3. Christian Democratic Appeal
4. People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
5. Small leftist parties
6. Not yet decided on party
7. Don't know
8. Neither

Table B--Development Cooperation



(1a)

Stelling: op ontwikkelingssamenwerking moet net als op andere ministeries worden bezuinigd. Bent u het daarmee eens of oneens? ⁽⁷⁾

	(2) allen	(3) PvdA	(4) CDA	(5) VVD	(6) klein links	nog geen partijkeus bepaald
Eens (8)	55%	56%	51%	73%	34%	52%
Oneens (9)	38%	40%	39%	20%	63%	35%
Eens noch oneens (10)	3%	2%	6%	2%	0%	5%
Geen mening (11)	4%	2%	4%	4%	2%	8%

Criminality

(1b)

Stelling: de criminaliteit is te hoog, de gevangenisstraffen zijn te laag.
Bent u het daar mee eens of oneens?

(7)

	(2) allen	(3) PvdA	(4) CDA	(5) VVD	(6) klein links	nog geen partijkeus bepaald
Eens (8)	77%	77%	85%	84%	41%	71%
Oneens (9)	12%	19%	4%	4%	22%	12%
Eens noch oneens (10)	7%	1%	9%	11%	29%	5%
Geen (11) mening	5%	2%	1%	1%	7%	13%

[Key on following page]

Key:

- (1a) Proposition: Just as for other departments, cuts should be made in development cooperation. Do you agree with that or not?
- (1b) Proposition: criminality is too high; prison convictions are too low. Do you agree or disagree?
- (2) Everyone
- (3) Labor Party
- (4) Christian Democratic Appeal
- (5) People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
- (6) Small leftist parties
- (7) Not yet decided on party
- (8) Agree
- (9) Disagree
- (10) Neither agree nor disagree
- (11) No opinion

Well-being


Hebben de verdrievoudigde uitgaven aan welzijnswerk de afgelopen tien jaar uw welzijn verbeterd? (1)

	(2) allen	(3) PvdA	(4) CDA	(5) VVD	(6) klein links	(7) nog geen partijkeus bepaald
Nee (8)	74%	86%	76%	66%	48%	66%
Ja (9)	19%	10%	19%	26%	51%	23%
Weet niet (10)	7%	5%	9%	9%	0%	11%

Key:

- (1) Have the tripled expenditures on welfare work improved your well-being during the past 10 years?
- (2) Everyone
- (3) PvdA
- (4) CDA
- (5) VVD
- (6) Small leftist parties
- (7) Not yet decided on party
- (8) No
- (9) Yes
- (10) Don't know

Social Problems



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
		allen	PvdA	CDA	VVD	klein links	nog geen partijkeus bepaald
Welk van deze vier problemen moet het kabinet allereerst aanpakken? (8)		72%	77%	70%	82%	59%	74%
Kernbewapening (9)		12%	12%	14%	3%	32%	11%
Veiligheid op straat (10)		8%	6%	10%	6%	5%	8%
Armoede in Derde Wereld (11)		3%	1%	5%	4%	2%	2%
Geen van deze/weet niet (12)		4%	4%	2%	4%	2%	6%

Key:

- | | |
|---|----------------------------------|
| (1) Which of these four problems should the cabinet tackle first? | (8) Unemployment |
| (2) Everyone | (9) Nuclear armament |
| (3) PvdA | (10) Safety on the streets |
| (4) CDA | (11) Poverty in the Third World |
| (5) VVD | (12) None of those or Don't know |
| (6) Small leftist parties | |
| (7) Not yet decided on party | |

The Popularity of the Cabinet

	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	nog geen partijkeus bepaald (7)
	allen	PvdA	CDA	VVD	
september	5.6	4.6	6.9	7.0	5.8
juni	5.8	5.1	7.2	6.8	6.0
mei	5.5	4.7	7.2	6.8	5.7
april	5.5	4.8	7.1	6.8	5.4
maart	5.4	4.4	6.9	6.6	5.7
februari	5.8	4.9	7.1	7.0	5.5

Key:
[as above]

Esteem for the Prime Minister

	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	nog geen partijkeus bepaald (7)
	allen	PvdA	CDA	VVD	
september	6.2	5.1	7.7	7.4	6.4
juni	6.5	5.7	8.5	7.4	6.7
mei	6.0	5.2	8.1	7.5	5.9
april	6.1	5.2	7.9	7.1	6.1
maart	6.0	4.9	7.9	7.1	5.9
februari	6.0	4.9	8.2	7.4	5.7

Key:
[as above]

FREE-WHEELING DEBATE IN COMMUNIST PARTY CALLED TO HALT

Former Party Chairman Issues Charges

Oslo FRIHETEN in Norwegian 9 Oct 84 p 8

[Letter to the Editor by former party chairman Martin Gunnar Horgen]

[Text] The Norwegian CP has just held a new central committee election, an event that is usually quite normal and occurs without controversy. This time too the election took place in a legal manner even though the national committee was split in half on its view of who should hold some of the most important central positions.

In FRIHETEN's first issue after the national congress, party leader Hans I. Kleven published an article expressing his almost unqualified satisfaction with what occurred. This article produced quite strong reactions and led a calm and level-headed comrade like Torgeir Storseth to write that it is untrue "and at best a dubious mistake in judgment in the present situation when Hans I. Kleven calls the outcome of the national committee meeting 'a new boost and a new phase.' In reality there is more disappointment and frustration than there has been for a long time."

I must say I agree with that assessment and with comrade Storseth's statement that "it seems especially divisive and provocative that the majority of the national committee proposed and approved disciplinary action against Torgeir Horgen."

Comrade Magne Mortensen was quite outspoken in a sharp response to Hans I. Kleven that revealed the background for the election that was carried out. He charged that in the elections Hans I. Kleven had handpicked people from the Oslo area, thus standardizing the central committee to a large extent. He also described some methods that were used according to their merits.

It would be tempting to go into this in more detail but I will refrain. Many people have described Age Fjeld's almost incomprehensible presentation on the first day of the congress and no attempt by him or his friends can explain this away or deny his responsibility. Nor will the spreading of rumors that I was the one to leak reports from the national committee meeting succeed, but I have already responded to that charge earlier.

Several of the articles printed after the national committee meeting praised some of those who were elected. That is commendable as far as it goes. One should always have positive reasons for wanting to associate with particular comrades. On the other hand, others must be allowed to express divergent opinions.

But are the problems of our divided and restless party simply the result of personality issues, of people who cannot get along with each other? Unfortunately there are deep political differences behind the unrest produced by the national committee meeting.

In other words I do not agree with comrade Storseth on this point. For me it is not a question of whether I think a comrade is "wonderful" or "good," since there is not much difficulty in agreeing on characteristics like these. But the following is vital for the party. What policy does a comrade stand for today and how does it correspond to the unanimous political decisions made by our national congress?

No one has been naive enough to oppose congressional resolutions on the problems of the international and the Norwegian class conflict. As far as resolutions go the party has stood on the same foundation all the way back to the historic national congress of 1975. No, as far as congressional resolutions go we can say that the party is in agreement. But I would like to say that it is wrong to interpret that agreement as if there had not been and still are serious political differences in the party, with a number of comrades advocating positions directly conflicting with the main lines approved by the party. Let me say something about this.

Eurocommunism

It should no longer be kept secret that NKU [Norwegian Communist Youth] has had a special attitude toward the socialist countries, Eurocommunism and international events in recent years. This "NKU line" is directly opposed to the main approved party line, but it has now penetrated the central committee. Comrade Storseth's warning to the party leadership on this point is timely, although it did not go far enough.

It cannot be denied that Hans I. Kleven has clearly affirmed proletarian internationalism verbally and in writing--and often in very strong terms. Then how can he just as clearly and deliberately add people with more dubious views to the central committee? That is a riddle that only Kleven himself can answer.

Norwegian CP's Own Political Profile

Other members of the new party leadership have expressed very weak attitudes when it comes to outlining the party's special political profile as the champion of conditions for the working people in this country. The major emphasis is placed on political attitudes that have even been stated like this: the main thing in the 1985 election is to vote for the communists, the Labor

Party or the Socialist Left. Familiar and constantly rejected strains from periods of conflict in the Norwegian CP.

Flirting with the Chinese CP

At the last national committee meeting several people asked that no delegation be sent to China before the matter was thoroughly discussed by the national committee. The new central committee majority has totally ignored this. Instead they decided to send a "study delegation" to China, obviously a first step toward closer relations between the two parties. I have called this--and will continue to do so--a party shift to the right in the international political arena.

Can there be any doubt that there is a political content behind these shifts? It is not what the leader of the party says or writes that is important but what his handpicked cronies stand for and intend to introduce in the future.

Some Comments on Working Style

In my period as party chairman it was common to have confrontations with comrades who either stood for other views than the party's official political line or seized every opportunity to demand leeway, free discussions and openness in the press. There has been no absence of provocations this time either.

Do all those who belong to Kleven's close group of acquaintances have so much to teach us about a friendly working style? Age Fjeld's provocation and before that, Asmund Langsether's quite unfriendly attack on Arne Jorgensen after the FRIHETEN editor had participated very capably on a TV program on Poland indicate something about what we can expect. If that is a friendly working style, then look out!

Without hesitation and without fearing the criticism that this might produce, I place myself among the ranks of all those who view the future of the Norwegian CP with concern. The outcome of the last national committee meeting and the provocation that took place before the elections led a great many of those we need by our side to stop viewing the Norwegian CP as a serious political party.

The lack of external activity can be covered up inside the party with seminars with wise and correct lectures, but no attention at all is paid to them outside the party.

Our present central committee was elected legally. Of course that must be accepted and the committee must function until the next congress is held. But I totally agree that this next congress must be held as soon as possible, in other words by the spring of 1985. This can only be done by advancing the congress or by holding an extraordinary congress, as some districts and local groups have requested.

Should the aim of this congress be to let political heads roll in the party? Of course not. It should be a congress that elects a party leadership that

is not solidly planted around a leader but will insure firm support in practice for the party's main political line as laid out in 1975, not a single word of which has been changed since. It must represent the whole party and not just half or eighteen thirty-fifths of it.

It is clear that the present central committee will launch a counter-offensive to prevent this from happening and to consolidate its positions. There will be a hectic and intense amount of traveling in the weeks ahead by the party leader and his handpicked circle in an effort to subdue the unrest and discontent with the help of the "big guns" from the central committee. They must not succeed in this effort. The situation is too serious for that.

Central Committee Defended

Oslo FRIHETEN in Norwegian 9 Oct 84 p 9

[Letter to the Editor by Asmund Langsether]

[Text] The public press debate we have had on the decisions (elections) from the last national committee meeting of the Norwegian CP--concerning internal party matters, in other words--has raised questions about its intentions as a result of both its form and its content.

For what are we seeing now?

Comrades who have maintained the principle for decades that debate should cease when decisions have been made, that decisions should be supported even if one disagrees with them, that internal party matters should not be discussed in public and that it is the duty of all members to defend the party leadership both in public and internally, have now made no secret of their doubts about the party leader and some unnamed people alleged to be his "close partners."

And all this after an election process in which all viewpoints and arguments were expressed and after a voting procedure that complied with party regulations.

To begin with, I would like to say that democratic centralism is not worth much for some party members, at least not when they are in the minority.

What is it that leads central party representatives to allege that the party is now in serious danger, that the party leader has "handpicked" a central committee, which has brought the party to the brink and that the party leader and his closest colleagues are using methods that are unprecedented in the history of the Norwegian CP?

What is it that causes one or more party members to go anonymously to the press with the following "information"?

As a result of intriguing by Hans I. Kleven, Martin Gunnar Knutsen was forced out of the top party leadership when he was chairman. (AFTENPOSTEN, 13 September)

People in the Norwegian CP say that Kleven's attitude toward information is extremely flawed. (ARBEIDERBLADET, 14 September)

The Kleven faction purged everyone they could from the central committee. (ARBEIDERBLADET, 13 September)

Arne Jorgensen, editor of the party newspaper FRIHETEN, would probably also have been forced out if he had not already been elected. (ARBEIDERBLADET, 13 September)

Kleven's mainstay, Age Fjeld, accused Martin Gunnar Knutsen of being a regular supplier of Norwegian military secrets to the Soviet Union. (ARBEIDERBLADET, 13 September)

However many members of the minority group felt this move had been orchestrated by the "Kleven faction." (ARBEIDERBLADET)

And in conclusion, what leads comrades to call /publicly/ [in italics] for an extraordinary national congress?

Internal Danger

The party is now in danger, it is charged by Magne Mortensen, among others. We are not told clearly what the danger consists of but it is obviously an internal danger that is represented by certain "handpicked" members of the new central committee.

I do not like veiled hints and I have been around long enough to know what operations are being planned when people talk about internal dangers.

Therefore I would like to be told explicitly which members of the new central committee represent a danger to the party. Are they new members or old ones? I would particularly like to know if I am regarded as a danger to the party.

What is the Danger?

What does the danger consist of this time?

Have some party enemies been elected to the leadership?

Have capable comrades been pushed aside to make room for (handpicked) comrades who are simply loyal to the party leader?

Does the party leadership now consist of a majority that will undermine the party's programs, resolutions and political line?

Does the danger consist of the fact that some representatives were elected by a majority of a single vote?

Let me answer the last question first.

Recently several central representatives, including the vice chairman and the secretary, have been elected with a majority of as little as a single vote. What is new this time is that comrades who were in the minority have not accepted the results.

If one can talk of a majority in the new central committee, it consists of comrades who have been central figures in working out the party's programs, congressional resolutions, election programs and resolutions on a long list of questions after the SV [Socialist Left] period. What is it that now makes these comrades a danger to the party?

Insult

The charges that the party leader handpicked a majority are an insult both to the national committee and to the party leader. He has the same right as anyone else to say who he will support for the various elected offices. That has been done in this party before without anyone reacting to it.

A big issue has been made out of the fact that some comrades were not re-elected to their positions. The arguments here make it sound as if some people have a right to be re-elected no matter what they have done.

This has long been the situation in the Norwegian CP and in my opinion it has been a contributing factor to the party's steady decline.

Consideration for the party should take precedence here over personal ambitions and prestige and comrades must learn to accept the fact that they cannot be re-elected if they have not functioned in the posts they were elected to or if there are other comrades who can do a better job. Comrades must also learn to work loyally even if they are in the minority or fail to gain re-election.

I am not saying this to offend anyone. Especially not Trygve Horgen, who in my opinion was placed in an impossible working situation when he was asked to fill the role of deputy leader separately from the rest of the leadership.

Extraordinary Congress

What surprises me the most is the demand for an extraordinary congress and the reason given for it, namely that there is unrest in the party. I cannot think of anything more apt to create unrest and intensify the conflict in the party than this demand.

The national committee and central committee that have now been elected have the major responsibility for solving the fundamental task of bringing the

Norwegian CP into the Norwegian labor movement as an initiating, creative, consciousness-raising and organizational force; to really introduce a new phase for the Norwegian CP.

This task is hard enough without some people attacking and casting doubts on the party leadership publicly.

Call for Extraordinary Congress Rejected

Oslo FRIHETEN in Norwegian 9 Oct 84 p 9

[Letter to the Editor by Sigvald Sundby]

[Text] I did not attend the national congress but I elected the delegates from my local group and these delegates were specifically instructed to vote communists into the national and central committees.

It was my assumption then that all who attended the congress were communists and I am still sure of that. But none, I repeat none of us is a good enough communist, none of us is like Davidov in Sholokov's "New Earth." Most of us work for the party in our spare time with some training, usually not much, and all of us have our shortcomings. And that is a good thing.

In view of the fact that the congress laid out party policy practically unanimously and that any disagreements did not follow what has now turned out to be a majority and a minority, especially since there were several groups with different positions in both the majority and the minority, this makes little difference. (I am not on that barricade, so I am basing this on second-hand information, but I would like to mount the barricades against our enemies.) However one thing is certain. The decisions were made by a majority. I can agree or disagree, but as a party member I must yield to these decisions, which is something other people ought to do too.

Another Congress?

The only result of a new congress would be to use up the money that has been so laboriously put aside and that should be spent on external activities. The only change, for better or for worse, would be that the current 17 members might win a majority, and would the present group of 18 accept that?

Another national congress would not solve any problems. In a party context we cannot vote our way out of an impasse. We would come closer to what "Rulle" describes: "While the enemy lies in wait, we give up the ghost." (Everyone should really read the whole poem.) No, what we need is for the "hotheads" to act like communists and clear up their differences face to face, whether the differences are political or personal.

Searching For Reasons

I do not doubt for a minute that everyone, both in the majority and in the minority, is in the party in order to create a tool that will make conditions better for both those who deserve it and those who do not in this country.

Those of us who are on the sidelines are searching for the reasons for this split, which we understand less and less.

It is a fact that the party's policy was set out unanimously during the congressional period, so what is it that people disagree about?

It is my belief that frustration is spreading. After years and years of external and organizational work in which time after time one sees that one's policy is not getting across, is not making any impact or hardly any, one gets tired of it and starts looking for scapegoats and internal mistakes, since that is something we are good at doing.

We must discipline ourselves, comrades, but that is not enough, we must also have some sympathy for each other. And as we know the heart is located on the left side, so let's see to it that it is not 17 against 18, but 17 plus 18, for we are all communists.

Editor of CP Organ Comments

OSLO (AP) — A Norwegian 9 Oct 84 p 9

[Statement by Editor-in-Chief K. R. Schreiner]

[Text] Of course the editor of a communist newspaper can only keep a debate going as long as the central committee gives its approval. But if the central committee decides that a debate is no longer desirable, it can order an end to it and then the editor has to obey the order. The editor does not follow a political line of his own. He is not an institution. He is not a political organ in himself.

The newspaper should be a powerful political sledgehammer, but the hammer is swung as the party with the central committee acting as the section leader.

The statements may seem somewhat unfair. But they are valid and have to be accepted. That is all there is to say about that. What is needed is discipline, discipline and still more discipline.

Central Committee Halts Debate

Oslo FRIHETEN in Norwegian 11 Oct 84 p 15

[Resolution passed by the Norwegian CP central committee at its meeting on 9 October 1984]

[Text] At its meeting on 9 October the central committee of the Norwegian CP passed the following resolution:

One of the main prerequisites for strengthening the Norwegian CP and forging its ranks together is that there are good, friendly and responsible relations between the party and FRIHETEN. This is a basic prerequisite and is especially important in the situation in which the party now finds itself. There must not be political uncertainty concerning FRIHETEN's relation to the party leadership. A difficult and ultimately impossible situation will arise unless there is agreement between the leadership of the party and its newspaper when it comes to party matters.

FRIHETEN is issued by the Norwegian CP. It is the party's main organ and its most important external spokesman. The editor belongs to the national committee and is part of the party leadership: the working committee of the central committee. Under Section 10 of the party bylaws the central committee, as the party's highest organ in periods between congresses, is responsible for current work in the party, the party press and party enterprises. A free, open, objective and comradely discussion before decisions are made is a prerequisite for the functioning of democracy in the party. But the leadership of the newspaper and the party have a special responsibility when it comes to dealing with internal party matters at closed meetings that become the subject of a public debate. This is especially true after a decision has been made by the highest organs of the party.

The party's leading executive bodies were elected democratically at the last national committee meeting following a free discussion. The provisions in the party bylaws were adhered to. According to Section 5, which is based on democratic centralism, "all members and party organizations have a duty to live up to and carry out decisions that have been made." This applies to both political and organizational decisions, such as an election.

The central committee also refers to its resolution of 17 September on the national committee meeting. The information given here is based partly on the minutes from the national committee meeting of 8 September, which were read and approved. It is understandable that party comrades would discuss such an important decision as an election to central party offices. It cannot be expected that everyone agrees that the right comrades were elected. There has not been unanimity on a number of reorganizational moves. There have been--and will continue to be--divided opinions on a number of these choices. And it would be wrong to prevent the airing of opinions on this kind of thing. But party democracy must not be abused and there must be clear limits to this kind of debate after a decision has been made. It is now time to end the

debate on the national committee meeting and the reorganization. Further speculation or "interpretations" in the press of what was said or done at that meeting would have a disorganizing and divisive effect. It would create unrest in the party ranks and weaken our ability to deal with tasks inside and outside the party.

Only our opponents have anything to gain from a further divisive discussion about the reorganization. And nothing very "new" would emerge either.

Against this background and in view of the party's unity and its ability to function as a good tool for the working class and other progressive forces in the future, the central committee finds it necessary to issue the following resolution:

1. The debate in FRIHETEN on the reorganization must come to an end.
2. The debate on internal party problems should take place in our membership paper, VART ARBEID, which the central committee will have issued more frequently and more regularly than has been the case in the past.

but at the same time we would like to stress that we must continue to hold debates in FRIHETEN. Party members should use FRIHETEN far more actively and more deliberately to clarify party policies and promote constructive solutions to the tasks and problems confronting our party and the Norwegian labor movement.

There were four votes cast against this resolution.

pdf8

OSU: 4639/18

POLL, SPECULATION ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

Pintasilgo Loses, Soares Rises

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 p 9

[Text] Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo's fall from 18 percent to 15.4 percent and the rise of Mario Soares from 8.2 percent to 14 percent and of Francisco Lucas Pires from 6.2 percent to 9.8 percent may substantially alter the scene in the race for the 1985 presidential elections. The poll was taken from 4 to 15 October and coincides--by an unusual irony of fate--with the moment when Lourdes Pintasilgo announced her intention of being a candidate for Belem... However, over and above the spectacular rise of Mario Soares, which puts him almost on a par with Pintasilgo and coincides with the public repercussion of the PS [Socialist Party]/PSD [Social Democratic Party] summit (seen as the latter's implicit support for Soares), the high percentage of those saying they do not know or do not wish to say--45.8 percent--continues to be a significant sign.

Falling continuously since May of this year, when she achieved 26.2 percent, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is the great loser in the overall standings of the exclusive NORMA/SEMANARIO poll conducted from 4 to 15 October. The loss of 10.8 percent in 5 months drastically affects her pre-electoral position, although it corresponds to a period in which she was almost silent in terms of public statements.

Looking at the six cities chosen, Pintasilgo lost heavily in Lisbon, held her own in Coimbra and Porto and rose in Viseu, Vila Real and Evora. The drop in Lisbon (from 18.1 percent in September to 12.1 percent in October) more than made up for the improvement in Evora (from 27.1 percent to 42.1 percent during the same period).

The descent of Pintasilgo coincides with the rise of Mario Soares, who reaches his highest percentage of the last 6 months, exceeding his 13.8 percent rating in May. Soares has recovered from his low of September (8.2 percent), obtaining 2.7 percent more in Coimbra, 3.9 percent more in Evora, 6.5 percent more in Lisbon, 5.2 percent more in Porto, 1.4 percent more in Vila Real and 10.8 percent more in Viseu, compared with the previous month.

[Results of Monthly Polls]

Name	May	June	July	September	October
Lourdes Pintasilgo	26.2%	22.0%	22.3%	18.0%	15.4%
Mario Soares	13.8%	12.4%	10.3%	8.2%	14.4%
Lucas Pires	--	--	--	6.2%	9.8%
Mota Pinto	8.2%	8.7%	3.4%	5.4%	6.7%
Firmino Miguel	1.3%	5.8%	4.4%	5.1%	4.6%
Franco Nogueira	--	--	--	--	2.2%
Costa Bras	--	1.0%	--	0.7%	1.5%
No one	24.9%	25.9%	39.0%	29.3%	29.4%
No answer	9.1%	10.1%	10.7%	27.0%	16.3%

[Results of October Poll, By Cities]

Name	Coimbra	Evora	Lisbon	Porto	V. Real	Viseu
Lourdes Pintasilgo	11.7%	42.1%	12.1%	21.1%	19.3%	18.3%
Mario Soares	11.8%	11.5%	13.8%	14.9%	16.3%	18.1%
Lucas Pires	2.4%	3.9%	11.1%	9.1%	9.0%	11.5%
Mota Pinto	8.2%	7.9%	7.2%	4.5%	7.7%	13.9%
Firmino Miguel	10.8%	9.2%	4.3%	3.2%	5.3%	3.9%
Franco Nogueira	0.8%	1.1%	2.1%	3.1%	2.4%	1.4%
Costa Bras	--	4.0%	1.9%	0.6%	--	--
No one	33.2%	11.5%	29.8%	30.6%	26.2%	17.4%
No answer	21.1%	8.8%	17.7%	12.9%	13.8%	15.5%

A combination of circumstances that puts the prime minister close behind Pintasilgo and in a more comfortable pre-electoral position.

Francisco Lucas Pires is third, rising 3.6 percent from the previous month, which is the more significant in that for the first time Alberto Franco Nogueira (who had 2.2 percent) is included in this poll among the possible choices. In this poll Lucas Pires equals the percentage that Diogo Freitas do Amaral had in July (9.8 percent) and, above all, rose 6.5 percent in Lisbon and 0.4 percent in Evora. According to the weighting used by NORMA, the rise in Lisbon more than compensated for the loss of 6.6 percent in Coimbra, 0.2 percent in Porto, 2 percent in Vila Real and 1.6 percent in Viseu. But if one takes into account the percentages received by Franco Nogueira in these cities (and which presumably came in large measure from Lucas Pires voters), the differences are less--Pires would have risen in all of them except Coimbra, where the real reduction would still be 5.8 percent.

Well behind Lucas Pires comes Mota Pinto, with 6.7 percent, better than in July and September, but considerably worse than in May and June (8.2 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively).

As compared with September, Mota Pinto lost ground in Porto and Vila Real, held his own in Coimbra and gained in Lisbon, Evora and Viseu (especially the last). Nevertheless, far behind the percentages of Pintasilgo and Soares and even those obtained by Lucas Pires.

Mota Pinto is closely followed by Firmino Miguel, who dropped from 5.1 percent in September to 4.6 in October, registering a substantial decline in Lisbon, Vila Real and Viseu.

Franco Nogueira, newcomer to the poll, had some effect upon Costa Bras, who even so rose from 0.7 percent to 1.5 percent, although with significant support only in Lisbon and Evora (and 0.6 percent in Porto).

Franco Nogueira scored best in Porto, Vila Real and Viseu.

Adding up the percentages of the "candidates of the Left" (Pintasilgo, Soares and Costa Bras)--using a merely approximate criterion--we would have a total of 31.1 percent.

Adding up the amounts garnered by the four other names (assuming, on a purely hypothetical basis, that Firmino Miguel would be included among the potential "candidates of the Right") we would reach 23 percent.

Lastly, the percentage of those not choosing any of the names suggested rose from 29.3 percent to 29.4 percent.

On the other hand, the percentage of those who did not answer fell from 27 percent to 16.3 percent.

The summation of both of these categories represents almost 50 percent of those interviewed, indicating that the procession has not yet left the churchyard... A situation now worse for Pintasilgo and better for Soares. Fair for Lucas Pires. Worse for Mota Pinto. Discreet for Franco Nogueira and Costa Bras. And deficient for the widely-discussed candidacy of Firmino Miguel.

It remains to be seen whether the situation will be good or bad for other names that are now emerging in the field and that will be included in the next exclusive NORVA/SEMANARIO poll.

Balsemao Mentioned

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 p 10

[Text] Although never completely out of it, the name of Pinto Balsemao suddenly feels the glow of the political spotlight. "He will be a candidate for president," several members of the press have declared. Will he really? Taking shelter in silence, Balsemao does not reply. Persons close to him nourish the suspense generated by the unknown: "he will not"; "yes, he could..."; "perhaps..." Meanwhile, they continue to weigh the matter.

"I can't read Dr Balsemao's thoughts, but the possibility of his being a candidate is not out of line, it could have some basis. Otherwise, wait and see..."

Before giving free rein to questioners desirous of making a list of "reasons" justifying "the desirability of a Balsemao candidacy for the presidency," a warning: we are dealing with persons who know him well, followers of his who, under the protection of anonymity, do not even bat an eye when asserting: "He is one of the few personalities of our political life with possibilities of barring the way to Mario Soares and an Eanist candidate."

What reasons lead to such a line of thought? One, for starters: "Balsemao still has intact considerable political capital, abroad as well as in Portugal. Who, other than he and Mota Amaral, within the PSD, can run for president with any chance of success?"

Adding Up Figures

Having evaluated the political weight of Francisco Pinto Balsemao, they begin doing some arithmetic. It begins by assuming that "a candidate supported by the PDS, CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] and independents situated to the Left of the PSD" is certain to get "about 40 percent of the electorate's vote" in the first round of the presidential elections.

The calculations go on from there to assert that this possible and somewhat subjective 40 percent can be augmented in the second round by votes "of those who do not want either Soares or an Eanist candidate in Belem."

According to them, this Eanist candidate will have at the outset "at least 32 percent of the votes--the 20 percent of the PC [Communist Party?] and 12 percent from among PS voters."

As they see it, the PS will have only 28 percent of the electorate, leaving it scarcely enough maneuvering room to put Mario Soares in the second round of the presidential elections and later in Belem.

Difficulties and Optimism

Balsemao is the man for those supporters who little by little are clearing the way for a "difficult but not impossible" candidacy.

Difficult because "Mota Pinto will do everything to boost Soares to the presidency. Either presenting the nation with a working agreement--Soares in Belem, Mota Pinto in Sao Bento--or seeing to it that the PSD has a weak candidate..."

Difficult because the CDS, if it turns to this solution--would it? What was discussed at this week's luncheon engagement between Balsemao and Lucas Pires?--"will try to impose conditions entirely out of line with its electoral weight."

However, the optimism that "Balsemao will not lift a finger until Mota Amaral clearly says to him: go ahead, if you wish, because I am not going to run..." Convinced, and apparently with reason, that Mota Amaral has in recent months become a "has-been," the advocates of the "Balsemao for President" solution are choosing not to tilt at windmills but rather at one of the principal obstacles that lies in the path of their dreams: Balsemao himself.

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 p 11

[Text] If the PSD decides to choose a presidential candidate who is not affiliated with the party and is not a military man, the most probable name is undoubtedly that of Proenca de Carvalho. He combines several attributes that at the moment of truth could be decisive, such as being widely known (fruit of the years in which he managed the RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System], especially), good relations with the CDS (which might even support him), good contacts in business circles, acknowledged intellectual capability and an oratorical style that has made him one of the best criminal lawyers in Portugal. Besides, he has a personal and political friendship with Mota Pinto (responsible for naming the candidate he chose to be voted upon in the National Council), excellent relations with Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (Proenca de Carvalho is president of the annual stockholders meeting of Edipress, the company that owns SEMANARIO), with powerful independents such as Casqueiro and with personalities such as Freitas do Amaral, Pinto Balsemao and Manuel Joao da Palma Carlos.

Would Not Refuse

His friends assert that they are convinced that he would not refuse an invitation from the PSD. If this is true, then the question will be to find out whether such an invitation will be made some day. For Proenca de Carvalho everything could be decided on 25 November, if the National Council adopts a motion of presidential strategy that requires it to support a PSD member. If this does not happen and, above all, if Alberto Joao Jardim does not want to be a candidate, then Proenca will have real possibilities. Because the Madeira politician is likely to get approval, with the support of the "New Hope," of a motion of strategy that reinstates his earlier motion favoring a candidate who is anti-socialist and against the system. And few people will be in a position to be such a candidate except for Jardim himself. Among them undoubtedly would be the man whom Sa Carneiro once called Mota Pinto's "propaganda minister," but whom he chose to become president of the RTP when Cunha Rego became Soares Carneiro's adviser, taking part in his presidential campaign.

Jardim on Candidate's Qualifications

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 20 Oct 84 p 11

[Text] A potential PSD candidate for president of the republic, Alberto Joao Jardim, president of the Madeira Regional Government, saw his political prestige increase as a result of the regional elections, which confirmed the hegemony of that party in the Madeira archipelago.

In statements made to this newspaper, Jardim said that the candidate of the PSD should "be against the current politico-constitutional regime and support the 1980 platform of Dr Francisco Sa Carneiro."

Joao Jardim told us that such a candidate "must be supported by all the forces situated to the Right of the PSD," providing additional support for the latter

party, "The candidate against the system," Alberto Joao points out, "must also attract the support of important economic, social and moral forces of Portuguese society, which have as a common denominator the feeling that it is necessary to do something to change Portugal and save the democratic regime."

For Joao Jardim this force will constitute the Radical Alliance "which should never be confused with the Democratic Alliance. The AD [Democratic Alliance]," he explains, "was disputed within the PSD itself, did not have the support of the autonomous regions and was a contract between parties, leaving out the social and moral forces of Portuguese society."

"Moreover," the regional president points out, "the person proposed must unite the support of the three factions within the PSD and the governments of the Azores and Madeira."

Alberto Joao Jardim refused to name persons in the PSD who meet these requirements and denied having entered the electoral race for the nation's highest office.

However, the precision of the candidate's maneuvers, together with his equally impressive radio interview on the very night of his overwhelming electoral victory, leave the impression that Alberto Joao Jardim could yet become the 1985 presidential candidate.

Jardim Candidacy Advocated

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 17 Oct 84 p 6

[Commentary by Pedro Santana Lopes: "What Now?"]

[Text] What now? What are all those "intellectuals" and "deep thinkers" going to say? How will they explain, to themselves and to their vast circles of followers, what has happened?

They called him everything: from crazy to unthinking, from ridiculous to grotesque, from adventurer to prodigal, from "godfather" to dictator, while the other one was the image of good sense, of composure, of civilization, of democracy, of consensus, of balance, of awareness, of moderation, and other concepts so much to the liking of our "intelligentsia"...

But it was precisely the former who had brought his region to economic and financial disaster, who had saturated the populace with his demagoguery, who had reached the heights of absurdity, that we said would have overwhelming success, a victory that would confirm the justice of the policy he has followed, a confirmation resulting from the maxim that says "in democracy there are no arguments against votes."

We do not intend hereby to minimize the magnificent success achieved by Joao Bosco Mota Amaral, because the renewal of the comfortable majority he has had for many years deserves to be stressed, despite the moderate decline that occurred.

But it was Alberto Joao Jardim, about whom such nasty things were said, who at the end of the story not only lost nothing but, on the contrary gained...

On 23 August 1984 we wrote on these pages that "the only two civilian members of the PSD that still have any objective chance of being approved by their party are the two leading candidates in the coming regional elections. For this very reason the outcome of these elections could strongly influence what happens on the Portuguese political scene." And we explained why: "First and foremost, because it will be known which of the two does better and on that basis one will see his stature grow and the other will be decisively rejected. But also because it will then be possible to see whether the results of the more successful one are substantial enough to demonstrate that against facts there are no arguments."

We assume that no one any longer has any doubts! Put to the acid test, Jardim won and it now remains to be seen whether two important requirements will be met: first, Jardim's decision to accept the candidacy and, second, whether his party, including Mota Amaral, has in the first instance the wisdom and in the second, the humility to acknowledge that Alberto Joao Jardim at this moment is the one who best meets the requirements to be the PSD candidate for the presidency of the republic.

No matter what this may cost the "deep thinkers" who have in their own persons their only and undeniable votes!...

CDS' Pires, Moreira Mentioned

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 18-24 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] The CDS will present its own candidate for the presidential elections, according to a widely-held notion in Largo do Caldas, TEMPO has learned from a reliable source.

With the withdrawal of Freitas do Amaral and with fewer and fewer supporters of a military candidacy, it looks like the CDS will choose one of three possible candidates: Lucas Pires, Adriano Moreira and Morais Leitao.

As Dr Morais Leitao is more and more withdrawn from active politics, partly for family reasons, the CDS may be faced with a choice between Lucas Pires and Adriano Moreira. There are no known splits in their mutual collaboration and loyalty, as it was the spirit of unity that brought them victory in the last congress. Some persons advocate choosing the CDS candidate before the PSD candidate is chosen, lest public opinion on the Right come to accept the candidate chosen by the PSD. Lucas Pires is more inclined toward a wait-and-see attitude and thus neither appears to be in any hurry nor expresses outwardly any interest in the post.

However, according to his friends, the major criticism that CDS opponents of the Lucas Pires possibility will raise is in regard to his age. But Lucas Pires, at 40, is the same age as Ramalho Eanes when the latter first ran for the presidency of the republic and is older than either Freitas do Amaral or Felipe Gonzalez when the latter were first candidates for prime minister and is about the age of Sa Carneiro when he first became involved in politics in 1974. And older than Laurence Fabius, now prime minister of France, who is 37. Moreover, supporters of the Lucas Pires candidacy think that he may be able to spark something like the Gary Hart phenomenon in the United States, especially through his innovative political language.

For those further to the Right who think him "too young," some CDS persons recall that Salazar was 38 when he left Coimbra. Lucas Pires was minister of culture and was chosen "parliamentarian of the year" three times, and is now the undisputed leader of the CDS. Everything indicates that the next party congress is preparing for his definitive election, his supporters assert, moreover.

As for Adriano Moreira, he is 10 years younger than Reagan and, in reference to the fact that he served in a Salazar government--from which, as a matter of fact, he was fired--the PS also has a member of the Marcelist government, Prof Veiga Simao, and the PSD has three members who belonged to the Salazar regime: Joao Salgueiro, engineer Rogerio Martins and Dr Vaz Pinto.

Adriano Moreira may thus be considered the first liberal of the Salazar era, permitting him to harbor hopes of becoming the CDS candidate for the presidency of the republic.

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DEFENSE RESEARCH/TECHNOLOGY LINKS ARMED SERVICES, INDUSTRY

Defense Research/Technology Concept

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Aug 84 pp 74-75

[Article by Peter Koerner: "The Research and Technology Plan of the Ministry of Defense--A First Evaluation"]

[Text] On 23 February 1984 the minister, Dr Woerner, "approved in principle the "framework for the planning and performance of defense research and technology" and he arranged a test run for 1984. This constituted a first step along the way toward the construction of a research and technology plan by the German Federal Ministry of Defense. In the following article ministerial director Peter Koerner, subdepartment head of armament planning in the Ministry of Defense, describes the historical origins of this research and technology plan. In a first evaluation the author expresses the view that this is a functionally definitive plan permitting optimal use of limited financial funds to provide promptly the technology required for arming the German defense forces.

Preliminary Studies Over Many Years

Preliminary studies have been going on for some years. In May 1978 the defense minister at that time, Dr Apel, placed a contract for an investigation of the flow of armament material between the United States and Europe. The planning staff which was responsible for these investigations inferred from their results a recommendation that proposals be worked up for an all-project comprehensive technology plan. With this study as the background it was understandable that the issue of cooperation should occupy the foreground and that special consideration should be given to international division of labor within the alliance. But it was precisely this aspect of the matter which encountered some doubts among the management of the armament department, where it was felt that the chances of any realization of such cooperation within the international context were unpromising.

The minister, Dr Apel, in May 1978 arranged to test the potentialities and the utility of such a technology plan. A working group assigned to this task confirmed the need for a systematic formulation. These investigations were completed by the end of 1980. Nevertheless, the resulting draft proposals were not approved. Toward the end of April 1981 a reworking was ordered which could aim especially at developing feasible instrumentalities.

Work on the technology plan then received a new stimulus from the commission established in March 1981 for the long-term planning of the German defense forces. In several places the commission's report¹ refers to the increased significance of military engineering research and development and the need for concentrated efforts in this area.² In the draft of "Guiding Principles for Armament Planning" it was emphatically urged that in view of the close interrelationships between conceptual ideas of the combat forces and future defense engineering developments primary attention should be given to a research and technology plan.³

Thus the studies directed toward the technology plan acquired the rank of items on the agenda of the above-mentioned long-term commission for defense planning and were placed under high pressure in terms of time and the importance of success. The corresponding ministerial decree of 12 June 1982 provided for the production in its main outlines of a research and technology plan, by the end of 1982, which would secure the long-term armament of our armed forces.

Summer of 1983: A New Review Agency for the "Research and Technology Plan"

The process of coming to an agreement within the German Federal Ministry of Defense turned out to be more difficult than had been at first expected. At the center of the discussion there were questions as to the instrumentalities required for evaluating research and technology activities and for administering the use of funds.

Toward the end of the summer of 1983 in the armament department there was formed a new review agency under the designation RuPL 5. The "Research and Technology Plan" was assigned to this agency as its primary task. This at the same time made it possible to focus personnel so that finally at the end of 1983 it was possible to present the draft of the framework of the research and technology plan to the minister; and this draft he approved. In the meantime "supplementary implementation regulations" have been set up which control activities during the test run period. This then was the starting gun for the implementation.

About 1,500 Research and Technology Projects

It is not any closing balance would certainly now be premature. Nevertheless, some general statements can be made.

The completion of studies for the technology plan show what extraordinary demands had to be surmounted. At the present time there are in progress about 1,500 individual research and technology projects having a financial

volume of more than half a billion marks. These must be systematically examined and subjected to regulation and control with reference to their focal points. It was necessary that this process should satisfy the following prerequisites:

- i. The research and technology plan must be established in the course of a dialogue between the military procurement people and the armament department. Each of these groups recognized the special importance of this.
- ii. The combat forces must evaluate the military problems and the needs to which these problems give rise while the armament department must evaluate technical-economic capabilities and potentialities.
- iii. On the basis of the correlation between these two evaluations and on the basis of an armament-political total evaluation points of special emphasis must be established which can be converted into goals for the annual programs.

The framing specifications of the program fully meet these prerequisites. Here I should like to limit myself to emphasizing some aspects of the matter which appear to me to be important.

Institutionalized Dialogue Between Armament Department and Command Staff

Cooperation between the combat forces and the armament department is being regulated in such a way as to produce an institutionalized dialogue between the armament department and the military command staff. This is being accomplished primarily through a jointly developed system of guidelines which has been established by the principal head of the armament department with the agreement of the chief of staff. This system of guidelines contains prerequisites, focal points and framework on the basis of which the armament department must then organize the annual program for research and technology. In this way there has been found an arrangement which logically combines the autonomy of the armament department and the requisite dialogue with the military procurement people.

At the same time this system of guidelines while consciously indebted to the planning of the German defense forces has for the first time put into effect an automatic control cycle which will guarantee a systematic orientation of research and technology toward immediate and long-term goals and establishes a direct link with the German Armed Forces plan.

"System Technology," "Future Technology" and "Fundamental Knowledge"

An additional specific feature of the new regulatory system consists in the fact that the research and technology activities are oriented in such a way as to take into account the point in time when the expected results are to be realized. This implies a subdivision into three planning sections: for the immediate time period there are the technological activities which are described under the heading of "system technology." These are activities which are required for armament taking place during a planning period of the German Federal Armed Forces (15 years). For the long-term period it is necessary to

assemble both "future technology" and also "fundamental knowledge" relevant to military engineering.

This--novel--staggering of time periods permits a logical structuring in terms of content and time which is tailored to the various requirements and goals of the individual sections. At the same time one does not lose sight of the fact that there exist numerous crossovers and that this subdivision has the primary purpose of serving the aims of planners.

Management, work sequencing and responsibilities are tightly controlled. Existing organizational units are used and there are assigned to them only those tasks and responsibilities which are required for fulfilling the research and technology plan. This has in consequence given rise to a quite complex control system and one which is associated with a substantial cost in labor. Nevertheless, this has been accepted as part of the bargain, in the interest of the logic of work sequencing as required by the purposes of the test run. Here practical experience will be the main regulator.

What Conclusions May Be Drawn?

There has now arisen a functionally definitive plan which in the last analysis should contribute to optimally using the limited financial funds in order to promptly provide the technology required for equipping the German defense forces. I expect--precisely as a consequence of the improved dialogue--an improved planning, guidance and control of research and technology activities. Of course, it may not be inferred from this that all previous efforts took place in an uncontrolled manner. It can be recognized at the outset that because of the continuous practical dialogue existing with the combat forces and on the basis of the continuous accumulation of practical experience on the part of the armament department it has also been possible for previously activities in this sphere to be essentially responsive to the threat and to needs.

There remains the fundamental problem that there exists no procedure for administering monetary funds in direct response to military needs. Nevertheless, an objectification of decisions which is adequate for the purposes of planning seems to have been found. I am optimistic that the goals which have been set will be attained with this research and technology plan.

FOOTNOTES

1. Report of the Commission for the Long-Term Planning of the German Defense Forces, published by the Ministry of Defense on 21 June 1982.

2. See items 561, 571-573, of the report.

3. Appendix 6 to the commission report. The guiding principles decreed by ordinance in January on 16 February 1983 contain a philosophy of the same kind.

4. Decree dated 6 March 1984 by the principal armament department head.

Management, Time Frame Structures

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Aug 84 pp 75-79

[Article by Detlef Forndran: "Planning Time Frames and Management Structures"]

[Text] It is intended that the new research and technology plan of the defense ministry shall lead to an intensification of the dialogue between combat forces and the armament area with regard to research and technology in military engineering and with regard to their use. In the following article this research and technology plan is described by ministerial counselor Dipl Eng Detlef Forndran who was responsible for working up the plan. As he describes it it is divided into three planning sections: "system technology" for use in the mediate-term time frame (that is, the 15 planning years of the German Armed Forces plan), in which the technological requirements are planned on the basis of "guiding concepts." Then there is the area of "future technology" together with the collection of "basic science" for the long-term time frame. For this purpose certain corresponding "armament tasks" are seen as being associated with the military tasks. The technological resources as well as guiding concepts such as armament tasks are similarly structured through the use of "technological elements." Thus the research and technology guidelines issued by the chief of the armament division are the basis of each year's research and technology studies. These same guidelines also establish the focal points.

As has already been described in the preceding article, the organization of military engineering research and technology with respect to mediate- and long-term goals is in future to be conducted on the basis of the research and technology guidelines.

These guidelines are the result of a process of mutual accommodation which takes place in three stages:

- i. first of all the combat forces evaluate the military requirements and the people in the armament division evaluate the technological possibilities;
- ii. correlation of these evaluations then yields the focal points of practical concentration;
- iii. and finally an armament-political evaluation of these focal points yields the actual guidelines.

This three-step process sounds quite "theoretical." In order to make it manageable, the planning time frames which have already been mentioned were introduced and management structures developed, all with the object of intensifying the dialogue

- i. within the combat forces with regard to military requirements and
- ii. within the armament division with regard to technological possibilities.

These structures are moreover designed in such a way as to permit the results of these initially intradepartmental specialized discussions to finally emerge in an interdepartmental dialogue. It is at the conclusion of this dialogue that the research and technology guidelines sponsored by the Ministry of Defense come into play in their totality.

In order to clarify this process we shall examine the planning time frames and the management structures more closely.

Planning Time Frames

The assignment of research and technology activities to specific planning time frames facilitates the evaluation process. In addition, it promotes dialogue on the one hand between the specialists who are closest to the projects and the technologists who within the armament division who have technological responsibilities--and on the other hand between the technologists and the researchers.

The System Technology Section

Within the armed forces plan there is formulated a demand for armament. The process of meeting this demand requires technological preparation. Since the systems and devices catalogued in the plan have a direct influence on the technology to be supplied the term "system technology" has been created. Technology activities in this section aim primarily

- i. at examining the technical-economic feasibility of militarily required characteristics,
- ii. at limiting the development risk,
- iii. at promptly establishing an adequate growth potential with respect to systems and devices.

In this area principal attention is given to

- i. the performance of system-analytic studies and system investigations;
- ii. the development of critical components as well as the elaboration of key technologies.

The relation between the technology activities and the projects of the defense forces plan is not only in terms of content but also with respect to time. It is only under certain circumstances that technology activities come into consideration for use in the mediate-term time frame (corresponding to the 15 planning years of the defense forces). These are those circumstances under which it is possible to set up a working plan, a time plan and a financing

plan compatible with the planning of the defense forces. And it is possible to set up such plans only in a situation when it is possible to survey the risk involved.

In order to be able to react flexibly to changes in the planning of the defense forces, technology needs are planned on the basis of a good dozen of system variants called guiding concepts.

One guiding concept--e.g., that of combat tanks and combat vehicles--here represents the totality of all those subordinate guiding concepts belonging to a single category of defense materiel. In the example chosen such items would be artillery vehicles, tank vehicles, etc.

The guiding concepts--at the level of the subordinate guiding concepts--are written out annually in accordance with the defense forces plan. These guiding concepts are the central planning notion governing the mediate-term procurement time frame.

The "Future Technology" and "Basic Knowledge" Sections

While for the mediate-term procurement time frame our technology requirement is plannable in a system-oriented way on the basis of the defense forces plan, beyond that period this is no longer possible. Our prognostic powers are simply not sufficient today to formulate realistic statements as to the systems with which we must meet a threat existing after the year 2000. Hence for the long-term procurement time frame it is no longer a question of preparing concrete system developments. Rather it is a question of preparing for the future in a flexible manner. This requires, in particular, that we should

- i. strengthen our prognostic capabilities,
- ii. create the prerequisites for the development and manufacturing capabilities which will be required over the long term,
- iii. examine the military engineering relevance of civilian research and technology results,
- iv. improve our ability to develop conceptual alternatives.

To this end, in particular,

- i. mission-technical studies and investigations are carried out and
- ii. parametric studies are performed for evaluating one's own technology potential as well as that of the enemy, and
- iii. the prerequisites are created for producing novel structural elements in the domain of military engineering.

Additionally, our basic technological knowledge must be strengthened. In this connection activities relating to basic knowledge have no time reference--they are problem-oriented.

There is a close interaction between research and technology activities for the long-term procurement time frame and conceptual studies. Amongst other things, the defense forces plan establishes goals toward which must be oriented the material support given to the combat forces by their suppliers. The defense forces plan describes military tasks and evaluates them in terms of their importance for the fulfillment of the task assigned.

To these military tasks (e.g., fighting in depth in the combat area) there correspond armament tasks (e.g., the acquisition and transmission of target data). In turn, the technology planning for the long-term procurement time frame is oriented with respect to both of these.

The armament tasks describe capabilities which are important for mission fulfillment quite independently of any special equipment. The armament tasks--in future certainly fewer than 20--are classified into six groups:

- i. situation reconnaissance and command,
- ii. mobility and transport,
- iii. target surveillance and pursuit,
- iv. weapons engagement/weapons effect,
- v. protection,
- vi. aids to decisionmaking.

It makes sense to endow the technological resources or the guiding concepts and of the armament tasks with similar structures. This is done by means of so-called "technological elements," of which the following is an example:

The "shaped charges" (hollow charges and projectile-forming charges) element serves both the structuring of the armament task called "effect" and also the structuring of the relevant guiding concept such as, e.g., "guided missiles, dispensers" et al. (Box, p 78)

Management

Existing organizational units shall take over coordination functions within the framework of the research and technology plan.

Essentially there are two types of coordination involved:

- i. first there is "vertical" coordination of all specialized contributions, each in association with one element. The task of producing this coordination is assigned to specialty reviewers (armament area) who are called "element reporters" and
- ii. there is also "horizontal" coordination of all contributions of diverse elements assigning each one either to one guiding concept or to one armament

task. With regard to this guiding concept this task is assigned to the guiding concept reviewer (armament area) or to the guiding concept contractor (combat forces) and in the case of an armament task it is the responsibility of the research and technology reviewers (armament area) or of the individual responsible for planning (command staff of the combat forces). Reviewers as well as contractors rely in their coordinating activity upon specialized working groups which they themselves constitute together with the element reporters.

Element Reporters

Agreement upon the technical aspects of an "element" takes place in the dialogue with the responsible specialized reviewers of the armament area. The latter make use of counsel provided by their own subordinate areas and also provided by the various institutes and by industry. This dialogue is "animated" by the element reporter. There is one of these for each of the approximately 100 elements.

In addition, he speaks in the interest of the result of the agreement. He does this in the above-mentioned specialized working groups. In this process it is his responsibility to secure that the research and technology activities are suitably supplemented within the three planning sections.

In accordance with the requirements of the research and technology guidelines he cooperates finally in the planning for the tasks of guiding concepts and armament. He does this in relation to both content, time scheduling and finances.

Guiding Concept Reviewer, Guiding Concept Contractor

The guiding concept reviewer and the guiding concept contractor jointly formulate the contents of the guiding concepts. The guiding concept contractor evaluates the military features which are required by a guiding concept; the guiding concept reviewer evaluates the technological possibilities (represented by the elements) which serve toward the actualization of a guiding concept. They jointly correlate the results of the evaluation. In their evaluation activity they rely upon the specialized working groups which have been mentioned above.

For his guiding concept, every guiding concept reviewer must make sure that the individual activities involved in the complex of the "elements" are oriented toward an optimal realization of the guiding concept. He accomplishes this task in close cooperation with the specialized reviewers of the armament division. These specialized reviewers must be those who are responsible for carrying out the individual activities.

Finally, the guiding concept reviewer is responsible for producing contributions to the annual program of research and technology for his own guiding concept. He does this on the basis of the research and technology guidelines while relying at the same time on the work of the element reporter.

Research Reviewer and Technology Reviewer and Conception Contractor

The research and technology reviewer (armament area) and deputy in charge of guiding concepts (command staff of the combat forces) jointly establish the goals of the armament task. They jointly evaluate the armament task with respect to its contribution to the fulfillment of future military tasks. The fact that this is a joint evaluation means that there is cooperation by the deputies in charge of guiding concepts within the specialized working group of the research and technology reviewer. In this panel the conception contractor evaluates the military importance of any capability which arises as a result of new technologies; the representatives of the armament commission evaluate the technological possibilities which exist with regard to fulfillment of the armament task.

The research and technology reviewer (armament area) and conception contractor (command staff of the combat forces) jointly establish the goals of the armament task. They jointly evaluate the armament task with respect to its contribution to the fulfillment of future military tasks. The fact that this is a joint evaluation means that there is cooperation by the conception contractors within the specialized working group of the research and technology reviewer. In this panel the conception contractor evaluates the military importance of any capability which arises as a result of new technologies; the representatives of the armament commission evaluate the technological possibilities which exist with regard to fulfillment of the armament task.

Finally, the research and technology reviewer is responsible for working up contributions to the annual research and technology program, for his armament task. The research and technology guidelines are an obligatory basis for this work. In doing his work he relies upon the element reporters.

Coordinating Group

The results of the correlation with the guiding concepts and of the joint evaluation of the armament tasks are subjected to a combined evaluation by a coordinating group. This group is made up of suppliers and of members of the armament division.

It is the aim of this step in the process to establish practical focal points in a general evaluation which encompasses the guiding concepts, the armament task and the procurement time frames.

Research and Technology Conference

Under the chairmanship of the state secretary for armament in the research and technology conference the draft of the research and technology guidelines is subjected to an armament-political evaluation. This draft will have been made on the basis of the practical focal points established by the coordinating group.

The principal armament division head issues the research and technology guidelines as a binding set of guidelines for the research and technology annual program. In their essential contents these guidelines are also opened up to industry and to research institutions.

Industry and research institutions are being included without delay in the process of forming practical focal points. At the same time industry is being kept informed of the focal points which have been established. In this way effort is being made to encourage industrial initiative toward purposeful reinforcement of official research and technology activities.

[Box, p 76]

Armament task:

General description of capabilities/features which--independently of the special application--are important for fulfillment of the mission.

Guiding concept:

The totality of the subordinate guiding concepts belonging to a particular category of defense materiel.

Subordinate guiding concept:

A future system having a utility phase which starts, in accordance with the defense forces plan, at the latest in year 15 of that plan.

Guiding concepts:

- Tanks and combat vehicles
- Methods of facilitating/obstructing movement
- Fixed-wing aircraft
- Rotating-wing aircraft
- Drones/RPV
- Guided missile systems/dispensers
- Surface battleships and boats
- Submarines
- Special naval weapons
- Rockets and guns/KWS ammunition
- Command and information systems
- Telecommunications systems
- Electronic warfare systems
- Reconnaissance systems

According to the present status of planning there exist for the achievement of the armament programs provided for in the defense forces plan 14 guiding concepts within the research and technology plan.

[Box, p 78]

The technological element is the technical means to achievement of a (mediate-term) guiding concept and toward the fulfillment of a (long-term) armament task. Thus an element can be simultaneously associated with several guiding concepts or subordinate guiding concepts. For example, the reporters for the elements listed above on the left belong to the specialized working group of the guiding concept reviewer for "guided missile dispensers." The same is true, with appropriate changes, of the specialized working group of the research and technology reviewer who is responsible for an armament task.

Guiding Concept
"guided missiles--dispensers"
with the following elements:

- 311 Target acquisition
- 402 Dispenser technique
- 405 System technique, guided
missiles-dispensers
- 434 "Shaped charges" element
- 417 Aerodynamics of weapons
delivery
- 421 Intelligent target approach

Armament Task
"effect"
with the following elements:

- 430 System technique effect
- 431 Detonators
- 432 Explosives
- 433 Armor penetrators
- 435 Special mechanisms
- 436 High-energy lasers

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CSO: 3620/434

LONG-RANGE ARMS PROCUREMENT PLANS DETAILED

Bonn WEHRDIENST in German 8 Oct 84 pp 1, 2

[Text] Significant Armament Plans of the Bundeswehr Presumably to Enter the Procurement Phase between 1989 and 1997:

--240 JF-90 fighter aircraft: estimated total cost 17.5 billion DM, including 9.970 billion between 1990 and 1997. In procurement increments of 210 million in 1990, 220 million in 1991, 650 million in 1992, 1.170 billion in 1993, 1.580 billion in 1994, 1.830 billion in 1995, 2.150 billion in 1996, and 2.160 billion DM in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 10 aircraft in 1995, 25 in 1996, 45 in 1997.

--Tactical reconnaissance system: estimated total cost 2.8 billion DM. In procurement increments of 70 million in 1990, 375 million in 1991, 685 million in 1992, 680 million in 1993, 590 million in 1994, 320 million in 1995, and 80 million DM in 1996.

--60 naval helicopters 90: estimated total cost 2.4 billion DM, including 784 million between 1991 and 1997. In procurement increments of 100 million per year from 1991 to 1994, 150 million in 1995, 14 million in 1996, and 220 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: four helicopters per year from 1994 to 1997.

--212 antitank helicopters PAH-2: estimated total cost 2.3 billion DM. In procurement increments of 80 million in 1991, 170 million in 1992, 400 million in 1993, 500 million each in 1994 and 1995, 550 million in 1996, and 100 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: four PAH-2 in 1992, and 52 per year from 1994 to 1997.

--18 naval patrol aircraft MPA-90 (antisubmarine warfare (ASW): estimated total cost 2.165 billion DM, including 2.125 billion between 1990 and 1997. In procurement increments of 250 million in 1990, 270 million in 1991, 300 million in 1992, 350 million in 1993, 372 million in 1994, 295 million in 1995, 200 million in 1996, and 88 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: three MPA-90 in 1992, six each in 1993 and 1994, three in 1995.

--70 transport aircraft to the T-37/38: estimated total cost 1.040 billion DM, including 270 million between 1995 and 1997. In procurement increments of 50 million in 1995, 70 million in 1996, and 150 million in 1997. Expected delivery schedule: 17 aircraft in 1997.

--59 light transport helicopters (LTH) and Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters: estimated total cost 812 million DM. In procurement increments of 40 million in 1991, 70 million in 1992, 150 million in 1993, 184 million in 1994, 188 million in 1995, 110 million in 1996, and 62 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: five LTH/SAR in 1992, 12 in 1993, 16 in 1994, 14 in 1995, eight in 1996, and four in 1997.

--13 small aircraft for target direction finding: estimated total cost 650 million DM. In procurement increments of 18 million in 1989, 63 million in 1990, 100 million in 1991, 120 million per year from 1992 to 1994, and 109 million DM in 1995. Expected delivery schedule: one each LTH/SAR in 1989 and 1991, two in 1992, and three per year from 1993 to 1995.

--Combat drone: estimated total cost 520 million DM. First procurement increment of 50 million in 1997.

--Three Air Force ELINT/COMINT systems (airborne): estimated total cost 452 million DM. In procurement increments of 42 million in 1989, 80 million in 1990, 110 million in 1991, 120 million in 1992, and 100 million in 1993. Expected delivery rate: one each system per year from 1991 to 1993.

--Four long-range transport aircraft for the Ministry of Defense flight standby: estimated total cost 380 million DM. In procurement increments of 60 million in 1990, 140 million in 1991, and 180 million in 1992. Expected delivery rate: two aircraft per year in 1991 and 1992.

--Combat effectiveness increasing (enhancement) of 175 Alpha Jet aircraft: estimated total cost 170 million DM. In procurement increments of 25 million in 1989, 60 million in 1990, 80 million each in 1991 and 1992, and 75 million in 1993. Expected retrofitting rate: 30 aircraft in 1990, 50 each in 1991 and 1992, and 65 in 1993.

--Tactical electronic surveillance (ELINT) equipment (Taktisches Elektronisches Aufklärungs-Werkzeug (TEAW)): estimated total cost 250 million DM. In procurement increments of 50 million in 1989, 60 million in 1990, 50 million in 1991, 70 million in 1992, and 30 million in 1993.

Additional significant Armament Plans of the Bundeswehr which will presumably enter the procurement phase between 1989 and 1997 (cf. WEHROHMST 958/88).

--4,467 armored combat vehicles 90: estimated total cost 17,118 billion DM, including 5,630 billion by 1997, in procurement increments of 20 million in 1989, 70 million per year from 1990 to 1993, 830 million in 1994, 1,280 billion in 1995, 1,580 billion in 1996, and 1,620 billion in 1997. Expected deliveries up to 1997: 2,140 vehicles, including 100 in 1990, 300 per year from 1991 to 1993, 40 in 1994, 180 in 1995, 400 in 1996, and 500 in 1997.

--535 M-113 tank-mounted mortars with enhanced combat effectiveness: estimated total cost 325 million DM, in procurement increments of 70 million in 1991, 75 million in 1992, and 90 million per year in 1993 and 1994. Expected delivery rate: 163 in 1991, and 124 per year from 1992 to 1994.

--143 ROLAND surface-to-air (SAM) tanks: estimated total cost 300 million DM, in procurement increments of 51 million in 1989, 60 million in 1990, 75 million per year in 1991 and 1992, and 20 million in 1993. Expected delivery rate: 47 vehicles in 1990, and 40 vehicles per year in 1991 and 1992.

--43 medium SAM systems MFS: estimated total cost 3,870 million DM, including 220 million up to 1997, in procurement increments of 70 million in 1996 and 150 million in 1997.

--Army air defense control system: estimated total cost 800 million DM, in procurement rates of 100 million per year in 1989 and 1990, 175 million per year from 1991 to 1994, and 100 million in 1995.

--Air Force control system ACCS: estimated total cost 257 million DM, in procurement increments of 10 million in 1989, 37 million in 1991, 50 million in 1992, 35 million per year in 1993 and 1994, 20 million in 1995, and 42 million in 1996.

--Communications portion of NATO identification system WIS: estimated total cost 553 million DM, including 328 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 8 million in 1991, 5 million in 1992, 70 million in 1993, 74 million per year in 1994 and 1995, and 43 million per year in 1996 and 1997.

--Army follow-up requirement for partially militarized motor vehicles: estimated total cost 9,014 billion DM, including 900 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 30 million per year in 1990 and 1991, 100 million in 1993, 150 million per year in 1994 and 1995, and 300 million per year in 1996 and 1997.

--Light vehicle cranes FK1 for the Army: estimated total cost 120 million DM, in procurement increments of 60 million per year from 1990 to 1994, and 20 million in 1995.

--Six frigates 90: estimated total cost 4.380 billion DM, including 3.115 billion by 1997, in procurement increments of 45 million in 1989, 145 million in 1990, 290 million in 1991, 300 million per year in 1992 and 1993, 450 million in 1994, 560 million in 1995, 600 million in 1996, and 500 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: one frigate per year from 1994 on.

--18 U-211 submarines (follow-on procurement): estimated total cost 5.4 billion DM, including 2.714 billion by 1997, in procurement increments of 95 million in 1990, 118 million in 1991, 196 million in 1992, 356 million in 1993, 367 million in 1994, 490 million in 1995, 492 million in 1996, and 600 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: two submarines per year from 1994 on.

--Six mine-speed boats MiJ-332 (second lot): estimated total cost 912 million DM, including 395 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 10 million in 1994, 50 million in 1995, 135 million in 1996, and 200 million in 1997.

--115 missile acquisition units CERBERO: estimated total cost 450 million DM, including 90 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 40 million in 1996 and 50 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: five units in 1996 and 25 units in 1997.

--60,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition (H-targets, ZEP1 shells): estimated total cost 900 million DM, including 400 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 20 million per year in 1993 and 1994, 120 million in 1995, 70 million in 1996, and 170 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 5,000 rounds per year in 1996 and 1997.

--93,000 rounds of 203mm ammunition SADARM: estimated total cost 1.140 billion DM, in procurement increments of 200 million in 1991, 150 million per year from 1992 to 1996, and 190 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 10,000 rounds in 1991, 15,000 rounds per year from 1992 to 1996, and 8,000 rounds in 1997.

--50,000 antitank directional mines 2: estimated total cost 278 million DM, in procurement increments of 85 million per year from 1994 to 1996, and 23 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 10,000 mines in 1994, 30,000 in 1995, and 10,000 in 1996.

--700 glide bombs: estimated total cost 245 million DM, in procurement increments of 50 million per year from 1993 through 1996, and 45 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 150 bombs per year from 1983 through 1996 and 100 bombs in 1997.

--650 TORNADO multipurpose weapons MW-1 (second lot): estimated total cost 1.630 billion DM, including 930 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 30 million in 1991 and 150 million per year from 1992 through 1997. Expected delivery rate: 12 MW-1 in 1991 and 60 MW-1 per year from 1992 through 1997.

--20,000 guided missiles MARS with TWG warhead: estimated total cost 5.3 billion DM, including 490 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 120 million per year in 1995 and 1996, and 250 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 1,000 per year in 1996 and 1997.

--22,050 guided missiles PARS 2,000 meters: estimated total cost 935 million DM, including 125 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 25 million in 1996 and 100 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 350 in 1997.

--38,800 guided missiles PARS 4,000 meters: estimated total cost 4.114 billion DM, including 1,810 billion by 1997, in procurement increments of 130 million in 1992, 125 million in 1993, 360 million in 1994, 375 million in 1995, 400 million in 1996, and 420 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 130 in 1993, 2,200 in 1994, 2,850 in 1995, 3,600 in 1996, and 3,800 in 1997.

--2,664 guided missiles MFS: estimated total cost 2,591 billion DM, including 110 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 30 million in 1996 and 80 million in 1997.

--6,000 guided missiles Def. Suppr. Self-Protect. SRARM: estimated total cost 300 million DM, in procurement increments of 50 million in 1992, 75 million per year from 1993 through 1995, and 25 million in 1996. Expected delivery rate: 500 in 1992, 1,500 per year from 1993 through 1995, and 1,000 in 1996.

--500 air-to-ground dispensers: estimated total cost 525 million DM, in procurement increments of 100 million in 1990, 290 million in 1991, 110 million in 1992, and 25 million in 1993. Expected delivery rate: 50 in 1990, 300 in 1991, 125 in 1992, and 25 in 1993.

--500 LRSOM: estimated total cost 1.5 billion DM, including 1.320 billion by 1997, in procurement increments of 100 million in 1992, 250 million per year from 1993 through 1995, 270 million in 1996, and 200 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 30 in 1992, 80 in 1993, 85 per year in 1994 through 1995, 100 in 1996, and 65 in 1997.

--2,300 AMRAAM (second lot): estimated total cost 1.8 billion DM, including 500 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 150 million per year in 1995 and 1996, and 200 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 45 each in 1996 and 300 each in 1997.

--4,663 ASRAAM: estimated total cost 1.1 billion DM, including 320 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 20 million in 1994, 50 million in 1995, 100 million in 1996, and 150 million in 1997. Expected delivery rate: 600 each in 1995, and 1,000 each in 1996 and 1997.

--88 KORMORAN II (national formation): estimated total cost 213 million DM, in procurement increments of 20 million in 1992, 43 million in 1993, and 50 million per year from 1994 through 1996. Expected delivery rate: 20 each in 1993, 40 in 1994, and 28 in 1995.

--Guided missiles 90 (ANS): estimated total cost 2.772 billion DM, including 750 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 20 million in 1992, 80 million in 1993, 100 million in 1994, 150 million in 1995, and 200 million per year in 1996 and 1997.

--300 torpedoes for submarines DM-2 A4: estimated total cost 260 million DM, including 80 million by 1997, in procurement increments of 40 million per year in 1996 and 1997. Expected delivery rate: 20 each in 1996 and 75 each in 1997.

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BAHR TASKS INSTITUTE TO SEEK CRITERIA FOR 'MUTUAL SECURITY'

Bonn DIE WELT in German 6 Oct 84 p 5

/Article by Ruediger Moniac: "Bahr Studies Criteria for 'Mutual Security.'
New Objectives at the Institute for Peace Research"/

/Text/ Bonn--The new director of the Hamburg-based Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Egon Bahr, who after a fierce party dispute was elected to this office by its board of trustees by a slim one-vote margin, explained his work program to journalists in Bonn. In contrast to his predecessor, von Baudissin, Bahr wants to focus scientific inquiries on "questions relevant to Europe," which "within the next 2 to 8 years could take on political significance."

In view of the small number (three) of scientific employees working at the institute thus far, Bahr would like to concentrate the inquiries on the question whether in the East-West conflict the preservation and consolidation of peace are attainable only in cooperation with the other side, or whether there are also other ways. As a working hypothesis, Bahr has labeled this "mutual security." This choice of words by Bahr is familiar from the political discussions which he as a leading Social Democrat is having with and against those who perceive the NATO strategy of deterrence as the long-term doctrine of realistic preservation of peace in Europe. Bahr's statements as a politician, in the opinion of experts, were more designed to reduce the willingness in wide circles of the population to support the strategy of peace preservation of the Western alliance currently in effect.

Bahr has now added that the scientific inquiry into the working hypothesis concerning "mutual security" between East and West could also lead to a finding of its untenableness. As the responsible person at the institute, he would also have to face up to this. He at any rate sees the search for the criteria for "mutual security" as his scientific task. One of these, according to Bahr, is surely the verifiability of agreements between both sides and the perceptibility of military preparations in West and East, but this is only one criterion of probably a dozen and a half.

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STUDY ASSAILS CRITICS OF 'AIR-LAND-BATTLE' DOCTRINE

Bonn DIE WELT in German 9 Oct 84 p 7

/Article by C. Brockdorff: "Harsh Criticism of Green Party, SPD, Peace Movement. Study: Fundamental Ignorance of Military Subjects"/

/Text/ Burssels--A paper of the Foundation for Science and Politics /Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/ in Ebenhausen, in which the author, Peter Stratmann (SPD), levels criticism at leading SPD members, the Green Party, and the peace movement, is currently attracting attention in NATO. In this paper, Stratmann charges the aforementioned with having created a distorted picture of reality with their criticism of the new "air-land-battle" command doctrine of the U.S. Army. The institute is internationally regarded as respectable.

Named in Stratmann's paper are SPD Federal Executive Chairman Peter Glotz, the deputy whip of the SPD bloc in the Bundestag, Horst Ehmke, and several journalists of well-known publications and electronic media in the FRG. Together with the Greens and the peace movement, they are charged with having represented a tactical command regulation for American troops for public consumption in such a way as to give the impression that the United States had developed a new offensive strategy for Europe.

Semantic Deviations

"One cannot help but get the impression that, for most of the aforementioned critics, the reading of the 'air-land-battle' regulation--or the excerpts therefrom that are being circulated--was their very first encounter with the military language, which would explain their semantic deviations," Stratmann writes. The presentation of the "air-land-battle" doctrine, he states, is the product of the same vices of the current German political culture which became apparent already during the rearmament debate: by a tendency toward rash politicizing, by a "fundamental ignorance of military subjects," the rejection of expert counsel, and the "unchecked distribution of alarming catchwords."

In addition to this, there is the "disinformation (misleading) propaganda" of the peace movement, which is basically opposed to the security-political direction currently being taken by the FRG. Stratmann quotes from a study given out by the Green Party in the Bundestag, which says: "the goal of the peace movement must, in the interest of peace, be a break with the United States,

a weakening, demoralization, and finally dissolution of NATO (and the bloc system as a whole). The peace movement must therefore strive to generate the crisis in NATO, to expose contradictions and leave them unresolved."

Absurd Consequences

The critics of the "air-land-battle" are reproached for having represented this as a "strategic doctrine" of the United States, even though it is not this and it expressly emphasizes that "the military strategy determines the basic conditions for military operations. Its formulation transcends the scope of this regulation." Concerning the strategic aspects of warfare, the "air-land-battle" regulation makes specific reference to the obligation to consult U.S. Army Publication 100-101. Stratmann: "Had the German critics followed this instruction, they would have found those sensible statements of principle concerning policy and strategy whose absence (in the "air-land-battle" regulation) is taken by them as proof for the allegedly depoliticized and purely military thinking of the American command."

In reality the principles of "air-land-battle" are clearly and exclusively related to the strategic and tactical command of large-sized units--corps and divisions. Consequently the regulation assumes a state of war as a premise and is directed at the mid-level military commanders: "If the operational-tactical concepts of this study nonetheless have political-strategic contents erroneously ascribed to them, then this misinterpretation must of necessity lead to absurd consequences." However, the important thing in the years ahead will be to carry out, in the security-political debate, a step-by-step approach to political-strategic reality, rather than to take refuge in "ideal security and strategy models," writes the author. Stratmann announced that the paper would be followed by a book.

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STATUS OF AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT, WEAPONS SYSTEMS SURVEYED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 84 pp 46-58

[Article by Brig Gen Andries Schlieper: "The Armament of the Air Force"]

[Text] In order to fulfill its assignment in the alliance, the German Air Force depends just as much on well-trained and well motivated soldiers, in sufficient numbers and with the appropriate organization, as it does on defense materiel, which must be available in the proper quality and quantity. The subject of modern air force armament was precisely the subject discussed in great detail by Brig Gen and Diplomat Engineer Andries Schlieper, General for Air Force Armament in the Air Force Office, at the Air Force Forum of the German Association for Defense Technology, reg. assn, at the end of June in Neubiberg. He describes the projects planned for the various functions of the Air Force--air attack, air defense, reconnaissance and command. The points of emphasis are air defense, new armament, increased survivability and executive capability of the air strike forces.

At a time when the arms race of the major powers is constantly making new and, depending on the view of the observer, necessary or objectionable progress--in this context even the use of the word progress becomes problematic--and also at a time marked by constantly new efforts to slow down the continuously turning armament spiral, everyone who has responsibility for dealing with arms issues is called on to keep in mind the political framework of his work and always to examine whether he is doing no more and no less than he is charged with.

In the article by the inspector of the Air Force (see WEHRTECHNIK 9/84) the task of our Air Force was represented in the framework of flexible response, the strategy of the alliance.

The fulfillment of this task requires above all a sufficient number of well-trained soldiers, motivated to fulfill their mission in the service, and the appropriate organization. However, these soldiers can only accomplish their tasks if defense materiel of the proper quality is available to them. Making this defense materiel available is the function of armament.

By armament I mean the totality of the resources, methods and people, including the defense materiel developed, manufactured and procured by them, which the soldier needs to accomplish his tasks.

Appropriate armament is the duty of the state toward its soldiers. The soldier, who is prepared to defend his constitution, his people and his country, and if necessary risk and lose his life while doing it, has a right to be properly armed for this task.

As primary objectives of the Air Force for accomplishing its tasks within the framework of the alliance, Lt Gen Eimler has listed that it should be capable:

- of initiative, in order to control its own operational area and to deny the enemy operational freedom.
- of engaging the ground forces on the battlefield with greater fire power, in order to support its own ground forces in their defense.
- of deep-strike operations, in order to prevent attacks from closing in because forces are being moved up.
- of securing the landing and insertion of overseas NATO reinforcements into the defense.
- of reinforcing our air defense in such a manner as to prevent our own forces from being in danger or perhaps even from being destroyed while assembling.
- of securely protecting our own air forces at their bases against enemy attacks, and finally
- of being capable of accomplishing all these tasks within the framework of NATO, and while doing so also being able to fall back on the overall potential of NATO.

In short, the Air Force envisions its mission as substantial participation in all operational tasks of the NATO air forces in Central Europe, in which context it primarily wants to reinforce its share of the joint air defense.

Now, what does this mean for the armament of the Air Force, what has been planned and how can it be realized?

However, since armament cannot be an end in itself nor take place almost without restraint, the military threat by the air forces of the Warsaw Pact (WP) and our own financial possibilities as the determining forces of our armament efforts, will be outlined as an introduction.

The Threat

In the past decade the Warsaw Pact has considerably strengthened the conventional capacity of its air forces with the introduction of a new

generation of modern tactical fighter aircraft, the buildup of a strong attack helicopter component and a continued expansion of ground-based air defense.

This development gains even more importance with the recognition that older weapon systems in general were replaced by the same number of modern, more effective systems, so that quality was not achieved at the expense of quantity.

Through the continued expansion of ground-based air defense, the WP is increasingly able to deploy its tactical aircraft for air strike tasks. For this purpose it also has available for the forward part of the battlefield an already considerable and constantly growing number of efficient helicopter gunships. Combat aircraft are thus being increasingly released from air defense tasks and direct support for their own ground forces in order to engage in combat deep into enemy territory.

The mobility of modern antiaircraft rocket systems allows for their deployment in all situations, that is to say combat aircraft remain essentially free from air defense duties, even when the ground forces are moving.

Framework Conditions for Our Armament Planning

NATO is countering the threat with the strategy of flexible response. In the 1960's, under the strategy of massive retaliation, the demands for conventional forces were initially limited. Through the change in strategy nearly 20 years ago, a reinforcement of the conventional NATO defense forces became urgently necessary, above all in Europe. The change in strategy and the constantly growing threat, in particular through the increased quality of the offensive forces of the Warsaw Pact, are significant reasons why the equipment of the Air Force today is not fully proportionate to the threat in the conventional area.

Further determining factors for the equipment deficit of the Air Force are the long periods of time needed for changing the generations of modern weapon systems, and, above all, the narrow financial margin for development funds and defense investments.

Since a generally desirable additional increase in the nuclear threshold is a very problematic option precisely for our country, considering the still inadequate conventional defense capability, we must, together with our alliance partners and while utilizing all opportunities, make an effort gradually to reduce NATO's weakness in conventional defense over the 1980's and 1990's, so that in the long run a greater measure of security can be achieved.

The Air Force can only render a partial contribution to this, which, however, must be well balanced. Balance is a goal for our armament planning. It means that from the aspect of materiel the subtasks of the Air Force must be realized in such a way that a maximum of combat efficiency can be achieved within the framework of the limited investment volume.

During the 1970's the emphasis of the Air Force's planning was on improving the air strike capability with the ALPHA JET and TORNADO. This necessarily led to the materiel becoming obsolete and thus to a growing lag in air defense capability. With regard to the goal of balanced combat efficiency, the need to catch up in electronic warfare and intelligence, as well as command, becomes clear at the same time.

In recent years the financial situation of the alliance has been marked by unfavorable national economic framework conditions, and today there are indications that only a slow economic improvement can be anticipated.

In this financial situation the Air Force is consistently trying to lower its operational costs, in particular the materiel maintenance costs, through rationalization measures, in order not to have to accept yet a further cut in its investment volume.

For the area of materiel investments, the current planning work foresees that the standard cost framework of the 1985 Federal Armed Forces Plan--that is the presently valid planning document--is to be continued with a rate of increase of about 3 percent. This rate of increase is not sufficient for the materiel-intensive Air Force, since the cost increases for equipment specific to the Air Forces clearly exceed this average value. Based on this fact alone, certain procurement projects will have to be shifted, spread out or cut back.

At more than 70 percent, the high proportion of fixed resources represents an additional problem over the intermediate term. They cause a sensitive reduction in the margin for planning and planning flexibility, and new projects cannot always be included in the plans at the proper time. The problems confronting defense planning at the moment are especially evident from the entries in the 1986 Federal Armed Forces Plan. According to this, a strict priority system is the only way it will be possible to adhere to the standard cost framework and simultaneously accomplish the mission of the Air Force in sufficient measure as regards materiel.

Therefore, the procurement of new weapon systems can only be realized by staggering them in time and by concentrating the resources on one weapon system at a time. At the same time this means that measures to prolong service life and combat effectiveness must be included in the plans for equipment that cannot be replaced at the right time, whereby the margin for new weapon systems becomes further reduced.

Air Strike Responsibility

The conversion to the new platforms will be completed by the late 1980's. The introduction of the TORNADO will establish all-weather combat capability in the conventional air strike role. The sortie activity will be considerably increased by the MW-1 multipurpose weapon and the accompanying submunitions optimized according to types of targets. This means that despite the cutback in platform component numbers after the conversion to the present generation, the air strike performance capability will be considerably improved, even

under unfavorable conditions, by increasing the payload and range and by improving weapons delivery accuracy.

TORNADO and ALPHA JET Combat Effectiveness Upgrading

The introduction of the TORNADO into the Federal Armed Forces has been taking place according to plan since 1982. The Air Force conversion plan is aimed at an annual delivery rate of about 40 aircraft. After Fighter Bomber Wing 38 in Jever and Fighter Bomber Wing 31 "Boelcke" in Norvenich, Fighter Bomber Wings 32 and 33 in Lechfeld and Buechel, as well as Fighter Bomber Wing 34 in Memmingen are slated for reequipping.

In addition to an extensive trinational flight testing program of more than 6,000 flight hours, it was possible to confirm by a national troop operational test phase

- the necessary flight properties at low-altitude flight
- the high precision of the navigation and fire control system, as well as
- the required favorable fuel consumption values.

The conversion from the G-91 weapon system to the ALPHA JET weapon system for the role of "close air support" for the ground forces has been completed.

Both TORNADO and ALPHA JET must remain equipped commensurate with the threat for the length of their service life. This is why programs to maintain and increase combat effectiveness have been scheduled, using the large development potential of both weapon systems. These programs have improvement in survivability, executive capability and weapons effectiveness as their objective.

For the TORNADO, measures

- for improving the electronic warfare capability,
- for a general increase in power plant performance, as well as
- for adaptation to future standoff weapons have been planned.

The plans for raising the combat effectiveness of ALPHA JET include measures for improving the operational performance of the power plant and for improving command capability and weapon effectiveness.

The formulation of a tactical demand (TaF) for an increase in the combat effectiveness of the ALPHA JET is being readied this year by the study group. The following improvements are, essentially, demanded in it:

- Anti-helicopter capability through improvement of the fire control system for the cannon and integration of the guided missiles.

- Improvement in survivability through integration of a radar warning system and increased ECM stability.
- Increased air-to-ground effectiveness through adaptation of an air-to-ground missile and a simultaneous increase in the accuracy of weapons delivery.

The possibility for chronological implementation of these measures to increase combat effectiveness depends exclusively on the actual availability of budget funds.

Modern Conventional Ammunition

The planned objective for the air strike sector is to utilize fully the performance capability of the modern platforms, so as to be able to cover the share of the target spectrum of the NATO air forces assigned to the Air Force.

To be sure, the present stockpiles of second-generation ammunition meet the NATO criteria for the duration of combat, but not for effective target coverage, as has been planned. A combat performance gap exists, which is expressed in a shortage of

- available operations
- all-weather point and area target weapons
- accurate guided air-to-ground ammunition and
- weapons to increase the executive capability, meaning resources for fighting enemy ground-based defense systems.

The importance of modern ammunition lies in the possibility for minimizing the expenditure of operations in order to cover the given target spectrum. Because of the greater effect at the target, a transition to the third generation of weapons can bring about a three-fold increase in effectiveness, on the average.

This means that:

- Measured by the actual status, the effect at the target can be achieved with one-third of the deployment expenditure.
- The loss rates can clearly be reduced.
- The Air Force acquires the capability of covering part of the targets many times over with the existing, limited, operational manpower, meaning, for example, the capability of mounting renewed attacks on airport facilities after they have been repaired and thereby paralyzing them for a long time.
- The gap in the combat effectiveness balance of the Air Force--measured by the target spectrum--can be closed.

Therefore, the entry into armament of the third generation has decisive influence on the effectiveness of the Air Force as a whole.

Since fewer combat operations are needed to achieve each operational objective, one's own forces are available again for new tasks, so that more rapid, stronger, and primarily more frequent massed concentration is possible.

The ammunition of the third generation has a decisive effect already during initial operations, when the enemy still has things well under control and the forward defense is particularly endangered. In the end, the Air Force's capability for extended conventional operations will also grow. This makes it easier to perceive the connection to the deployment of the overseas reinforcements and escalation control.

For all these reasons the Air Force regards the introduction of modern armament up to the end of the 1990's as a large, not yet exhausted, potential for upgrading conventional combat effectiveness. Therefore, the Air Force is pursuing a continuous, long-range and flexible procurement program. Basically, it does not involve modernization of the entire inventory in a few years. Rather, the primary objective is to effect the replenishments needed in certain spots in order to close tactical gaps.

Throughout the step-wise accomplishment of entering the third generation of weapons, it is also important to maintain a high measure of flexibility and innovative capability.

This means

- no unilateral commitment to large amounts of a single type of weapon.
- no concentration on a limited target spectrum and
- no singular commitment to individual sensors and effectiveness mechanisms, in order to assure that the enemy is not able to dodge the achieved increase in effectiveness by means of a few countermeasures.

Rather, in the future it will be necessary to

- keep available target-adapted mixes of different weapons, action mechanisms and sensors,
- make the introduced airborne weapon systems operational for the most varied weapons of the third generation--from the aspect of interoperability with other air forces and their armament as well--and
- possess a sufficient number of trained crews for the weapon systems with their increasingly broad palette of weapons.

The armament projects which have been introduced into the planning do justice to these objectives. In detail, the Air Force has included the following projects in its planning:

Maverick Short-Range Air-to-Ground-Missiles

The MAVERICK in its B version is equipped with a television camera, which can lock onto a target from a long distance and which then makes it possible to head for the target on a precise course. The production of guided missiles intended for the Air Force has been completed by the industry, and their distribution to the units is being prepared. Launch equipment will still be delivered in 1984. Furthermore, practice missiles with video recording equipment for training will be available after the summer. By early 1985 the F-4F's of the fighter bomber wings will have been equipped with MAVERICK B.

However, the disadvantage of the television homing head lies in the fact that sufficient light conditions and high contrast between target and background must be present in order for the target to lock on; these are conditions which do not occur every day in Central Europe. This disadvantage has largely been eliminated in the D version of the MAVERICK, since it has a heat-seeking homing head. This homing head senses the temperature between target and background. For motor-driven point targets, in particular, these temperature differences are quite significant.

Both versions of the MAVERICK have the same construction, to a large extent; they need the same launch equipment and essentially the same testing equipment and special tools. The MAVERICK in its various versions is used in very large numbers by the U.S. Armed Forces, and interoperability has been assured.

The intention is first to employ the F-4F and later the ALPHA JET as platforms.

VEBAL-SYNDROM Air-to-Ground Weapon

In connection with the plans for new air-to-ground weapons, the abbreviation VEBAL-SYNDROM has recently appeared. This acronym describes a self-contained dispenser system, which is primarily to be used against hard, mobile point targets. Target engagement takes place

- after rapid, low-altitude flight
- while overflying without pulling up and
- with automatically targeted weapon release.

The abbreviation VEBAL = Vertical Ballistics describes the mode of function of the weapon, which enables the submunitions to be dropped vertically. SYNDROM stands for a sensor combination of a laser altimeter, infrared sensor and radiometer, which accomplishes the target acquisition and undertakes the weapon release.

The system is a development financed independently by a consortium of companies. On the official side, the program was first supported by furnishing the test platform (F-4F), and it was not until 1983 that it was

also supported financially by the Federal Ministry of Defense. That this system was operable in principle was proved under "laboratory conditions" in flight.

However, in order to convert the system, which so far has only been experimental, into an operational weapon, more development work is needed on all systems components, but in particular on the active part (VE-BAL part). In this area there is still a certain amount of technical risk.

Despite numerous positive aspects, it should not be overlooked that VEBAL-SYNDROM does not fulfill all of the Air Force requirements regarding full all-weather combat and standoff capability. Rather, the main advantage of this system lies in the reduction of the sortie/target ratio, insofar as the obtainable terminal accuracy and ammunition effectiveness is great enough against moving targets. A combination of unmanned standoff missiles as carriers and VEBAL-SYNDROM as armament undoubtedly opens up interesting perspectives for future air warfare operations.

To begin with, the Air Strike Study Group drew up a tactical demand for VEBAL-SYNDROM as an aircraft armament. The procurement funds have been planned for the late 1980's.

MW-1 Multipurpose Weapon

The MW-1 was developed in order to fulfill the conventional role of the TORNADO in engaging mobile and stationary, hard and semihard area targets with submunitions optimized according to target. Five types of submunitions are under development at the present time, or are already available:

- for main target group I (tank and mechanized units):
 - the KB 44 shaped-charge bomblet
 - the MIFF low-trajectory mine (both types of submunitions are usually used in a mix)
- the Aktiv MUSA fragmentation mine.
- for the main target group II (hardened permanent targets, such as airports)
 - the STABO runway bomb
 - the MUSPA passive bomb, as well as
 - the ASW anti-shelter-effect charge.

The development of containers, peripheral equipment and submunitions against the main target group has been completed. Pilot-less testing has taken place, each one with a full discharge of KB-44 and MUSA. The delivery of the first containers armed with submunitions--also called war loadings--is to begin in late 1984, just in time for the assignment of the first Air Force TORNADO unit in 1985.

The development of the STABO and MUSPA submunitions for attacking airfield targets will be completed by the end of 1985. At this time the intention is then to resume the development of the ASW anti-shelter submunition, which was halted in 1981. Pilot testing with live STABO war loadings will be carried out in mid-1985 in the United States. A TORNADO is intended to be the carrier aircraft.

The development of modern conventional ammunition is--as is shown by the example of the MW-1 project initiated in 1968--lengthy and costly. However, the Air Force must--for tactical and strategic reasons, as well as in the interest of having a voice in determining the corresponding international programs--also make a significant contribution to conventional defense. The ability to stand up to obstacles of the most varied kinds in the course of such a development project assures its success.

Even if in the not too distant future for example offensive-counter-air action with MW-1-type weapons while flying over the target may no longer be possible, in order to avoid extremely high losses, the development work on the submunitions will not have been in vain.

Long-Range Standoff Air-to-Ground Missiles

With the "Tactical Demand" the Air Force intends to assure continued use of the developed submunitions for a "Long Range Stand-off Missile" (LRSOM), as well as the use of additional new submunitions. The LRSOM is thought of as an air-to-ground guided missile with a standoff range of up to 100 km. Essential objectives for the development of this missile are night and all-weather operational capability, modular construction, as well as a deployment spectrum optimized for stationary counter-air targets.

The planned modular standoff weapon for long ranges is presumably likely to involve a conventional air-to-ground weapon flying in the high subsonic range, whose lift is aerodynamically produced, which is preprogrammed for the target and which heads for this target at an approximately constant height above ground. The required final approach accuracy of the LRSOM is to be accomplished by the use of special sensors, such as pattern recognition, altitude contour scanning and a laser or millimeter-wave-line scanner. Modular construction is to enable deployment of various warheads with a submunition such as STABO or ASW.

The effect of this guided missile depends essentially on

- the type and accuracy of the guidance system
- the survival probability in free flight and
- the warhead effectiveness.

These individual aspects, among others, will be the subject of detailed study in the concept phase.

The TORNADO is intended as carrier system for LRSOM. In addition to the FRG, the United States and Great Britain have so far announced a need for such missiles. Continued development work as well as supplying the demand will therefore take place in cooperation with these nations. Development funds and funds for procurement are included in the plans for the 1990's.

Short-Range Standoff Air-to Ground Missiles

The same objectives--but for a standoff missile with shorter and intermediate ranges and against mobile targets--are part of the concepts developed for an SRSOM (Short Range Stand-off Missile). Conceptions for SRSOM have been worked out by both Dornier as MBB in cooperation with MATRA. In this context the use of both MW-1 submunitions and newly developed intelligent submunition types is being considered. The concepts for an SRSOM have not yet been concretely formulated, and as yet no tactical demand has been worked out for it.

HARM Anti-Radar Missiles

The penetration ability and executive capability of airborne units depends significantly on the ability to recognize early when they are detected by enemy air defense-radar equipment and to limit the effective areas of enemy air defense systems in a sustained manner. This purpose is to be served by, among other things, the procurement of a High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) in the framework of "Suppression of Enemy Air Defense."

With the tactical demand for an anti-radar guided missile, the Navy is requesting procurement of a large numbers of HARM's. These are primarily to be deployed against ship-supported radar installations.

The HARM was developed in the United States; the purchase and integration of this missile into the TORNADO is intended to take place until 1990. The missile has a passive wideband homing head with no fewer than 14 highly sensitive receivers. With those the homing head covers the entire threat frequency spectrum known today. With a speed of over Mach 4, the missile has a maximum range in excess of 100 km.

According to an undersecretary directive in 1976, similarity in construction must be guaranteed for all German TORNADO's, meaning that the planned HARM integration measures will also be carried out for the Air Force's TORNADO's. From this aspect the participation of the Air Force in the procurement of HARM seemed quite sensible, since a short-range anti-radiation standoff weapon for penetrating combat aircraft had been planned anyway on a long-term basis. In this connection it is of importance, despite the smaller number of HARM's involved than for the Navy, that this step by the Air Force

--on the one hand should enable deployment of the most modern weapons available in Europe, presumably in large unit quantities, (meaning fallback on U.S. stockpiles as for the MAVERICK)

- on the other hand will create the operational and training preconditions for a self-defense that will not be implemented until later, and thereby already
- allow more flexible reactions as defense against the increased threat.

Short-Range Anti-Radar Missiles

In the more distant future, the executive ability of the delivery means will then be further improved by means of a Short Range Anti-Radiation Missile (SRARM). These considerations are based on a NATO study from 1980. As a result, a self-protecting missile is required, by the deployment of which primarily the current threat can be effectively countered.

The most significant individual requirements are concentrated

- to suitable homing heads,
- to a range of up to 10 km,
- to a CEP value between 0.5 and 1 m, as well as
- to a very short reaction time.

The preliminary time schedule provides for implementation in the 1990's, and the first funds are included in the 1985 Federal Armed Forces Plan for this period.

Small Anti-Radar Drone

By reactivating the small anti-radar drone (KDAR), it is also intended to reduce the operational effectiveness of enemy air defense resources and to saturate the enemy's anti-aircraft defense by the massed use of active means. This project had to be halted as a result of the 1981 closed armament meeting.

Since additional measures to raise the future survivability of our own fighter aircraft cannot be avoided, the inspector of the Air Force has arranged for the resumption of the project. On the basis of drones developed in the meantime, the considerations are aimed at a cheap solution (LOCUST) with the participation of additional NATO partners. The unit quantity concept and the appropriated funds are based on a system unit price of about DM 50,000. Whether this is sufficient remains to be shown by the now restarting concept phase of the project.

Seen as a whole, in my opinion it is a step in the right direction, which --beginning with HARM/SRARM--with KDAR will lead to a further increase in performance in the area of "suppression of enemy air defense."

The Air Defense Function

Originally, air defense was to have been the main point of the arms effort in the 1980's. But because of the well-known problems in connection with financing the "refurbishing of the Federal Armed Forces," and in particular through the delays in the TORNADO program for various reasons, this point of

emphasis of the Air Force had to be slimmed down by eliminating the planned ROLAND weapon system and, above all, delayed in time by shifting the PATRIOT system. The results are well known: Air defense is today the Achilles heel of our defense. In view of the growing offensive power of the Warsaw Pact air forces and the NATO concept of having to wait for the enemy's first strike and then contain it, this is an insupportable situation. It is possible to improve the situation, but a longer period of time is needed for it.

Now that the ROLAND weapon system can again be procured for the Air Force and for the Navy as well, the renewal of the air defense is to take place in three steps:

- Phase-out of the NIKE weapon system and introduction of the ROLAND and PATRIOT weapon systems from 1986 to 1992.
- Replacement of the F-4F weapon system in its fighter role by a new fighter aircraft (in this country called JF-90) after 1995.
- Replacement of the IHAWK weapon systems by an anti-aircraft rocket system for the intermediate altitude range (so far called MFS) toward the end of the 1990's.

PATRIOT/ROLAND

The goal is to combine financially, in time and in personnel the introduction of PATRIOT for area protection and ROLAND for protection of vulnerable points.

Through an agreement in principle in December last year, in essence the following was established:

- The United States will make 12 PATRIOT batteries available free of cost and assume portions of the cost for training and operation.
- The FRG will buy 12 PATRIOT batteries and 95 ROLAND weapon systems.
- With 27 ROLAND weapon systems the FRG will undertake to protect three U.S. airports in the FRG for an initial period of 10 years.
- The FRG will operate an additional 12 PATRIOT batteries for an initial 12 years for the United States.

The capitalization of services for the United States enables the Air Force to deploy 68 out of the 95 ROLAND weapon installations for vulnerable point protection at the TORNADO and F-4 operational airports. The financial framework, which originally was created for the procurement of PATRIOT, will be maintained for the overall PATRIOT/ROLAND project.

The FRG will continue to operate the 27 ROLAND systems and 12 PATRIOT batteries of the United States after the end of the 10-year period. The remuneration for that will then have to be renegotiated.

For the logistics area, the inspector of the Air Force has arranged that

--for ROLAND, procedures in conjunction with the Army and the Navy are to be utilized.

--for PATRIOT, the most extensive joint materiel supply possible with the United States should be aimed for. In this respect the emphasis is on the area of data processing software care and alterations, which are a constantly growing problem for modern defense materiel.

In the still ongoing German-U.S. negotiations about a "memorandum of understanding,"¹⁾ the German interest in adequate participation in the supervision of the construction phase must be seen to immediately, in order to prevent the Americans from drifting away from us with the construction of their equipment, unless we want to help complete all the changes with the corresponding financial expenditures.

In sum: With PATRIOT/ROLAND we achieve a considerable improvement in area protection with 36 PATRIOT batteries as compared to the present 24 NIKE batteries, and in the protection of vital installations with the ROLAND systems for the protection of the Air Force airfields.

It may further be remarked on the subject of PATRIOT/ROLAND, that what is involved here, both politically and, above all, financially, economically and organizationally, is the most complicated supranational armament project the Federal Armed Forces have ever undertaken.

AMRAAM/ASRAAM

We intend to procure after 1988 an air-to-air missile for intermediate ranges, namely the U.S.-developed Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM), which is currently being tested. Several alliance partners are participating in this procurement project.

Beginning in the mid-1990's a modern air-to-air missile for short ranges will be acquired by us and a number of alliance partners. In this case it is a German/British development, known as the Advanced Short Range Air to Air Missile (ASRAAM).

The development results for AMRAAM and ASRAAM are to be exchanged without cost. In developing the ASRAAM, the resistance capability against infrared jamming and the capability of "moved-up deployment" are in the foreground.

In the so-called "MoU Package ASRAAM/AMRAAM" the United States, Great Britain, France and the FRG agreed on this form of labor division for the development projects. Both missiles will be the principal armament of the new fighter

¹⁾ MoU was signed on 12 July 1984 at the ministerial level.

aircraft. This is yet another example of the "two-way traffic" concept, which despite all the constantly arising difficulties should already be implemented because of its political importance.

Fighter Aircraft 90

It is the planned intention of the Air Force to introduce in the 1990's a fighter aircraft, which is to assume the air defense duties of the present F-4F weapon system.

This weapon system, which was originally known as the TKF-90, has carried the description JF-90, Fighter Aircraft 90, for some time. This is to make it clear that the weapon system involves mainly and above all an instrument for air-to-air combat. Secondary capabilities for deployment against ground targets are part of the normal technical appearance of present-day fighter aircraft.

The requirement for an efficient fighter aircraft in the 1990's has been quantified by many years of study. In so doing mixes of manned and unmanned weapon systems of the most varied composition were considered in a comparative manner. The Air Force pursues the JF-90 project from the aspect that in the 1990's the F-4F must necessarily be replaced by another system not only for reasons of structural age, but primarily because of its increasingly unsatisfactory relative combat performance, as measured against the enemy. The increasing technical quality of the enemy's air attack aircraft, in particular his ability for rapid low-altitude flying when penetrating our airspace, as well as the equally increasing quality of the enemy fighters, must be taken into account in designing the JF-90.

This means that the new aircraft must have the so-called look-down/shoot-down capability under all weather conditions, and be able to initiate combat already at intermediate distances--a range of about 50 km. The enemy's known capabilities in the field of electronic countermeasures force us to require a high measure of jam-proof and deception-proof qualities for the sensors and fire control installations of the JF-90. For the tasks of intercepting, identifying, pursuing and engaging the JF-90 must possess a wideband sensor combination.

The airframe of the new aircraft must be designed to achieve great maneuverability, low weight and simultaneously a long lifetime, using the appropriate modern building materials. Furthermore, the great maneuverability will only be possible to achieve with newly developed control techniques and a largely unstable design. Fighter 90 will be required as a one-seater with two power plants.

We are planning to equip eight fighter squadrons with about 250 aircraft, including the circulation reserve and training component.

The JF-90 is to be developed and procured as much as possible in cooperation with other European countries. A joint demand has been determined in

principle with France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain. In the course of continuing harmonization of the requirements, a so-called "Outline European Staff Target" (OEST) was signed on 16 December of last year.

By the end of this year we wanted to arrive at a so-called "European Staff Target" (EST) with the abovementioned nations, in order to be able to follow up the date of the planned introduction in a somewhat realistic manner.

Upgrading the F-4F's Combat Effectiveness

We want to introduce the new fighter in 1995. However, in the meantime we can no longer make a serious air defense contribution with the F-4F in its present condition. This is why we must at least equip that aircraft with new radar equipment, which can master the growing demands and which corresponds with the capacity of the new AMRAAM air-to-air guided missile to be acquired in the 1980's. This radar equipment will then be transferred to the JF-90 in modernized form.

However, with respect to its airframe the F-4F can only be deployed until the year 2000 if we undertake measures to extend its lifetime. With the simultaneous implementation of the JF-90, the upgrading of the F-4F's combat effectiveness will not be easy financially.

MFS Intermediate Antiaircraft Rocket System

The third step in the renewal of the air defense equipment of the Air Force is to replace the IHAWK weapon system with an intermediate antiaircraft rocket system (MFS). MFS is to be deployed in close combination with PATRIOT for area protection to engage low-flying manned and unmanned air targets, but will also be suitable for point defense and will later supplement and finally replace ROLAND in that field. In view of the long development period, during which the threat will continue to change, it is necessary to assure that when it is introduced the system is modern and equal to the threat and shows an appropriate development potential.

A European development program is the objective, possibly with all nations using the HAWK, but above all with France.

The especially long period until it is replaced makes it necessary to subject the IHAWK weapon system to yet another combat effectiveness maintenance measure. In the foreground of this adjustment to the changing threat are measures for improving target acquisition, increasing the multiple target engagement capability, assuring air situation information exchange within the alliance and modernization of older modules with the goal of increasing their reliability and availability.

Reconnaissance and Command

Within the framework of the alliance and of NATO, the Air Force is helping to reconnoiter the situation and the intentions of the enemy

- by monitoring the airspace,
- by air reconnaissance and
- by electronic communications intelligence.

NATO's air space surveillance system will be effectively supplemented after the mid-1980's by the already initiated commissioning of AWACS.

Tactical Reconnaissance System

In the field of air reconnaissance, the acquisition of a new Tactical Reconnaissance System (TAS) is pending, in addition to extending the lifetime of the RF-4E in combination with upgrading the combat effectiveness of the sidelook radar (SLAR). Concepts as to how and with what means the task of tactical air reconnaissance, in combination with the electronic communications intelligence, can be conducted most expediently in the future are being developed at the present time.

Significant demands for a TAS are all-weather capability, as well as a comprehensive and extensive reconnaissance capability. The sensors should enable direct interpretation during deployment. The resolution capability must allow for location, identification and weapon delivery against the acquired targets. The information obtained with the reconnaissance sensors must be transmitted in quasi-real time via a data network to the users on the ground and in the air.

The sensors, as well as the data transmission and processing installations, have unequivocal priority over the quality of the carrier. As delivery systems both available manned systems and drones for reconnaissance in enemy airspace, or manned or unmanned systems for standoff intelligence, are being considered. Possibilities and limits for satellite reconnaissance are also being studied. A declaration of intent by the heads government was recently signed with France.

As supplement to the RF-4E fleet, with its upgraded combat effectiveness but shrinking number of units available, the TORNADO weapon system with equipment for both reconnaissance and combat against enemy anti-aircraft defense is also being considered. Work is underway in the study groups on a tactical demand for the equipment of the TORNADO (ECR = Electronic-Combat and Reconnaissance) for this function.

Electronic Communications Intelligence

In the field of air-supported electronic communications intelligence the Air Force is working on concepts for a tactical-electronic intelligence system (TEAM) as a successor prototype for the Breguet ATLANTIC. This system should

be able to operate at high altitudes and be able to cover the reconnaissance area for long periods of time.

Command Information Systems

Reconnaissance creates the precondition for reactions and actions by the command in accordance with the situation. But if the even today sufficient supply of information is to be fully utilized, a reduction in time for the transmission and command procedures, as well as an improvement in the quality of the decisions under pressure of time, are necessary. Efficient data processing facilities as well as rapid, secure and powerful electronic communications must be employed in order to meet this goal.

Based on the rapid combat operations to be anticipated in a war fought with modern weapons, in the future the operational value of information will depend even more strongly than now on the age of the information. In this respect, the planned investments by the Air Force in command and technical information systems, as well as digital and automated communications networks, will lead to an increase in combat efficiency.

A sweeping improvement in the command capability of the NATO air forces is finally to be achieved by means of the acquisition of an "Air Command and Control System" (ACCS). With this system the

- planning,
- issuing of orders,
- monitoring and
- implementation

are to be supported in all areas of air attack, air defense and operational support.

In this context the Air Force endeavors to concentrate the NATO plans to what can be financed, to utilize existing procedures and structures as much as possible and on this basis to implement stepwise the new air warfare command system.

The planned requests of the Air Force are primarily:

- the Air Attack-Air Defense joint command system
- the improvement/networking of the sensor base
- the improvement/networking and automation of the communications systems and
- the joint function or information system of all services, above all in the area of airspace management.

The introduction of a jam-proof and deception-proof electronic NATO identification system (NIS) is being included in all ACCS plans, but with

precisely this fundamental problem there are profound differences of opinion and objective in the circle of allies.

The national plans for the improvement or new introduction of computer-supported command information systems such as EIFEL are being included as components in the ACCS project. EIFEL will definitely become a cornerstone of the ACCS in the Central European area.

The Air Force is thus taking a significant step toward improving its command capability, and at the same time it is meeting its obligations toward the alliance.

Fulfillment of the Tasks

Now, how are the material preconditions for fulfillment of the tasks to be created with the sum of the individual Air Force armament projects?

Initiative and Offensive in the Operational Area

The Air Force gains and obtains the capability for initiative and offensive in the operational area through real-time intelligence with TEAM and TAS, rapid information transmission with modern wireless means of communication and with the automatic command communication system. In partnership with the allies, EIFEL and its subsystems permit rapid turnover of command information in command decisions, which can be transmitted rapidly by means of the abovementioned communications to the operational units. The executive capability of the air forces at the right time, in combination with the appropriate self-defense capability allow for the objectives to be accomplished with acceptable losses. Modern armament reduces the threat of the enemy's air defense by means of HARM, SRARM and KDAR, increases the power at the target by means of MW-1, VEBAL-SYNDROM and modern submunitions and lowers vulnerability through standoff capability by the use of MAVERICK, SRSOM and LRSOM.

Support of the Ground Forces

In order to support our own ground forces, ALPHA JET will have its capability increased, be adapted to modern armament and made capable of defending against helicopters. KDAR and SRARM reduce the enemy's air defense capabilities over the battlefield and permit the F-4F and TORNADO, in their upgraded combat effectiveness versions, to be deployed in the roles of "Battlefield Air Interdiction" and "Interdiction" in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from constantly bringing up fresh forces.

Operations

Operations are prepared by means of TEAM and TAS, translated into commands by means of EIFEL, and brought against stationary and moving targets with the TORNADO as platform for MW-1, SRSOM and LRSOM in the roles of "Interdiction" and OCA (Offensive Counter Air). KDAR, SRARM and HARM increase the executive

capability, SRAAM as a self-defense weapon and the JF-90 with ASRAAM and AMRAAM as escorts protecting the air strike platform. ACCS creates the connection between air strike and air defense operations and, supported by an NIS, reduces the danger to the friendly forces.

Safeguarding the Delivery of Overseas Reinforcements

Protection of the delivery of overseas reinforcements takes place by means of the air warfare operations just described, which help deprive the enemy attack of its momentum and limit the operational capability of the enemy air forces.

Reinforcement of the Air Defense

Reinforcing our own air defense by introducing ROLAND and PATRIOT, the JF-90 and the MFS will protect our own assembly, maintain the operational freedom of our own forces in association with those of the allies and safeguard the insertion of arriving overseas reinforcements into the battle.

Protection for the Air Strike Forces

Together with the allies, and within the framework of the integrated air defense at the bases, the protection of our own air attack forces is assumed by modern systems, such as ROLAND and later MFS, for protecting installations, in our own airspace by the performance-improved F-4F and later the JF-90 in combination with IHAWK, and later MFS in combination with PATRIOT. On the way to and from the target, the attack forces protect themselves by means of their own ECM capabilities, self-defense weapons such as ASRAAM and anti-radar weapons such as HARM and SRARM. KDAR and JF-90 contribute to this protection. ACCS and NIS assure the near real-time execution of the operation, its protection and a minimum of endangering.

Besides constant participation in planning and command, the German Air Force is meeting its obligations within the NATO framework through interoperability, joint command systems and by systematically shaping the Air Force as a component of the allied air forces. By using the two-way street between Europe and the United States for armament projects, the necessary integration becomes a highly valued factor in this connection. The Europeans should not allow themselves to become responsible for a breakdown of this cooperation.

Naturally, the described projects can only be realized if the Air Force receives the necessary funds from Individual Plan 14 and if the latter develops according to expectations. For us it is a matter of creating in the 1980's a solid basis for the 1990's and of reinforcing our own conventional power, as required of us by the present NATO strategy. Hopefully, the points of emphasis have become clear: Air defense, armament, survivability and executive capability of the air strike forces, against the background of real-time intelligence and command within the alliance framework.

In the often quoted trio of Air Force--Armament--Industry, the industry which is cooperating with us, has the task of

--participating in the alliance-wide cooperation for development and production

--innovatively contributing to the improvement of our capabilities as an Air Force, primarily in the areas of reconnaissance, command, air defense and armament, and while doing so

--keeping in mind the given limits in the areas of money and personnel.

It is in the joint interest to protect the security and freedom of our country within the alliance; the limits to what is possible in this respect are given by the financial potential of the state and the manpower available for defense. It is our common task to observe these limits and at the same time achieve the highest performance, from the aspects of quality and quantity, in the armament area.

11949

CSO: 3620/30

OeTV CHIEF ASSERTS UNION'S BARGAINING POSITION

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 21 Sep 84 pp 44-49

[Interview with Monika Wulf-Mathies, president of the labor union, Public Service, Transportation and Communications [OeTV], by Bolke Behrens and Armin Mahler: "The Battalions Are Ready"; date and place not given]

[Text] In Stuttgart on 25 September, wage negotiations will begin for the public services. Monika Wulf-Mathies, president of the labor union Public Service, Transportation and Communication (OeTV), explains the union's position in a conversation with WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE.

[Question] Frau Wulf-Mathies, following the harsh criticism of the last round of wage talks, you are under pressure to succeed. Is this the explanation for the handsome demand for a 5-percent wage increase and 10 free days off?

[Answer] There was a lot of criticism of the result of the last round of wage talks. But at the last union congress there was also great solidarity in the OeTV, which demonstrated broad agreement in the basic questions. To that extent I am not more under the compulsion to succeed than anyone who was elected to represent the interests of the members. The demand is not shaped by my personal interests or by what would look good for me in the opinion of the media, but by the situation of the employees in public services.

[Question] And is this position supposed to be so bad that it justifies a demand of this kind?

[Answer] Public services in the past had to make disproportionate sacrifices in the name of stability. Even the Minister of the Interior has determined that the public services cannot be expected to do more. If we are striving not to lag behind in the advance of income in the industrial economy and in the question of the reduction of working hours, that is not an excessive demand.

[Question] Only the need to catch up?

[Answer] Many of the sacrifices that were imposed on the employees of the public services exceeded what was expected of employees in other areas. It

starts with the reduction in the grades of entry level positions and continues to the elimination of meal subsidies.

[Question] Voluntary benefits were cut to a much greater degree in private enterprise.

[Answer] But additional voluntary benefits exist there in much greater measure. In public services we have no buffer between negotiated and real wages. If something is cut, it affects everyone with full force.

[Question] In the free economy, wage increases this year are averaging 3.3 percent . . .

[Answer] . . . as a rule demands were considerably above that.

[Question] We'll talk about the outcome in a moment. You are also looking for 3.3 percent--possibly with the deduction of a certain percentage for job security, as was customary in the public services in the past?

[Answer] I have no statement about the outcome. We have made a demand and have never negotiated once about it. We can talk about the outcome when we are close to acceptable offers.

[Question] Let's stay with that; Will there be a deduction for job security?

[Answer] I am surprised that in public services this argument is constantly advanced. In growth industries, in industries with full employment and even better profits, the idea has not occurred to anyone to make similar demands. It is considered perfectly normal there that those who work in a business that is going well also receive appropriate increases in their income. Employees in public services are not living from their job security, but from their incomes.

[Question] Many employees in crisis industries would sacrifice something in return for job security.

[Answer] The goal of economic policy is to ensure that jobs and training positions are adequately available. Your question also reveals that the image of public services is characterized by a very low level of willingness to take facts into account. Personnel in public services is being sharply reduced. Statistics show a substantial decrease in expenditures for personnel costs.

[Question] But there have never been mass layoffs.

[Answer] This type of question sounds a little cynical . . .

[Question] . . . it is only a matter of comparison with private industry . . .

[Answer] . . . because for anyone who is working on behalf of the workers' interests, fighting unemployment is the supreme objective. There are substantial numbers of firings in public services, for example, at the spas or kindergartens.

[Question] Again and again you have mentioned the importance of income for your members. The demand for a reduction in work hours has to assume the appearance of a compulsory exercise for the union. Both at once is a little bit much, surely?

[Answer] I don't know where you get this idea from. If I see it correctly, IG Metall won a wage increase and a reduction in working hours at the same time. Why should that be senseless or exaggerated for public services? We are not demanding any more in the reduction in work time than has come about in other areas. You ought to be praising us for this demand instead.

[Question] Isn't the wage demand much more important for the majority of your members?

[Answer] We have two main areas of emphasis: to break out of the zero increase round and to achieve a reduction in working hours. If a government believes it can push through a zero increase round, it is quite clear that the topic of wages and salaries is of considerable value, particularly against the background of the last increase of only 0.5 percent for 1984. If we are demanding a reduction in working hours as the second point of emphasis, it is not as a reminder, as some people believe, but because the employees of the public services also see the necessity of exercising some effect on job market policies by means of a wage policy.

[Question] Don't two such demands arouse expectations, which--because they are hardly likely to be realized--must of necessity lead to your members being disappointed in the end?

[Answer] Both demands are realistic. To that extent I cannot understand your concern for our rank and file.

[Question] But it precisely that part of the rank and file who will be so important in the event of a work struggle, for example, the much cited garbage collectors, who are showing a preference for a reduction of the length of time they work during their lives over another form of reduction of working hours.

[Answer] If that were so, then we would not need any form of democracy within the union. Then we can ask certain daily newspapers what the opinion of the rank and file is. We had a lengthy discussion about our demands and reached a decision with a broad majority. There was never any attention paid among the public to the basis on which our colleagues wish early retirement, namely without any reduction in income and in their pension later. Among the membership, particularly among those who are interested in early retirement, there is unanimous rejection of Blum's model. That is why we have asked the public employers to work for an improvement in the legal framework.

[Question] Your battalions are behind you then?

[Answer] Our battalions are standing by our demand. Otherwise we would not have passed in that form. I should like to tell you that those very male and female fellow workers, in whose name you like to speak, are represented in

our big wage commission. They bear the full responsibility for this decision as well and they have also indicated that they are ready to fight for these demands if necessary.

[Question] Since you mention fighting: Don't you feel that you have to avoid a further confrontation, following the labor conflict in the case of IG Metall [the Metalworkers Union]? The majority of the populace would certainly not be in sympathy.

[Answer] Who is the populace? Most of them are employees, whose situation is just as good or just as bad as that of the employees in the public services. Just ask someone, who is earning DM 2,000 by himself, how he is managing on his income and whether anyone can buy more for the same income, just because he is employed the public services. Our colleagues in the private economy understand very well why wage increases and reductions in work hours are necessary-

[Question] The populace consists primarily of taxpayers. Your wage demands by themselves will place a burden of DM 11.5 billion on the public budgets. Does that not program in tax increases or additional cuts in the social network?

[Answer] In that case we would have had to receive a tax rebate in the last round. I cannot follow this kind of logic. I only know that every economy made at the cost of the workers has a positive effect on the bank accounts of companies and the self-employed. Apart from that, the average citizen is not only a taxpayer. He also demands public services.

[Question] The savings have contributed to a consolidation of the state's finances, the necessity of which is recognized by all parties.

[Answer] Even impartial economic institutes have criticized the excessive reduction policy of the state. The so-called budget consolidation has had unambiguously negative effects in the area of employment policy.

[Question] Would it not be more sensible to finance public investments than wage and salary increases?

[Answer] We need both. Public investments do create jobs, both outside and inside public service. They also require in every instance additional personnel. This would be an effective contribution to employment from the public service that we would welcome. Instead of redistribution to the benefit of those earning large salaries, the government ought to make more money available for necessary public services. For example, we need greater efforts in public local transportation and in social services. That will create jobs, it will improve the infrastructure and will also create the requisite premises for private economies.

[Question] The only question is whether public services won't be inflated as a result--viewed against the background of long-term declining population figures.

[Answer] We are not looking for the fireman on the electric locomotive. But the public service sector is willing and able to accept the assignments of the future, such as environmental protection.

[Question] But where is the money to come from?

[Answer] Where did the money for the farmers come from? Where did the money come from that is being given to the companies as additional tax relief? If employees demand a larger share of the tax yield in order to safeguard the social network, to combat unemployment and to secure their existence, it is represented as inequitable. I can tell you where the money for an active employment policy should come from: From the reduction of unnecessary subsidies, from the elimination of depreciation companies, from the energetic collection of tax arrears and from the introduction of a supplementary assessment on higher incomes.

9581

CSO: 3620/28

EEC MEMBERSHIP ONLY COURSE TO MODERNIZATION

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 13 Oct 84 p 17

/Article by F. Sarsfield Cabral: "For the EEC"/

/Text/ As was to be expected, the succession of failed negotiations and delays in the process of Portugal's membership in the EEC is turning that membership and the Community itself into the butt of jokes and sarcasm, which is also a (very Portuguese) way of dealing with frustrations.

Naturally, those who always viewed with a jaundiced eye the inclusion of Portugal in a bloc of democracies of the Western type (supporters of the Soviet system, socialists, Third-Worlders or others) are rejoicing over that situation. Also happy are the men of the old days, when membership in the EEC was unthinkable because our country was not democratic; strangely, among those anti-Europeans, former followers of corporativism and state paternalism, are some who today call themselves "liberals."

But there are also genuine liberals who do not believe in the European Community precisely because they consider it to be a bureaucratizing, protectionist machine and for that reason incapable of achieving a dynamism comparable to that of the Americans and Japanese. (Is that not precisely the position of the Portuguese Industry Confederation (CIP), which opposed membership in the EEC for tactical reason, as a form of pressure to bring about the famous structural reforms? Actually, it does not appear that this position has had any significant influence on either the reforms or the course of negotiations itself.)

The criticism about rigidity and the lack of dynamism that is leveled at the EEC unfortunately is true. It is simply that, comparing the panorama of the Community with what is happening in Portugal, we will have to conclude that, despite everything, the market functions much more there than it does here. For that reason, our membership in the EEC can (could?) represent a salutary--though not painless--jolt to old habits which corporativism fostered and socialism accentuated to an extreme degree. Thus, one understands why the Sa Carneiro government had indicated membership in the EEC as the priority of priorities.

Does anyone have any illusions that without the push of the EEC a system such as the BRI's /expansion unknown/, for example, (the most irrational and corrupt protectionism) will ever be abolished, or agriculture modernized, or regional development promoted?

It is not a matter of negotiating membership at any price because the obstacle does not lie in serious negotiating differences; it lies in the internal crisis of the Community. It is only a matter of being aware of the fact that--beyond all the political party and electoral games--if we do not join the EEC, we will still have to take the course of opening up abroad and economic liberalization, but with much greater difficulty, unless we choose the apparently convenient solution of refusing to modernize.

8711

CSO: 3542/24

DENUNCIATION OF AGREEMENT WITH SPAIN

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Oct 84 p 2

/Article by Oscar Mascarenhas: "On Bad Terms with Everybody"/

/Text/ Two Spanish ministers simultaneously canceled their scheduled visits to Portugal. It appears certain that the denunciation of the fishing agreement with the neighboring country by Lisbon was at the root of that decision. Actually, the agreement was no longer in effect in practice and the two governments even seemed to get along very well without it. But the formalization of the de facto situation required an equivalent stand by Madrid in order to manifest its dissatisfaction, in turn. A gratuitous act by Portugal. Obviously not. Not only because it was necessary to clarify the situation, but as officials say, because it was necessary to show the European Community Portugal's complete readiness to accept the rules that may be imposed. Unfortunately, not even that gesture seems to have convinced the would-be partners to ease things and speed up the membership process. Portugal--through the voice of its administrations--has never wanted a joint strategy of membership with Spain. Madrid understood the reasons perfectly. But from that to getting this demonstrative jab in the ribs was not in Monclos' plans. Let us hope that the tactics to join the Common Market do not lead Portugal to being on bad terms with everybody without getting any benefits.

8711

CSO: 3542/24

MINISTER TO EXPLAIN UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN BUDGET DEFICIT

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Oct 84 p 2

/Text/ The expectation generated concerning the bill to modify the 1984 budget has intensified with the announcement of a deficit increase of more than 45 million contos. The debate that is opening today will be conducted in an atmosphere of great controversy and contention after the revelation by the secretary of state for the budget, Alipio Dias, to the Assembly of the Republic that the original bill is going to be modified.

Thus, instead of the 28 million which the original version presented, the parliament will have to vote on a deficit increase of about 73 million contos. According to opposition deputies, more serious is the fact that the total budget deficit will rise to 250 million, "one of the highest of all time."

In summary, at the end of 1983 the government presented to the Assembly of the Republic a budget bill that foresaw a difference between expenditures and revenues on the order of 176 million contos. At the beginning of October, it became necessary to correct that prediction, adding another 28 million contos to the deficit, then 2 weeks later determined that the debt had increased by more than 45 million. Why? Alipio Dias explained to the deputies that this unexpected "gap" stemmed from the inability of the Bank of Portugal to transfer profits in that amount and only later having informed the government of that fact. That explanation was received with great skepticism, especially by the opposition parties, which led the secretary of state for the budget to refer to the failure to implement a gold operation transaction. That information was given to the DIARIO DE NOTICIAS by an opposition source, the same one that told us that the decline of revenue was the cause of this whole imbroglio. In his view, the government's "recessive policy" caused an increase in company failures or simply the failure of other companies to pay taxes in order to cope with their financial difficulties. Thus, the executive's revenue predictions presented in the 1984 budget fell short "resoundingly," which caused a widening of the difference between the expenditures made by the state and the revenues that actually entered the treasury.

Disagreement Also in the Majority

But the disagreement is not circumscribed to the majority. Finance Minister Ernani Lopes went to the Assembly of the Republic for an exchange of views with

the parliamentarians of the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) during which he listened to sharp criticism from representatives of both parties. Some persons present at the meeting mentioned to the DIARIO DE NOTICIAS such names as Carlos Laje (PS) and Joao Salgueiro (PSD), who had been conspicuous in criticism of the unexpected deficit increase. However, it is not expected that these positions will spill over from the internal arena and be reflected in the debates today and tomorrow, although the justifications presented by the minister were not made to all the deputies.

For the time being, it is not known how the government is going to plug this new deficit rise. In theory, there are two possibilities: increase taxes or increase the domestic debt, which in the original version of the bill amounted to 200 million contos.

It is possible that at the opening of the debate today, Ernani Lopes may respond to this and other problems that present themselves with the new budget modification bill, which had been expected to be submitted to parliament yesterday.

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